Something is quite fishy about this VA, page-15

2 Large shareholders colluding and threatening management from acting in shareholders interest in order to benefit themselves.

Lazard suddenly goes from buying up last year to selling hard around end of March and most likely totally liquidating their position. What did they know? Where they part of the plan?

Bank lends to a worthless company solely based on support from guarantors. Guarantors then raise many many millions on numerous occassions whilst the value of the company sits around $500M. They repair the company and then pull guarantees early, threaten directors and company ends up in VA with guarantors in the paper the next day pretending they are saviours. Facility was still available until maturity at end of year however, security providers (also shareholders who want to take it totally over) suddenly pull the pin and make threats against directors to be able to use the facility thus compromising the company.

If a director is found to have not acted in the interests of shareholders he can be sued for negligence.

What if a major holder makes threats against directors and instructs them to not act in the interests of shareholders, can they be sued? Directors probably had no options but to place into VA as they had become compromised by the major shareholder that wants to steal this from existing holders rather than pair a fair value.

Will be interesting to see how this all plays out but I believe ASIC should look into further to ensure the dudded shareholders are reasonably compensated by the greedy destroyers of this company.

From the annual report released end April:
Total current borrowings at the end of the period were $73.8m (Aug 2016: non-current borrowings of $90.2m) which comprised:
 A bank loan of $40m drawn on the $200m Revolving Cash Advance Facility with CBA; (which was paid down by $150M over 18 months from cap raise end 2015). Why could a cap raise not have been facilitated again if things were so bad.
 Capitalised interest and commitment fees of $5.5m;
 Shareholder guarantor fees of $29.0m; (Payable to the ones that pulled the guarantee. Should it be paid if they withdraw early in order to stealthily acquire what is not rightfully theirs?)
 Less: capitalised transaction costs of $0.7m.

The benefits of the whole of business transformation program are expected to predominantly impact TEN’s financial results from the start of the 2018 financial year.
Management have identified the following key sources of improvements to future earnings:
 delivery of the cost and revenue initiatives identified in the transformation process currently underway;
 renegotiation of material programming contracts;
 reduction in Federal Government imposed licence fees.

Company had an underlying loss of $17 million but the $232M has been bandied around like it will be such a loss on an annual basis. Loss was approx $10M in 2016 F/Y when you take out the one-offs. So only $7 mill worse than prior year with significant savings to occur on the following year which would probably put it in profit.

Market share indicators showed it was retaining its revenue and actually growing. Share of revenue with competitors was growing. Opportunistic to write down a significant amount of the licence value in previous half and licence value is currently way out of whack compared to licence value Seven and Nine put on their licence.

An old saying is, if it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, it probably is a duck.