iraq, page-23

I'm surprised.

With all this mention of America being the "great Satan" reminds me of what happened in Kosovo.

It appears that an increasing number of people are no longer favouring intervention in Iraq, and are classifying the USA as "the Great Satan".

In many respects, these are the same people who several years ago:
1)
were against intervention in Kosovo;
2)
criticised the USA for not wanting to take a committed role in Kosovo;
3)
criticised the USA for eventually becoming involved in Kosovo; and
4)
deplored everything that Milosevic was doing at the time.

Now, as the focus of attention turns tightly on Iraq, the questions remain - just what has Saddam Hussein done that justifies a regime change of the magnitude or order being discussed globally?

A number of observers consider that Iraq should not be penalised, and that Saddam Hussein's regime should be left in power.

But, in considering all the relevant information, several matters remain abundantly clear:
1)
until the late 1980s, the Iraqi regime was importing a staggering array and amount of weapons;
2)
Iraq was clearly on the road to developing both nuclear technology, and a nuclear weapons capability;
3)
Iraq did possess a chemical weapons capability at the time of the Gulf War and which was used to devastating effect on both the Iranians (during the Iran-Iraq War), and on the Kurdish minorities in the North, and but for the threat of massive retaliation by both Israel and by the Allies during GW1, may well have been used at that time;
4)
throughout the 1990s, has sought to secure renewed access to nuclear technology /secrets;
5)
has regularly exported /promoted regime changes elsewhere in the Middle East (not just in Israel);
6)
has previously bombed the Iranian nuclear reactor facility located at Bushehr;
7)
has been extensively supplied with arms and technology by the French and by the Russian over the last 2+ decades; and
8)
continues to maintain a disruptive, interventionist attitude in Middle Eastern affairs.

Conversely, barely a mention on this forum, or in the press, of the French going into Sierra Leone last week.

If, and when it gets down to the final debate, Russia and France will side with the USA and Britain, along with the other Allies.

At issue though are 2 things:
1)
persuading Saddam Hussein to leave power, and go into exile (ie: finalising safe passage); and
2)
finalising the post-regime structure for Iraq, including status, representation and participation from the various ethnic groupings.

As the EIU RiskWire, at the Economist has recently argued, a regime change in Iraq is more, rather than, less, likely, soon. See, below:

20 Dec 2002
Alert – On schedule for war
COUNTRY BRIEFING
FROM THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT

SUMMARY

Iraq’s failure to disclose fully details of prohibited weapons programmes, and the expected condemnation from the US, supports RiskWire’s forecast of a US-led war against Iraq early in 2003. The timing of the diplomatic process at the UN, and the continued military preparations in the Gulf, point to an armed engagement by end-February, although we continue to believe that an attack is likely any time between the start of the year and end-April. The onset of war will have negative implications for security risk in the Middle East, for the global price of oil and possibly for terrorist activity world-wide.

RISK IMPLICATIONS

*
RiskWire has argued for many months that the US commitment to "regime change" in Iraq would lead to armed conflict early in 2003; recent events have confirmed that view, and we continue to forecast an 80% probability of US military action. As required by Article Three of UN Security Council Resolution 1441, the Iraqi government on December 7th submitted a declaration describing its biological, chemical and nuclear weapons development activities, as well as an inventory of missiles capable of delivering them. On December 19th, Hans Blix, the chief UN weapons inspector, declared the document inadequate, adding that it contained "not much" about weapons. The US went further, insisting that Iraq’s omissions had placed it in "material breach" of the UN resolution, advancing the day when Iraq would face "serious consequences"--phrases that are UN code words for war.

*
When Resolution 1441 was approved on November 8th, we suggested that Iraq would be broadly co-operative in the weapons inspection process, and for the most part it has been: inspectors so far have not been denied access to any site, including a presidential palace. But the unprecedented rigour of the inspections regime, as spelled out in Resolution 1441, was always likely to meet resistance from Saddam Hussein at some stage. The failure to comply fully with the weapons declaration is the first example of this. A series of progressively more serious Iraqi violations will, in our view, provide the US with the evidence it needs to return to the UN, probably in late January, and assert a further breach of Resolution 1441, opening the way for military action.

*
Although the US has declared Iraq to be in "material breach" of Resolution 1441--thereby potentially clearing the way for immediate military action--Iraq in fact has yet to commit a substantial violation under terms laid out by the UN. Resolution 1441 requires two conditions to be fulfilled before a serious violation can be declared: failure to issue a complete weapons declaration (Iraq has already failed this test); and a refusal to co-operate fully with the inspections process. Iraq, so far, has been complying with the inspectors, but the numerous triggers in the resolution all but ensure that Saddam Hussein will, at some stage, run afoul of at least one of them.

*
Two initiatives by the UN weapons inspectors, both permitted under the resolution, could become the tripwires that push Iraq into a further material breach of its obligations. The first is US insistence that Mr Blix identify Iraqi scientists who potentially have knowledge of prohibited weapons programmes and then remove them from the country for interviews. The US believes that disclosures by knowledgeable scientists may be the only way inspectors will discover Iraq’s well-hidden weapons programmes. Iraq strenuously opposes the relocation of its scientists, and may resist this; if it does, Iraq will be in further violation of Resolution 1441. The second UN initiative is a programme of much intensified, more intrusive weapons inspections--perhaps with intelligence provided by the US and UK. The inspectors, for example, have the right to declare exclusion zones around selected sites, which can be safeguarded by the presence of fixed wing and rotary aircraft. This would amount to a far more aggressive inspections process than has so far been attempted, and could meet resistance from Iraqi authorities, especially if sensitive sites, such as presidential palaces are targeted. Here again, a violation would build the case for a finding of a further material breach, and, inevitably, lead to US military action.

*
Washington’s preference to work through the UN process could both hasten and delay the onset of war. By complying with UN procedures, the US improves its chances of winning wider support for military action if and when a serious Iraqi violation occurs. The US would prefer to remove Saddam Hussein under the cover of a UN mandate, and the UK has made it clear that it is eager for UN approval before military action takes place. UN approval for an attack would also blunt criticism from France and Russia, which have been openly challenging the US for months. Conversely, because the UN process is not completely within the control of Washington, military action by the US could be significantly delayed, or blocked entirely, if the inspections process and subsequent UN deliberations are prolonged. The most likely scenario, however, is that the US will build a sufficiently convincing case to allow it to strike at Mr Hussein. The next important date is January 27th, when Mr Blix is due to issue a status report on the inspections. If the Blix report is less than positive, the momentum for war will accelerate significantly.

*
US military preparations for war continue apace. Men and material continue to move into the region; in early December, the head of the US Central Command, General Tommy Franks, conducted a major military exercise from the Al-Udeid base in Qatar in what was clearly a dry run for war for Iraq. The Pentagon is in the process of calling up 50,000 troops for early in the new year, and military planners expect most necessary assets to be in place in about five or six weeks--that is by end January, when the UN diplomatic process could come to a head. This points to possible military action sometime in February.

*
Several factors could yet delay or even prevent a war. The first, and least likely, is complete compliance by Saddam Hussein with all UN requirements. A second possibility is a generally positive report from the weapons inspectors on January 27th, which might be difficult for the US to ignore or contest. France and Russia would seize on such a report to press for continuing inspections. The US could refuse and launch a military attack on its own, but it would be isolated and clearly uncomfortable with such a course of action--and might therefore delay action for some time.

*
Uncertainty about the impact of war on global oil supply has already had an effect on the oil market--oil prices have been about US$6 per barrel higher than they would otherwise have been since March 2002. This means we are already experiencing a global economic impact from the tensions between the US and Iraq—higher oil prices act as a tax on production in much of the OECD and so weaken economic growth (although prospects for emerging world oil producers are boosted). However, the scale of the price increase seen so far has probably only been sufficient to cut OECD growth by about 0.2% in 2002. This is not inconsiderable, given that many countries in the OECD are struggling with other economic difficulties. But neither is it a disaster--an oil price premium on this scale is unlikely to cause an OECD recession. Once the conflict actually starts, Iraqi oil production will cease. But we are assuming that OPEC will increase oil production to make up for this. Oil prices will spike to about US$35-40/b, but only for a week or so until it becomes clear to oil market participants that supply continuity has been maintained.

*
The period leading up to and during a war with Iraq could see a substantial increase in terrorist incidents world-wide, but especially against US, Western European and Israeli targets. The number of arrests of suspected terrorists has increased substantially in recent weeks, with detentions occurring in all parts of the world. If war breaks out, Saddam Hussein has suggested that he might pursue a scorched earth policy, inflicting significant harm to people and property and then blaming it on the US and its allies. The prospect of widespread Iraqi casualties, whatever the cause, could enflame sentiment among militant Islamists and trigger a wave of terrorist attacks.

SOURCE:
EIU RiskWire London