Ukraine, page-2177

Interview Continued:

DOUG MACGREGOR: Well, I think the one voice of reason in the Biden administration is the CIA director, and that is William Burns. He has always been a voice of reason on the subject of Russia. And he has tried to modulate the Russian hate that is so prevalent. But, again, he’s being crushed by those who see Russia as something that has to be denationalized, much as the left is denationalizing the United States as a place whose borders have to be opened to allow mass migration from the developing world into Russia. All of these things are part and parcel of the reasons people hate Russia. And, of course, Russia declares itself to be an Orthodox Christian country. That’s completely unacceptable, because atheism, nihilism, multiculturalism, all of these things are caught up together, and there is a vile hatred for anybody who thinks the kinds of things that exist in Russia could be remotely positive in any way. William Burns has tried to push back against that; he’s tried to reason with people about it. It hasn’t worked very well, but I think there was a chance for a short time.

Now Putin, from where he sits, looks at what’s going on. He’s aware of the things that we’re discussing, but he also saw a large troop buildup in eastern Ukraine, approximately 60,000 troops that were poised to strike at the Donbas, at Luhansk and Donetsk, and I think he was persuaded that this would happen, and that obviously the Donetsk and Luhansk republics and their population would be destroyed, and he could not sit by and tolerate that. I also think he thought that there was no hope, that every time he tried to make the case, which he did several times, [but] no one would listen to him, somebody said, ‘Well, the reason this didn’t happen under Donald Trump was that Donald Trump is strong and no one would challenge him.’ It had a lot less to do with that than Trump’s private willingness to listen to Mr. Putin’s position. What disappointed Putin—and I think many others—was Donald Trump’s inability to get control of his own administration. He appointed people that were absolutely opposed to him in his thinking. So, from the moment he opened his mouth and said, ‘Why can’t we have a better relationship with Russia?’, he was sabotaged and subverted. Putin realized that.

Then, I think he waited to see how Biden would respond and, of course, you know that Biden was bragging about how he told Putin that he was a vicious killer and a thug, how proud he was of insulting the man to his face and denigrating him and what he’s done inside Russia. I think you put that together with the build-up in the east and I think he felt Russia was genuinely threatened, and he thought it was only a matter of time until something akin to the Pershing II missiles that we once had on the ground in Germany would show up in eastern Ukraine. And we can all sit here and say, ‘Oh well, that wouldn’t have happened’, but he had a lot of reason to believe that it would, for the reasons we’ve already discussed. The NATOization of things, and that’s the kind…remember the Pershing II was a hypersonic missile. You’re talking a few minutes and it lands in Moscow, and he kept telling people this. No one would listen, and there was no willingness to reassure him and his government in any way, shape, or form that this was not the intention.

So, I think he rightly concluded he didn’t have much choice, and I think the biggest mistake that he’s made, if he’s made any with this operation, so I think he’s tried to be too careful. And I think it’s tragic, but when you do what he’s done with his force, you try very hard to avoid unnecessary civilian casualties and avoid damage, you end up in the position he’s in. This thing has lasted three weeks, longer than he would have liked. It creates opportunities for your enemies, for your opponents to meddle in what’s happening. It gives false hope to people on the other side. That’s the problem, and that’s what he’s up against. And I’m sure he’s heard that from his inner circle; I’m sure some of his senior officers have said that. And if you try to convince anybody in the United States, by the way, that Vladimir Putin was remotely concerned about the loss of civilian life in Ukraine, well, they’ll laugh you off the stage. ‘That’s impossible. He’s evil. He’s terrible. He’s bad.’ It’s a lot of nonsense. He was and he still is, I think—he would like to get an agreement because I don’t think he wants anything to do with going into Kiev.

MAX BLUMENTHAL: Yeah.

DOUG MACGREGOR: That’s the last option. I mean, if you look at it right now, Kharkiv and Kiev are about it. The cauldron—it has to be dealt with, and they’re still laying siege to Mariupol. But I’m afraid, given the enemy that they have cornered there—the 3,000 Azov members—they’re probably going to reduce it and be done with it. But that’s clearly not what he wants in Kharkiv. That’s clearly not what he wants in Kiev. But if he can’t get somebody to put their name on the agreement and agree to those basic terms, then I suppose he’s going to act.

AARON MATÉ: Russia has attacked Kharkiv. I mean, there were civilian buildings hit there.

MAX BLUMENTHAL: Yeah, the question is whether they will actually go in, and in the way they treat it, the way they did Grozny [capital city of Chechnya], for example.

DOUG MACGREGOR: Yes, I think you’re right, Max, and that’s the point, Aaron. If you go back to World War II, one of the first things that all sides learned in the war was that you don’t win a city by going room to room and building the building to flush out your enemy. Doesn’t work. You bring up artillery, you lower the guns and direct fire, and you bring down city blocks. That’s what happened in Warsaw; it happened in Stalingrad; it happened all over Europe all during the war. When we went into Manila, we did exactly the same thing. It was ferocious.

Nobody wants to do that. It is the worst possible outcome. And that’s why, for instance, as I was telling you earlier, I looked at some film footage this morning that came from Poland, that was transmitted into Poland from Ukraine, showing Ukrainian citizens that had showed up at an exit point from Mariupol where the Russians said, ‘Come out. We have humanitarian assistance’—in other words, food and medicines and so forth—‘and you will be protected.’ And sure enough, there was the Azov Battalion: ‘You’re not leaving. You’re not going anywhere.’ And the people, of course, were destroyed, but that’s where we are.

MAX BLUMENTHAL: Yeah, we’re seeing a lot of these sort of incidents at checkpoints, of motorists being shot, particularly men. There may have been even some Western journalists, or a journalist, who was shot at one of these checkpoints. Still looking into that, but that narrative obviously isn’t getting out.

I know you have to go soon, Colonel Douglas Macgregor. Just wanted to ask you, based on your last comments, about negotiations. That is obviously part of the Russian strategy; it’s the linchpin of the Russian strategy to advance, to inflict damage on the Ukrainian military while negotiating, in order to affect what’s been taking place at the table. Because there have really been no negotiations for the last year that have had any effect at all. So, now we’re starting to see some movement, I think. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has said publicly that Ukraine does not wish to join NATO. I guess my question is, do you think—you have sources all around the region—do you think Zelenskyy even has the ability to negotiate, given the different forces in Ukrainian politics, the hardline forces, the US? And how do you see the negotiations shaping up when the US is so, at least at this point, when the Biden administration is so hostile and determined to escalate?

DOUG MACGREGOR: Well, let’s be frank because Zelenskyy right now has better press than Mother Teresa, so he’s reluctant to give that up, and he’s become a rock star to the West, pretending to be a lot of things that he’s not. But it’s worked very well for him. He has always been in danger of some of the hardliners, the radicals that control, frankly, the SBU, the equivalent of the secret police inside Ukraine, as well as the military, of being assassinated himself if he went too far. I don’t know if that’s still the case; I’m sure there’s some truth to that, but I really think that the cards are in the hands of Washington and in the hands of President Biden.

And President Biden is in a position that’s not very different—since Aaron Maté is interested in Vietnam—not very different from Lyndon Johnson in this sense. Lyndon Johnson wanted to end the war in Vietnam; in fact, there’s a lot of evidence that he didn’t want to go there at all. But it didn’t make any difference because he was afraid that if he didn’t do those things that he would be outed as soft on communism and a friend of the Reds and so forth. And so, Johnson found it impossible to simply cut his losses and get out, which was the right thing to do in 1968-69. All the generals privately said, ‘This is a waste of time. We’re not going to win it. Let’s go.’ He didn’t do it, and obviously he didn’t run for re-election. I think Biden’s in a similar position right now. He’s got the Uniparty out there depicting him as feckless, weak, incompetent, incapable. If he were to simply say, ‘Alright, Mr. Z, the show’s over. Sign on the dotted line. We’ll back you; we’ll help you rebuild, etc., etc.’ I think he can’t do that. I think he should, but I don’t think he can. And I think every time he’s inclined in that direction, he’s warned by the people around him of the dangers associated with that.

MAX BLUMENTHAL: The political dangers.

DOUG MACGREGOR: Yeah, but there are a couple of things that are also happening. The assumption is, ‘Well, if we can just keep the Russians in the field long enough, their army will collapse.’ Well, there’s no evidence for that. ‘If we can just keep them in the field long enough, the population at home will say, “Bring them back,” and “This is bad.”’ There’s no evidence for that right now.

But there is a lot of evidence that our position economically is going to continue to weaken. You had [chief economic adviser at Allianz and president of Queens’ College, Cambridge] Mohamed El–Erian, just the other day, who said a 100-basis-point increase in the interest rates—in other words, a one percent rise—could send the American economy into a recession, a deep recession, maybe something worse. Well, the longer this goes on the harsher the outcome for us here at home. You know that gasoline prices, like so many things, are lagging indicators. So, the real problems have not even struck yet. So, if you look at the prices of food, energy, metals, these kinds of commodities, then add to that the enormous sovereign national debt that we have to service and the unambiguous requirement to increase interest rates and deal with inflation that is ostensibly dangerous to the economy, the question is: How long before we fall apart. How long before we simply can’t go on? I mean, I’m always reminded of the question that used to come up in graduate school, and then subsequently when I was teaching: When did the British leave India? Well, the British did not leave India when they should have, when it made sense to do so, when it was strategically advisable. They left India when their debt-to-GDP ratio was 240 percent after World War II, in 1947. That’s when they left because they were broke. I suspect that we’ll have something similar to that here in the United States. That will be a game changer.

But all the expectations of imminent failure in Russia, I think, are ridiculous. I don’t see any of that, and I think they’ll stay the course. It’s a vital strategic interest for them; it isn’t for us. It never has been. That’s the problem.

MAX BLUMENTHAL: Well, Colonel Douglas Macgregor, we’re coming up on an hour. You’re invited to stay with us. We have a…

DOUG MACGREGOR: I’m glad you’ve invited me. I’m surprised my phone has not jumped off the table here. But thanks very much for inviting me. I appreciate it. I wish you guys well.

MAX BLUMENTHAL: Thank you so much, and judging from the feedback we’re getting, our audience salutes you and thanks you for your honesty in a time of just complete deceit. So, thank you so much for joining us.

DOUG MACGREGOR: Well, Americans are beginning to figure things out. It’s slow, painful. But they’re beginning to figure things out. And when you start to hear people refer to anyone they disagree with as a traitor, you’re in a lot of trouble. That doesn’t speak of strength; that suggests real weakness in the government and the people that run it. And I wish the president would step forward and put a stop to it, but he won’t.

MAX BLUMENTHAL: Yep. No, it is a complete sign of a lack of confidence in the system that they claim to represent, the democracy they claim to represent. And I’ve been saying…

DOUG MACGREGOR: One last thing, during the Kosovo air campaign I had a British major who was in the intelligence section of the Joint Operations Center where I was the director. He got into something of an argument with people that worked for [former British Prime Minister Tony Blair’s spokesman] Alastair Campbell. These were professional spinmeisters that had been sent across by Tony Blair to help quote-unquote ‘spin the air campaign as a big success.’ And this British major got into an argument with him, and finally the British major said, ‘Look, you can’t say that. That’s not true.’ He said, ‘Well, of course we can. It doesn’t matter whether it’s true or false.’ And he said, ‘Look, if our cause is just, why do we have to lie about it?’ And I think that’s where we are right now in Washington.