Ann: Termination of Purchase and Sale Agreement, page-21

Fair enough, but what I really meant was “in the context that the URF didn’t jump .at the same time to gain from the benefit of the loss of value to the pref holders”.

I agree with your 4 criticisms, but would qualify the first one about NTA. Over the last two years, the sales prices achieved for individual properties were closely in line with book value (before deductingtaxes and other selling costs); so there was no reason to doubt the 31/12 21 balance sheet values. The big problem was attempting the bulk sale: they would have been seen by the market as a keen, perhaps even desperate, seller trying to sell a bulk portfolio which didn’t provide a good fit for any of the supposedly interested buyers. Hence the awful 18.6% discount to 31/12/21 book value in the agreed sale (not the phoney 11% that the RE tried to spin it as).

I hope we get some cogent and prompt external advice that it would be more sensible to seek gradual, smaller sales- say in blocks of US$20- 50m at a time. That might be much more marketable. Also, the latest quarterly update shows US$50m of free cash- which could make a huge impact on the prices of URF and URFPA if aggressively applied to on-market buybacks. Otherwise, it may take a couple of years to rectify the unit price effects of this disaster.

Best possible thing now would be for the RE to resign and internalise the management of the Fund. We have had enough of their incompetence and conflicts of interest.

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