Ann: Annual Report to shareholders, page-42

Let's have a look at the evolution of Range over the last few years according to the company's own announcements: (don't trust me, reread them yourselves)

On 3rd September 2015, Sibo provided $30m under a convertible loan arrangement in return for a 32% equity stake in Range. That $30m was actually provided in hard currency according to the company's own announcement.

Then on 3rd August 2017, Range acknowledged an outstanding payable of $39m to LandOcean. It's in the announcement where management talks about "factoring", in black and white.

And now on 1st October 2018, we learn in Range's annual report that the company has "cash and liquid assets of US$6.7 million including a US$2.8 million refundable deposit". (We'll call that $3.9m shall we?), total outstanding debts of $87m, and an average production rate of 650 bopd.

So let's just consider the (rough and ready*) implications of these announcements...
*I do not pretend that this is an exhaustive analysis, but the real picture is almost certainly worse.

1 - Range has spent AT LEAST $117m since 3rd September 2015 ($30m from Sibo + $87m in debt) - ignoring the additional amounts spent from incoming revenues. The real total is certainly higher.

2 - The company's remaining cash on hand is negligible - at $3.9m.

3 - The market cap of the company is down to $8.5mAUD; yielding a MASSIVE debt to equity ratio for such a minnow and ensuring that there is no real scope for any more convertible loans. (e.g. if someone were to offer a $2m convertible loan at the current share price they'd immediately own c20% of the company, which is unrealistic).

4 - If we assume a generous starting point of 100 bopd in September 2015, then Range has spent an incredible $117m to produce an additional 550 bopd by October 2018, which is ludicrous. At that rate of spending, the remaining $3.9m of cash that the company has could barely produce an additional 18 bopd.

The company is as good as dead. If not dead, then certainly impotent and infertile. Range can't do any meaningful share-for-share M&A deals because its market cap is too small. The same problem limits its ability to raise equity. It doesn't have enough cash (or revenue) to significantly raise production given that every additional bopd seems to cost at least $212k ($117m / 550bopd = c$212k) under its insane service agreement with LandOcean. And its already massive debts ($87m and counting) will surely deter any new potential lender who is capable of basic mathematics.

Since Abraham's entry and the signing of the LandOcean services contract, Range has become nothing more than a vehicle for transferring funds between Chinese corporate entities. The game is now becoming unsustainable and Range will sooner or later vanish like fluff in a furnace.