https://europeanconservative.com/articles/analysis/who-controls-rare-earth-minerals-can-control-the-world/
Who Controls Rare Earth Minerals Can Control the World
U.S. attempts to challenge China's dominance over rare earth elements explain President Trump’s interest in Ukraine and Greenland
Robert Fig
— May 23, 2025
President Donald Trump’s ‘rare earths deal’ with Ukrainian President Volodmyr Zelensky officially comes into force on Friday May 23rd. While much has been said about what this deal might mean for the prospects of peace between Ukraine and Russia, there has been far less discussion about how the struggle to control rare earth elements (REEs) fits into the wider geopolitical contest involving China and the West.
China’s overwhelming dominance of the market of rare earth elements, which are vital in modern military as well as civilian technology, goes a long way toward explaining U.S. President Trump’s interest in Ukraine and Greenland—both REE-rich areas of the world. The control over REEs represents a critical battle to shape the new world order. The reordering of defense spending prompted by U.S. tariffs and its push for increased military contributions from NATO members have also sparked renewed interest in the UK and EU in reducing their dependence on Chinese resources.
For years, there has been a lacklustre attempt by developed countries to find an alternative to China’s dominance in the production of rare earth elements. Globalisation and supposed free trade, along with falling prices and with the exorbitant cost of refining material, have held back these countries’ attempts to pursue their own alternate supplies.
Rare earth elements are a group of 17 metallic elements, commonly added in small quantities to iron and boron to improve their physical and chemical qualities substantially. These metals are widely used in the development of modern technology and global strategic demand has been increasing fast.
These REEs are divided into ‘heavy,’ ‘medium,’ and ‘light’ rare earths. China has concentrated on restricting exports in ‘heavy’ and ‘medium’ sectors, which are vital for military applications such as F-35 fighter jets, nuclear submarines, destroyers, Tomahawk missiles, advanced radar, military drones, sophisticated smart bombs and hybrid and electric vehicles and mobile phones, which all rely on high-performance magnets which can withstand high temperatures. China dominates the market of ‘heavies’ by producing 99% of these REEs, with a tiny balance coming from Vietnam.
These magnets are also vital for the electric vehicle industry and the production of wind turbines. Given the ‘just in time’ procurement supply chain programmes of most automotive plants, the supply of REEs and magnets can potentially run out relatively quickly, adding significantly to the cost of production of hybrid and electric vehicles.
‘Light’ rare earth elements, such as neodymium and praseodymium, which are used in the production of magnets, have experienced supply disruption tactics such as trade export bans . Although they have not been directly targeted by tariffs, these actions have contributed to increased price opacity. Beijing has also chosen to impose stricter export controls to ban the re-export of these materials to the U.S.
Rare earth mining brings with it significant environmental impacts, including the generation of radioactive waste production and the release of major contaminants. These environmental concerns have been a key factor contributing to the substantial decline in production in the U.S. and within NATO member states. China has demonstrated no such environmental concerns, with continued leaching of these elements into groundwater and the accumulation of environmentally hazardous surface slag.
Today, China mimics OPEC’s control of oil in its commodity dominance over REEs, mining 70% of rare earth concentrates, processing 87%, and refining over 91% of these metals, with almost no production occurring elsewhere. Although prices are primarily determined by supply and demand, they remain highly susceptible to volatility driven by heightened geopolitical risks, rendering the market a largely one-sided bet. Both Trump and his predecessor Joe Biden have made it clear that the U.S. is prepared to take drastic measures to lessen its almost total reliance on China.
This dominance has left key industries, including defence, energy, transport, and advanced medical sectors, almost entirely dependent on one source: China. Of course, China does not want its rare earths returned in the form of missiles or munitions and has leveraged its global dominance over these critical minerals as a geopolitical tool, including through the imposition of export restrictions during the recent tariff war with the Trump administration. China has also sought other strategic objectives, including favourable domestic pricing to Chinese firms and encouraging international users of these minerals to relocate their production to China. Not far off from Trump’s current ambitions of doing the same.
In the meantime, China has rapidly increased its military expenditure, effectively placing itself on a war footing with regard to advanced munitions. Today, it is estimated that China is producing these weapons at a rate five to six times faster than the U.S.
While the U.S. has recognised the strategic threat and is seeking to secure its own sources, it seems to be flailing about with wild rhetoric in this area. Proposals such as the proposed takeover of Greenland, the adoption of Canada as the 51st state, the recent mining deal with Ukraine, and early-stage investments in Africa’s Lobito Corridor Project reflect nascent efforts to speed up supply chains for concentrates and establish new refining possibilities. However, even under current plans, once fully operational, the U.S. will only be able to produce a fraction of the rare earth magnets produced in China. Beijing’s continued monopoly in this field could potentially retard the continued dominance and development of the U.S. technology sector.
Anumber of countries—including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the U.S., and Vietnam—have moved to develop light and heavy rare earth deposits, alongside investments in processing, research and development, and magnet manufacturing. In their attempts to gain access, the U.S., the EU, and Japan have made a number of recent investments in many of these projects, all of which are expected to need several years before yielding any meaningful production volumes. The Trump administration’s recent imposition of tariffs on these allied countries has not been helpful for these countries’ willingness to trade on American terms. They are more likely to form other alliances, alongside maintaining their own strategic reserves of these materials and pursuing their own priorities.
But China has also been seen to weaponise its dominance in this field. It banned exports of REEs to Japan in 2010 over a fishing dispute and has imposed export restrictions on the U.S. since 2023. It has also placed a ban on the export of REE extraction and separation technologies.
In recent years, both the U.S. and China have intensified their diplomatic efforts in response to the growing recognition of global dependence on China’s dominance in the field of REE production. This dominance has increased exponentially in recent years and substantially strengthened China’s geopolitical influence, enhancing its position within the world economic order and its ability to assert itself and retaliate when threatened by trade threats, such as tariffs.
It will also be interesting to see how resource-rich developing countries are able to leverage their REEs to make meaningful economic gains. History says otherwise; without control over the production, marketing, and price risk management of their resources, they face the threat of continued underdevelopment. The belligerence of the main players in this field does not augur well for the ability of these developing nations to move beyond being bit players in a more significant battle.
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