Ever increasing capex and opex in conjunction with falling RE prices are outside management's control, though how/when they are communicated to the market is another question. There are two events that shareholders should be rightly outraged at imo.
The Feb'22 DFS Update released wildly erroneous figures from the research I did, which one can argue convinced the market to buy/hold HAS when the financial metrics of the DFS Update were materially lower than presented (again, as far as considerable spreadsheet evaluation of the Feb'22 DFS and previous DFS studies by way of validation of my analysis).
The Aug'22 $150M loan from Wyloo that was unambiguously presented as a " cornerstone investment in Hastings by Wyloo Metals " and juiced the price up to $5.50 to allow for a $110M Cr at $4.40. Although there is no doubt enough fine print buried to cover required disclosure of the true nature of the $150M con-note, a con-note is 100% a loan, debt, and only convertible into shares at the choice of the lender (ie a loan with equity conversion option value).
Without the $110M CR at $4.40 HAS would be in a lot more trouble than $1.40 today, that's for sure. Had the Feb'22 DFS Update been accurate in it's project valuation release, it's questionable if the Wyloo loan, Neo purchase and subsequent CR would have ever happened. Despite the $110M CR in Aug, HAS at end Mar'23 has $150M cash equiv, $150M debt, ~$750M accrued interest by Aug'25, and Neo shares worth about $75M at today's prices.
The erroneous return metrics from the Feb'22 DFS Update is mostly simply shown in the summary table below. With a revenue: op-cost ration ... it just can't be so.
How are companies allowed to make false claims or release erroneous figures without later making a retraction for a document so important, that investors absolutely rely on to make their investment decisions is beyond me...
GLTAH, you need it now more than ever.
(20min delay)