Some one pointed me to this article about why China 5G/Huawei was banned. I always thought its an overreactions. But it seems BGP, Floptus excuse, how we connect to the internet/rest of world is a highly critical, national security issue. I for one, hope TLS does its jobs in this. As a TLS shareholder, I'm guessing, TLS do not want to "touch" a poisoned network like floptus in cases like this. How can you ensure, their "routes" are accurate? Would this not add extra expenses by allowing something like this to happen?

I'm not saying TLS might not be culpable for future outages/breakage. I'm just saying, as a publicly listed company in Australia, there are recourse, as a nation, as shareholders that are citizens to do stuff about it. While if it Floptus, its a foreign owned entity. I'm thinking of the recent saga of QAN as an example, how eventually, shareholders anger forced change in the company. Floptus took 2 major scandal/outage, year on year for its CEO to resign. Even Alan Joyce wasn't so blatant in his excess. TLS might be TeleSCUM, but its at least our SCUM.

This might be why this thread is going for so long. We are all TLS shareholders.

Disclaimer: Not a network engineer.

https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/06/bgp-mishap-sends-european-mobile-traffic-through-china-telecom-for-2-hours/

THANKS, BGP. —

BGP event sends European mobile traffic through China Telecom for 2 hours

Improper leak to Chinese-government-owned telecom lasts up to two hours.

Dan Goodin - 6/9/2019, 2:05 AM

Enlarge/ A graphical depiction of Thursday's BGP leak.

ThousandEyes

130 with

Traffic destined for some of Europe's biggest mobile providers was misdirected in a roundabout path through the Chinese-government-controlled China Telecom on Thursday, in some cases for more than two hours, an Internet-monitoring service reported. It's the latest event to stoke concerns about the security of the Internet's global routing system, known as the Border Gateway Protocol.

The incident started around 9:43am UTC on Thursday (2:43am California time). That's when AS21217, the autonomous system belonging to Switzerland-based data center colocation company Safe Host, improperly updated its routers to advertise it was the proper path to reach what eventually would become more than 70,000 Internet routes comprising an estimated 368 million IP addresses. China Telecom's AS4134, which struck a network peering arrangement with Safe Host in 2017, almost immediately echoed those routes rather than dropping them, as proper BGP filtering practices dictate. In short order, a large number of big networks that connect to China Telecom began following the route.