Banter and general comments, page-38830

You might be a holder but you are peddling BS worthy of a prize bull.

There are several possible pathways for Core so any statement there is only one is misleading. I know which one I think is most likely but at this point anyone who says there is only one is incorrect and misleading (for what purpose?). Some of the many possibilities include:

• The pathway whereby Grade matters. Grants and BP33 are high grade ore, among the highest in Australia. New management manage to utilise this high grade ore to get lower operating costs for each unit of concentrate. Core emerges with a much lower cost structure
• The pathway whereby despite the natural benefits of high grade ore that is close to port, Core's management don't manage to utilise these strengths and Core drifts and doesn't restart. Zara is a strong proponent of this being the likely pathway
• The pathway where Core transitions to other metals with an increased focus on Gold, Uranium, Silver or some other metal they discover on their significant tenement holdings
• The pathway whereby Core is taken over. A hostile takeover requires 90% shareholder acceptance. A scheme of arrangement endorsed by the board needs the board to endorse the takeover and 75% shareholder acceptance. These takeover thresholds are laid down in legislation. They may be hard to achieve unless the takeover is compelling.

Over the last 4 years the Top 20 as reported in the AR has been 26.3% (2020), 31.89% (2021), 36.01% (2022) and 33.24% (2023). The top 20 grabbing any takeover offer with "both hands" does not get anywhere close to 90% shareholder acceptance. A pre-condition of any scheme of arrangement reducing the shareholder acceptance threshold to 75% is the board recommending the offer. You will note GDE Exploration on the list below at #14. Part of that top 20 is Core's Chairman. That's the bulk of the 9,640,000 shares in which he has a beneficial interest.
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It wasn't PLS that screwed over Altura. It was Altura's Board and management that created an unviable balance sheet structure. There's an absolutely massive balance sheet difference between AJM and Core.

At the last quarterly, Core had $80m cash in the bank and no loan borrowing. The balance sheet of Altura as they got into trouble is below. $2.3m in cash and $209.4m in debt ($17.7m current, $191.7m term debt) through a loan note facility at 15% pa. The loan had an interest cost of $34m in the year to June 2020 and a further $26.4m of amortised transaction costs. Beyond debt, payables were also high with no cash to pay them.

Those Altura borrowings were costing a fortune