Another bankster Lewinski strappin' on the ol' knee pads for bailout Benny & the ink jets.
Fancy being so indolent and hypnotically obedient as to slurp up any proposals from these self interest/secretive,non- incarserated $billions fine paying(donation) scum.
Im betting the end of the world might bite a few blunt dullards on the bot-bot when some of those trillions$xCDS ( opaque) swallow 9-10 times what's in ya' SMSF.
Bailout works for bank(sters) only.
Typical nodding bed warmers mentality."Someone-tell me what to do next"!
Profits to all.BMD
By MICHALIS PERSIANIS A woman leaves a branch of Bank of Cyprus after using the ATM machine in Nicosia, Cyprus. Associated Press Cypriots were understandably livid at the Eurogroup’s decision some 18 months ago to resolve the two largest banks in the country through a so-called bail-in, which involved taking away depositors’ money in order to rescue the ailing banks. The Cypriots were told that taxpayers should no longer rescue troubled financial institutions. Instead, failing banks should be bailed out from the inside, and that this would now become the norm. The European Union has already moved a long way towards this through its Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive. The new rule foresees that bail-ins will precede any external bail outs, essentially ensuring that uninsured deposits are up for grabs if a bank fails. But as the recent Bank of Cyprus capital increase shows, there’s an inherent problem with the new paradigm. Namely: When depositors are turned into shareholders through a bail-in, they do not become investors, their incentives continue to be those of a depositor. One is trying to recover the value of lost deposits; the other is betting on the long term. The bailed-in depositors now hold roughly 80% of the newly issued shares in Bank of Cyprus and essentially control the board of directors. As a result, the new board is now a mélange of Russian oligarchs (or their lawyers), Cypriot pension and provident funds, and a hodge-podge of other representatives who never expected to be running a bank, much less owning one. With nonperforming loans rising, low provisioning for those bad loans, and on the hock for some €9 billion worth of emergency cash lending from the European Central Bank, Bank of Cyprus desperately needs a new infusion of capital. Without it, the bank stands no chance of passing a coming ECB stress test later this year. But from the start, some of the board members objected, saying that a capital hike—which would dilute their shares—was tantamount to a new haircut. There were various attempts by the board to derail the proposal, including setting an unrealistically high price for the new shares, or demanding that depositors-cum-shareholders have the right to acquire all the new shares. In the meantime, some of Bank of Cyprus’s erstwhile depositors have been trying harder to bail out of the lender, rather than bail out the lender. Some have sold off deposits by exchanging them for assets held by distressed borrowers; others have offered to sell their deposits outright at a discount. Bailing in a bank transforms the biggest depositors into its biggest shareholders. But turning their deposits into shares doesn’t transform depositors into investors. Investors are betting on the long-term appreciation in the bank’s equity price. Depositors just want their money back.
