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article from www.intelligentinvestor.com.au

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    This is an old article I found on centro intresting to see some of the insites they provided. Its from June '07.

    Centro’s American
    shopping spree
    Centro has recently filled its trolley with regional US
    shopping centres and it’s busy unpacking them for
    investors. We wonder who’ll be left holding the empty
    shopping bags.
    When we last reviewed Centro, on 18 Jul 06 (Hold for
    Yield—$6.82), it had announced a $4.3bn takeover of an
    American group, Heritage Property Investment Trust. It
    turned out to be the beginning of an acquisition frenzy that
    has turned the group into Australia’s largest manager of
    American property (no mean feat in today’s climate).
    We didn’t think much of the Heritage assets, but we
    took comfort from the fact that they were destined to
    become feedstock for several new unlisted funds, rather
    than additions to Centro’s own direct property portfolio.
    The deal had another effect, though. To help fund it,
    management decided to demerge $2.5bn worth of its own
    shopping centres into a new listed vehicle called Centro
    Retail Trust, which we’ll discuss in more detail in a moment.
    New Plan
    Without any hint of indigestion following the Heritage
    acquisition, management announced the US$3.7bn
    purchase of New Plan Realty in April. New Plan manages
    467 American neighbourhood and community shopping
    centres across 38 US states, including a direct portfolio
    of 290 centres that Centro has bought on an average yield
    of just 6.75%. That doesn’t leave much wiggle room for
    higher borrowing rates.
    The New Plan deal increased Centro’s funds under management (FUM) dramatically to $23.1bn. But still
    not content, it recently bought out the interest of its
    American joint venture partner, Watt Companies Inc,
    thereby further increasing FUM to $25.5bn. It’s a huge
    change from being a dominant Australian owner of
    niche regional shopping centres with a fledgling property
    and fund management business on the side.
    Institutional appetite
    With the current institutional appetite for all things
    property, Centro has willingly purchased assets quicksticks
    to satisfy the demand. The assets barely make it
    on to Centro’s balance sheet before they are hived off
    into funds and syndicates for institutional investors
    Even though it’s usually a co-investor in its funds,
    management prefers the fees it can generate over longterm
    ownership of the assets. So high prices, particularly
    in the US, haven’t been a deterrent. The focus has instead
    been on finding willing investors for its funds and
    syndicates. It’s a great business as long as the punters’
    dollars keep rolling in. While the rewards for a fund
    manager are potentially higher than for a staid property
    trust, the risks are also higher. Mass redemptions, for
    example, could force Centro to sell parts of its own
    portfolio to raise cash.
    Occupancy almost perfect
    Centro’s strategy has worked a treat in the current
    economic environment. Whatever Centro has paid for
    assets, the next year’s revaluations have sent them higher,
    thereby improving the asset backing and performance
    of its funds.

    Occupancy rates remain almost perfect in Australia
    and hover around 94% in its US centres. While interest
    rates stay low and shoppers keep spending, Centro can
    increase rents and distributions.
    But at some point this self-reinforcing scenario will
    be challenged and then we’ll see how shrewd the recent
    acquisitions have been. For now, though, it’s hard to know
    what the likely impact on Centro might be, because it’s
    continually shuffling assets between itself and its funds.

    Perhaps this is a warning sign in itself.
    Fortunately for securityholders in Centro itself, the
    fees will keep rolling in even if the assets’ underlying
    performance suffers. It’s the investors in the various funds
    that will likely end up carrying the can. But ultimately,
    of course, poor fund performance would reflect badly
    on the manager.
    Frequent capital raisings
    As you might expect with this level of activity, there
    have been frequent capital raisings. In the latest halfyear
    result, net tangible assets (NTA) per unit had fallen
    98 cents to $2.65 (although this included a 75 cent special
    distribution for the Centro Retail Trust demerger) and
    net debt-to-equity was hovering around 90%. Remember
    that this is before the latest round of acquisitions.
    The stock currently trades on a forecast yield of 5.2%
    and expectations for the property and funds management
    business continue to increase. Debt is sky high and
    American property owners must be thanking their lucky
    stars for Australia’s willingness to fatten their wallets.
    Centro has been Australia’s best-performing listed
    property trust over the past decade, but this company
    has rapidly transformed into a much different beast,
    and both the new assets and the new strategy will
    struggle when the cycle turns. With risks mounting and
    expectations high, we’re happy to sit this one out for the
    time being. AVOID.

    Centro Properties Group: key financials
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 CAGR*
    Total assets ($bn) 1.58 2.34 3.52 6.15 5.15 32.8%
    Total FUM ($bn) 2.40 3.00 6.40 9.10 11.50 45.3%
    NTA per unit ($) 2.71 3.09 3.42 3.60 3.63 7.1%
    Net debt-to-equity 42% 17% 49% 83% 39%
    Interest cover 4.2 3.9 3.9 4.8 3.7
    Distribution 26.25 27.40 30.55 33.60 36.80 8.0%

 
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