A Bimonthly Jewish Critique of Politics, Culture & Society > > May/June 2003 || http://www.tikkun.org > > > Israel, the United States, and the United Nations > > Stephen Zunes > > In attempting to justify its invasion of Iraq, the Bush administration > claimed that the credibility of the United Nations Security Council > and its resolutions would be at stake if the enforcement arm of the > world body did not authorize the use of force against Saddam > Hussein's regime. Critics, however, correctly pointed out that Iraq > was not the only Middle Eastern state to defy such resolutions. > Israel, it was noted, by even the most conservative interpretation, is > in violation of no less than thirty-five UN Security Council > resolutions, more than any other nation. These critics observed how > the Bush administration was not only not threatening an invasion of > Israel, but had pledged to block the imposition of sanctions and > other measures to ensure Israeli compliance with these resolutions > and to continue to provide Israel with large-scale military and > economic assistance despite its ongoing violations. > > How valid is such criticism? And is Israel indeed the world's number > one international outlaw? > > Israel owes its very existence to the United Nations, which > partitioned the British Mandate of Palestine into a proposed Jewish > and Arab state in 1947 through General Assembly Resolution 194. > And yet the United Nations has been seen for at least three > decades to be hostile to Israel. > > The two main bodies of the United Nations are the General > Assembly and the Security Council. > > The General Assembly consists of all member states of the United > Nations, which was made up of just 51 nations at the UN's founding > in 1945 and now totals 191 countries. Each member has one vote > and most decisions are made by a simple majority. Though the > General Assembly's recommendations are an important indication > of world opinion and can represent the moral authority of the > community of nations, it does not have the power to enforce its > resolutions on other nations. As a result, most resolutions are > largely symbolic in nature. > > The Security Council is a fifteen-member body. This includes the > five permanent members, which were the major victorious allies of > World War II: the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and > China. Each has the power to veto any Security Council resolution. > There are ten nonpermanent members representing regional blocs > that serve two-year terms and do not have the ability to veto. The > Security Council, unlike the General Assembly, has the power to > enforce its resolutions through sanctions, military force, and other > measures if they deem there is a threat to international peace and > security. As a result, Security Council resolutions are taken far more > seriously. > > As decolonization led to a Third World majority in the General > Assembly by the 1970s, these former colonies=97in alliance with the > Soviet Union and its Communist allies=97passed a series of > resolutions that focused upon the major grievances of the world's > poor majority, particularly the maldistribution of global wealth and > other legacies of colonialism. Also of concern was what was largely > seen as contemporary manifestations of colonialism, particularly the > apartheid system then in effect in South Africa and the ongoing > Israeli occupation of Arab land since the 1967 war. A series of > resolutions critical of Israel were pushed through the General > Assembly, some of which were based on well-documented Israeli > violations of the Fourth Geneva Convention and related international > covenants on human rights, and others which were largely based on > ideological opposition to Israel's very existence. The most notorious > was a resolution passed in October 1975 as an amendment to a > General Assembly resolution establishing the Decade to Combat > Racism and Racial Discrimination, which claimed that Zionism was > a form of racism and racial discrimination. Other initiatives of the > General Assembly included the 1974 decision to grant observer > status to the Palestine Liberation Organization, (similar status was > granted to the Southwest Africa People's Organization [SWAPO], > which was fighting for the independence of Namibia, then occupied > by South Africa). The General Assembly at this time also > established the Committee on the Inalienable Rights of the > Palestinian People to advance the Palestinian cause, and invited > PLO leader Yasir Arafat to address the General Assembly. > > While many of the concerns raised by the General Assembly > regarding Israeli violations of international law and internationally > recognized human rights were valid, the fact that Israel received far > more attention than any other member of the United Nations, and > that the majority of Israel's most vocal critics were among the > world's more serious human rights violators, raised the specter of > anti-Semitism. On the one hand, as an occupying power, Israel was > legitimately subjected to more intense scrutiny by the United Nations > than most human rights violators who are legally protected by their > right of sovereignty from most criticisms of domestic repression. > This does not mean, however, that there were not egregious double > standards. I recall witnessing an impassioned speech on the subject > of Palestine by one UN delegate stressing the fundamental right to > self-determination and the deplorable human rights situation in the > occupied territories. While there was nothing in the speech that was > in itself unreasonable, the delegate happened to represent the > government of Indonesia, which had invaded, annexed, and > colonized the island nation of East Timor in violation of a series of > UN Security Council resolutions, resulting in the deaths of 200,000 > East Timorese civilians. > > In more recent years, anti-Israel rhetoric in the General Assembly > has dramatically decreased. The resolution equating Zionism with > racism was overwhelmingly repealed in 1991. Still, the United > Nations has yet to live down its anti-Israel reputation. > > In contrast to the General Assembly, the Security > Council=97dominated by Western democracies and with a firmer > commitment to international law and the United Nations > Charter=97has generally not displayed an anti-Israel bias. For > example, the UN Charter is explicit in its recognition of the > inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war. As a result, Iraq'= > s > 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait was not allowed to stand, > with the Security Council authorizing the use of force to enforce its > resolutions demanding Iraqi withdrawal. When Morocco invaded > Western Sahara in 1975 and Indonesia invaded East Timor that > same year, the UN demanded the withdrawal of the occupying > armies and underscored the right to self-determination. Similar > demands were made of Turkey when it seized the northern third of > Cyprus the previous year. Though none of these resolutions were > enforced=97in part as a result of the United States' close strategic > relationship with the invaders=97the Security Council did reiterate > basic legal principles against such territorial expansion. > > By contrast, UN Security Council resolution 242=97passed after the > 1967 war when Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula of Egypt, the > Golan Heights of Syria, the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), > and the Gaza Strip=97did not include demands comparable to these > other resolutions for the occupying army to withdraw unconditionally > and grant the right of self-determination. Instead, Israeli withdrawal > was made conditional on neighboring states recognizing Israel's > right to exist within secure and recognized borders, free from acts or > threats of force. This principle=97reiterated in UNSC resolution 338 > passed after the October 1973 war=97became known as "land for > peace." > > Supporters of the Israeli Occupation sometimes claim that the > resolution spoke of "territories" rather than "the territories," implying > that there is no obligation for a full withdrawal. By this interpretation,= > > the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1981 thereby fulfilled > Israel's obligations. However, the resolution's text in French (the > other official language of the United Nations) does use the definite > article. Furthermore, the authors of the original resolution=97the > American and British ambassadors=97explicitly stated that they were > thinking only in terms of very minor and reciprocal adjustments of > the jagged border that was based upon cease-fire lines in the 1949 > armistice agreement. > > The Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization initially > rejected these resolutions, though there were indications that some > of them were moderating this rejectionist stance as far back as the > mid-1970s. By the early 1990s, it appeared that the PLO and > virtually every Arab state was ready to accept the principle of land > for peace. In March 2002, at the Beirut summit of the League of > Arab States, a resolution endorsing a peace plan by Saudi Prince > Abdullah that essentially reiterated 242 and 338 was adopted > unanimously. > > As the Arabs became more open to accepting the formula of land > for peace, the Israelis and the United States became more > intransigent. For example, the United States barred the PLO from > participating in the U.S.-sponsored peace process for nearly twenty > years in part because the PLO refused to accept UN Security > Council resolutions 242 and 338 as the basis of negotiation. Since > the resolutions did not recognize Palestinian national rights, > however, the PLO initially rejected them. A proposed UN Security > Council resolution quietly supported by the PLO and several > prominent Arab governments that reiterated 242 and 338 with the > proviso that a Palestinian state be established on the West Bank > and Gaza Strip was vetoed by the United States in 1976. When the > Palestinians formally accepted the resolutions without the proviso as > the basis for peace talks in 1988 and were finally allowed into the > peace process five years later, the U.S. essentially dropped these > resolutions as the basis of the peace talks. The U.S. has not > formally rejected them, but has called on the Arab parties=97after > they accepted them=97to be "flexible" and to be open to "new ideas." > > The security guarantees called for in the resolutions were generally > interpreted to mean promises of non-aggression by neighboring > states, presumably enforced by some kind of combination of arms > control, demilitarized zones, early warning systems, and > international peacekeeping forces. The United States and Israel > have dramatically expanded this interpretation, however, now > insisting that the resolution essentially requires that the physical > safety of every Israeli citizen must be somehow guaranteed. In > effect, the Israeli and U.S. governments argue that Israel is under > no obligation to withdraw from the occupied territories unless there > is a total halt of attacks by suicide bombers or other terrorists. Since > most of these come from underground terrorist cells that are beyond > the effective control of any government (particularly a > disempowered Palestinian Authority under siege by Israeli > occupation forces) and who explicitly want to sabotage the peace > process through violence, this effectively means that the Israelis > need not be obliged to withdraw. Ironically, it is the Occupation itself > that is largely responsible for the suicide bombing campaign, as the > failure of Israel to abide by Security Council resolutions and the > failure of the United States to insist upon their enforcement has led > many Palestinians to give up on peaceful means of resolving the > conflict. > > Indeed, there are other Security Council resolutions that the Israeli > government is undeniably violating. These include resolutions 446, > 452, and 465, which require Israel to cease its colonization of the > occupied territories through the establishment of Jewish > settlements, which are illegal under the Fourth Geneva Convention, > which prohibits an occupying power from transferring its civilian > population onto lands seized by military force. Despite this, the > Clinton and Bush administrations have declared that the fate of the > settlements must be determined through negotiations between > Israel and the Palestinian Authority. President Bill Clinton's > December 2000 peace plan=97like Israeli Prime Minister Ehud > Barak's plan presented at Camp David in July of that year=97allowed > Israel to annex huge swaths of occupied West Bank land so to > incorporate 80% of the settlers, even though every one of them was > living in these settlements in violation of a series of UN Security > Council resolutions. Given the asymmetry in power between the > Palestinians and their Israeli occupiers, it is not surprising that not > only has Israel refused to withdraw from these illegal settlements > but has nearly doubled them since the signing of the Oslo Accords > in 1993. The attempt to annex these illegal settlements into Israel > through the Clinton and Barak plans effectively divided up the West > Bank into a series of non-contiguous cantons which made the > prospective Palestinian "state" so unviable that Arafat was forced to > reject it. The result has been the horrific violence that has been > ongoing ever since. > > Significantly, Article 7 of UN Security Council resolution 465 forbids > all member states from facilitating Israel's colonization drive. Given > that the United States has largely been funding the construction of > the so-called "bypass" roads and other infrastructure that reinforces > Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories, one could make the > case that the United States is also in violation of this resolution. > > Another series of UN Security Council resolutions deal with another > sticking point in the peace process: the status of Jerusalem. Israel > is currently violating UN Security Council resolutions 262, 267, 476, > and 478 which call upon Israel to rescind its annexation of Arab > East Jerusalem and surrounding areas seized in the early days of > the 1967 war, and to cease other activities which attempt to change > the city's status. Article 5 of Resolution 478 calls upon all member > states of the UN to accept this decision, yet through a series of > executive orders and Congressional resolutions over the past > decade, the United States has effectively recognized Israeli > sovereignty over all of greater East Jerusalem. > > Other resolutions currently being violated by Israel include UNSC > resolution 487, which calls upon Israel to place its nuclear facilities > under the safeguard of the UN's International Atomic Energy > Agency; UNSC resolution 497, which demands that Israel rescind its > decision to impose its domestic laws in the occupied Syrian Golan > region; UNSC resolution 573, which calls on Israel to pay > compensation for human and material losses from its 1985 attack > against Tunisia; and, resolutions 1402, 1403, and 1405 which > require Israel to withdraw from occupied Palestinian cities on the > West Bank. There are also well over a dozen resolutions currently > being violated which insist that Israel abide by the Fourth Geneva > Conventions regarding the occupied territories, including ceasing its > deportations and assassinations of Palestinians, its demolitions of > Palestinian homes, and other forms of collective punishment as well > as controlling violence by settlers against the Palestinian population. > > For twenty-two years, Israel remained in violation of UNSC > resolution 425 and nine subsequent resolutions demanding its > unconditional withdrawal from southern Lebanon. Even as a sizable > majority of Israeli public opinion supported such a unilateral > withdrawal by the late 1990s, U.S. ambassador to Israel Martin > Indyk told the Israeli media that the United States supported Israel's > continued occupation anyway. When the radical Lebanese Islamist > group known as Hizbullah finally drove the Israelis out of Lebanon in > a hasty retreat in May 2000, it demonstrated to many Palestinians > that reliance on UN Security Council resolutions was fruitless. By > contrast, the military victory by Hizbullah led many Palestinians to > believe that the only way to free themselves from Israeli control is, > like the Lebanese, to wage a sustained armed resistance led by an > extremist Islamic movement. Indeed, there are few Palestinians > engaged in the ongoing anti-Israeli violence who do not cite > Lebanon as their model. For a number of reasons=97particularly the > great difference in Israeli perspectives regarding the significance of > the occupied Palestinian territories as compared with southern > Lebanon=97it is a very inappropriate comparison. Still, the United > States' effort to undermine UN Security Council resolutions > regarding Israel and Lebanon is largely to blame for this radicalizing > shift in Palestinian attitudes. > > Having renounced armed struggle and unilaterally recognized Israeli > control of most of Palestine in the 1993 Oslo Accords, the strongest > tool left at the Palestinians' disposal was these outstanding UN > Security Council resolutions dealing with settlements, Jerusalem, > and other matters. The Palestinians assumed that, as guarantor of > the Declaration of Principles, the United States would pressure > Israel to make needed compromises later, based upon UN Security > Council resolutions that the United States, as a Security Council > member, was obliged to uphold. However, both the Clinton > administration and the current Bush administration claim that the > United Nations no longer has any standing in the Israeli-Palestinian > conflict, arguing that the UN resolutions have been superseded by > the Oslo Accords. According to Madeleine Albright, when she > served as Clinton's ambassador to the United Nations, "resolution > language referring to 'final status' issues should be dropped, since > these issues are now under negotiations by the parties themselves. > These include refugees, settlements, territorial sovereignty, and the > status of Jerusalem." > > This attempt to unilaterally negate the authority of the United > Nations, however, has not been shared by the international > community. No UN resolution can be rescinded without a vote of the > body in question. Neither the UN Secretary General nor any other > member of the Security Council agrees with the U.S. assessment, > which discounts the relevance of the resolutions. Furthermore, no > bilateral agreement between two parties can supersede the > authority of the United Nations Security Council. This is especially > true when one of the two parties (in this case, the Palestinians) has > made it clear that such resolutions are still very relevant. > > Non-enforcement of existing UN Security Council resolutions is only > one part of the perceived U.S. bias. Since the early 1970s, the > United States has used its veto power in the Security Council forty > times to block resolutions critical of Israeli policies in the occupied > territories, more than all other countries have used their veto on all > other issues during this period combined. Most recently, this has > included vetoing a 2001 resolution calling for the stationing of > unarmed human rights monitors in the occupied territories and a > resolution this past December criticizing Israel's slaying of three > United Nations workers. In addition, there have been scores of > occasions when threat of a U.S. veto has led to a weakening of a > resolution's language or the withdrawal of the proposed resolution > prior to the vote. For example, in March 2001, the United States > scuttled a series of proposed resolutions by European nations by > threatening to veto any resolution that used the term "siege" in > reference to Israeli occupation forces surrounding Palestinian > towns, or said anything in relation to Israel's illegal settlements, the > Geneva Conventions, international law, or the principle of land-for- > peace. > > It is not surprising, therefore, that the United States insistence that > an invasion of Iraq is necessary to maintain the integrity of the > United Nations and its resolutions comes across as hypocritical in > the extreme. > > Defenders of the Israeli and American position point out that the > resolutions dealing with Israel fall under Chapter VI of the UN > Charter regarding the "Pacific Settlement of Disputes" while most of > those dealing with Iraq fall under Chapter VII, "Action with Respect > to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of > Aggression." While technically true, this ignores the fact that the > choice of which resolutions fall into which category has nothing to > do with the severity of a given nation's violations of international law > or the human impact of the country's transgressions as much as it > does with the violator's relationship with major powers on the > Security Council. For example, resolutions dealing with Indonesia's > invasion and massacres in East Timor were placed under Chapter > VI while a resolution addressing an extradition dispute between the > United States and Libya was placed under Chapter VII. > > This flagrant politicization of the UN Security Council by the United > States on behalf of Israel=97as well as other allies such as Morocco > and Turkey=97has seriously undermined the legitimacy of the United > Nations, the international legal system, and basic principles of > multilateralism. Combined with the U.S. invasion of Iraq, it threatens > the very legitimacy of twentieth century concepts of an international > system based on agreed-upon legal principles and replaces it with a > nineteenth century notion of power politics. Such an anarchic world > that could result cannot be good for the Israel, the United States, or > anyone else. > > ------------------------------------------------------------------------- = > ------- > > Stephen Zunes is chair of the Peace & Justice Studies Program at > the University of San Francisco. He is the author of the recently- > released Tinderbox: U.S. Middle East Policy and the Roots of