The problem with QIN is that it is a company that reports lots of accounting profits (cumulatively, almost $400m over the past 5 years), but that generates zero operating cash flows (and significantly negative free cash flows).
(In that way, it reminds me a lot of Babcock and Brown, the investment bank which also financially engineered significant profits, but whose cash flow statement told a totally different story.)
Let's look at QIN's capital position going forward:
The company had $90m in cash @ 30 December 2016.
Excluding dividends, the company consumes between $60m and $80m of cash per annum (in DH2016, alone, it chewed up $55m).
Which means that, by December this year (i.e., a little more than 6 months time), it will - for all intents and purposes - be down to its last $10m or $20m.
In the context of the business's imminent funding requirements, the thing which you point to to for reassurance - namely the refinancing of debt that is only due in 2023 - is totally immaterial.
It's the short-term position of capital adequacy (or lack thereof) that the company's creditors are sure to be squirming about.
I can't how you can possible envisage a positive outcome out of any of this.
(Please don't shoot the lowly messenger.)
QIN Price at posting:
29.5¢ Sentiment: None Disclosure: Not Held