(The following aims to fill some gaps in the presentation of my thoughts yesterday, which are only provided here for those who are interested. Otherwise, please simply ignore.)
I agree,
@Hingdog (I tried Reply, but the flaky web site is acting up again).
Another point lost on some is that us longs can, and do borrow, to various degrees during a bull market. That leverage, over and above the spending power if only using one's personal resources (i.e. renting money you don't already own to supercharge the share purchasing power), acts as a purchasing multiplier during a bull market. It's effectively no different to the equal, but opposite, effect that the short multiplier (discussed yesterday) has during a bear market.
They are both different sides to the same coin, each potentially adding their own version of extremes to the bull and bear cycle.
To compare shorting as an act that deliberately sets out to destroy a well-run company is pretty extreme. I'd argue, just as extreme as calling leveraged longs during a bull market a ponzi scheme.
Shorts don't destroy well-run companies because well-run companies will always find a bid prepared to push-back. Poorly-run companies destroy themselves. In general, shorts simply alert the market and hasten poorly-run company demises. (See special comment re- PLS at the end.)
To bitch or advocate for the banning of one (shorting) without also seeking the banning of the other (borrowing to fund longs) smacks of self-interest that is only wanting to enjoy the spoils without accepting the commensurate risks associated with playing the market. A form of market protection to pander to the naive or selfish.
As for the argument around the manipulative tactics employed by bears/shorts. Ideally it would be stamped out or a tighter framework put around it. That said, punters might consider that the bull/longs are not faultless during bull markets either. So, ideally, a tighter behavioural framework for the both.
tl;dr: Measure the effects of the various tools employed by bulls and bears across the entire cycle not just during a bearish snapshot. Those who don't will end up with a rather distorted sense of reality and won't be able to understand why the regulatory reality doesn't fit their idea of how it should. We're all ants. None of us is larger than the collective. If something isn't as we expect it should be, then perhaps there's a gap in our individual understanding that, when filled, will make much more sense.
Special PLS Shorting Comment (per above):
Wrt to the current outsized short interest in PLS', I do think >20% is a bit extreme.
I'm guessing what follows has probably been already discussed elsewhere in these threads, but I'll mention it anyway, just in case it hasn't:
I'm aware of and agree with the possible explanation that suggests that the current outsized short interest has been amplified to the current level (i.e. over and above what one might expect to be a more 'normal' level during a bear market) due to int'l investment interests wanting to express their bearish views on the Li spod price. That is, sans a futures market in Li spod in which they could otherwise express those bearish views they have done the next best thing by finding a large pure play stock (PLS) and shorting it very heavily, instead. A proxy. Not a direct attack on the company to attempt destroy it, but a potentially unfortunate by-product of an immature Li spod market. Hopefully one of the exchanges will launch some spot futures product in due course. Ultimately, I have no doubt the company will shrug it off in time. Just one of the
joys challenges of being a big player in an immature space.
(20min delay)