@KhoutamHey King, whilst on the subject of IP licenses etc.. I...

@Khoutam

Hey King, whilst on the subject of IP licenses etc.. I thought I'd post this and may well ask what you think it all means in regards to how WDC is going to play the 4DS scenario..

To me it seems to say they aren't prepared to let anything go easily and for the simple reason the value of then IP is too great to give up...

So unless someone swallows WDC I can't see another buyer getting a piece perhaps? Def not of anything related to Flash anyway..




Remember how WDC blocked the original bid by Bain to take over TMC?

Well this is why? And bear in mind Toshiba is now Kioxia..



What NAND IP does Western Digital/SanDisk own and what IP is Western Digital/SanDisk contributing to the JVs today?

How important is SanDisk’s IP to the success of the JVs?
SanDisk’s IP portfolio has long been recognized for its strength and importance; in fact, the SanDisk IP portfolio was a key motivating factor in forming the JVs.
• SanDisk’s portfolio strength has been ranked in the Top 10 of the semiconductor industry by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) – a distinction held since 2012. Also, an iRunway report has stated that SanDisk has more seminal patents in semiconductor memory than anyone else.
• More than 50% of SanDisk’s patent portfolio is related to flash design and manufacturing.
• Excluding Toshiba, SanDisk has royalty-bearing licensing agreements for the majority of NAND produced worldwide, further reflecting the importance and strength of the SanDisk IP portfolio.
• SanDisk has more than 4,000 U.S. flash-related patents, about twice the number of TMC’s U.S. patents.



What would prevent Toshiba from taking their IP outside of the JV, combining it with Bain and/or other third-party IP, and starting another JV?
Toshiba is contractually prohibited from working with other companies to manufacture BiCS or other NAND flash memory being developed or manufactured in the SanDisk-Toshiba JVs.

What is SanDisk’s contribution to the JVs? Why is SanDisk essential for the success of the JVs?
We have approximately 700 employees in Japan who are critical to joint venture technology development and operations actively collaborating with Toshiba’s memory unit. An additional 1,000 employees worldwide are involved in development activities that directly contribute to the JVs.
• These employees are involved in end-to-end NAND technology development and manufacturing including architecture, fab unit process development and integration, device development, memory design, product and test engineering, reliability engineering, etc.
• Throughout the history of NAND development within the JVs, unique and foundational intellectual property has been developed by SanDisk and implemented in the production of NAND flash chips.
• SanDisk designs approximately half of all the NAND chips that are manufactured in the JVs. SanDisk has been responsible for breakthrough design and system innovations that have resulted in advancements such as Multi level cell (MLC), Three-level cell (TLC) and Quad level cell (QLC) technologies, among others.


Note: Nothing can come out of Fab 6 without WDC via Sandisk say so!!!

Can Toshiba manufacture NAND in Fab 6 without SanDisk’s participation as it announced in August 2017?
No, Toshiba does not have the right to make the unilateral investments in Fab 6 equipment that it announced in August.
• Accordingly, SanDisk has filed an arbitration request seeking to protect its rights to invest jointly.

What does Western Digital have to say about Toshiba’s unilateral announcement in Fab 6? Why have they made the announcement?
Western Digital believes the evidence in arbitration will show that Toshiba is trying to exclude SanDisk from Fab 6 to coerce SanDisk into waiving its consent rights.
• Keep in mind that investments in a new fab occur over multiple building phases and over multiple investment tranches within each of those phases. Toshiba’s investment announced in August pertains to only an initial tranche that translates to less than 10% of total Fab 6 estimated investment.
• Also, Toshiba’s planned initial investment in Fab 6 is for its directly-owned capacity that is outside of the JVs. Toshiba will need to convert a substantial portion of JV capacity from 2D to 3D NAND through Fab 6 in due course, and any investment in JV capacity must be done jointly.

What are Western Digital’s plans should SanDisk not be able to participate in Fab 6 and when would the Company need to make decisions on those plans?
As mentioned above, it is very unlikely that the JVs will not utilize Fab 6. • Western Digital is currently engaged in discussions with Toshiba about JV utilization of Fab 6.

What is Western Digital’s ability to access NAND supply from the JVs beyond CY 2018?
The JVs are expected to provide NAND supply to Western Digital through 2029.
• The primary purpose of Fab 6 is to provide cleanroom space to install the equipment necessary to convert existing JV wafer capacity at Yokkaichi to next-generation technologies.
• Based on the JV agreements, we remain confident in our target bit growth rate of 35-45% for CY 2019, irrespective of the initial investment in Fab 6.

I need to check but it appears WDC may still have a permanent injunction on sale without their being invited to the party? Can anyone confirm? Plus it says fab 6 is specially set aside to ramp up for new next gen technologies ?????

What is Western Digital’s reaction to Toshiba’s claim that they can close their transaction with the Bain-SK Hynix consortium regardless of the arbitration outcome?The JV agreements are clear that Toshiba cannot transfer any of its interests in the JVs – for example, its equity in the JVs, its managerial and control rights, its contractual rights under the JV agreements, and its rights to receive output from Yokkaichi – without SanDisk’s consent.
• Toshiba implies that our arbitration only seeks to prevent the transfer of its equity, in which case they still intend to close even if Toshiba loses. Toshiba ignores that the arbitration seeks to prohibit the transfer of any JV interests without SanDisk’s consent. Because Toshiba transferred other JV interests, such as its managerial and control rights in the JVs, Toshiba cannot close its transaction if SanDisk prevails.
• As a first order of business in the arbitration, SanDisk will seek interim injunctive relief to prevent Toshiba from transferring without SanDisk’s consent any of Toshiba’s JV interests, whether in whole or in part, through a sale of TMC or otherwise, until the arbitration process reaches its final disposition. From there, Western Digital intends to seek a permanent injunction. REF: October 2017

"TOKYO, September 28, 2017 - Bain Capital Private Equity has signed a definitive agreement with Toshiba Corporation (Toshiba) for the purchase of Toshiba Memory Corporation (TMC).
A special purpose acquisition company formed by the Bain Capital-led consortium, K.K. Pangea (Pangea) has entered into a Share Purchase Agreement (SPA) with Toshiba for the purchase of all shares of TMC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Toshiba.

The Consortium includes US investors Apple, Dell Technologies Capital, Kingston Technology and Seagate. These investors have non-voting shares and will not participate in the governance or operations of the company. The consortium also includes SK Hynix.

Bain Capital together with Toshiba, who remains a significant investor, will control the Board and governance of the company. It will support TMC management to ensure the business and key semiconductor technology remain in Japan. Hoya, a global diversified company of innovative high-tech and med-tech products, will also invest in TMC as a common equity holder, subject to the terms and conditions in its commitment letter executed. The consortium will abide by and respect all the contractual terms of the Western Digital (WD) joint venture.

Bain has, in a recent press conference, expressed a desire to settle with Western Digital. Has Bain contacted Western Digital? No. They have not contacted Western Digital. We do not have any current discussions with Bain.

Aren’t SanDisk’s consent rights limited to equity?
No, SanDisk’s consent rights apply to transfers of more than just Toshiba’s equity in the JVs. They apply to “any interest” in the JVs, such as, by way of example, equity, managerial and control rights, and contractual rights under the JV agreements including the right to receive output from the Yokkaichi fabs.
• Toshiba’s suggestion that it can transfer all of its JV interests to the Bain-SK Hynix consortium except for its JV “equity interests” is illogical. The “equity interests” are critical to the management of the JVs, which is why the JV agreements explicitly identify the “equity interests” as one example of the JV interests that cannot be transferred without the other partner’s consent.

What is Western Digital’s position on Toshiba’s assertion that the Bain-SK Hynix consortium is just like the consortium Western Digital agreed to, except that it doesn’t include Western Digital?
Toshiba’s assertion is inaccurate. The two consortiums are very different.
• The Bain-SK Hynix consortium includes three of Western Digital’s competitors, namely SK Hynix, Seagate and Kingston Technologies. It also includes Apple and Dell, which are key customers of Western Digital. The KKR-INCJ-DBJ consortium that Western Digital endorsed included neither competitors nor customers.

Why is SanDisk’s consent required when Toshiba’s transaction with the Bain-SK Hynix consortium represents a change of control?

The change in control exception to SanDisk’s consent rights applies only when there is a change in control of Toshiba Corporation itself. It does not apply to a change in control of TMC, which is merely a subsidiary of Toshiba Corporation.

Why does Toshiba say that the transaction with the Bain-SK Hynix consortium is no different than Western Digital’s acquisition of SanDisk?
Toshiba’s comparison of Western Digital’s acquisition of SanDisk to Toshiba’s sale of TMC to the Bain-SK Hynix consortium is an invalid comparison. Western Digital acquired the entirety of SanDisk in 2016, and SanDisk remains Toshiba’s JV partner to this day. Toshiba never claimed it had any consent right over SanDisk’s acquisition.
• In contrast, the Bain-SK Hynix consortium is not acquiring all of Toshiba, but is instead acquiring only Toshiba’s spun-out memory business.

What about Toshiba’s claim that SanDisk has already consented?
• This claim has no basis in fact or law. Western Digital believes the evidence in arbitration will refute this claim.
• The fact that Toshiba claims TMC transferred the JV equity back to Toshiba, and the efforts Toshiba has taken since then to coerce SanDisk to consent, show that even Toshiba recognizes the invalidity

What are the next steps in the arbitration process? When is arbitration expected to conclude?
• Western Digital remains confident that SanDisk will succeed on the merits of its arbitration requests commenced in the ICC International Court of Arbitration on May 14, 2017, July 5, 2017, and September 20, 2017.
• Each arbitration matter will be decided by an arbitral tribunal of three impartial arbitrators following arbitration proceedings that will be held in San Francisco, California. On Thursday, October 5, 2017, the ICC confirmed the three-member arbitral panel in the arbitrations commenced on May 14 and July 5. Toshiba’s response to SanDisk’s arbitration request filed on September 20 is due October 25.
• SanDisk plans to seek interim injunctive relief, and a decision on SanDisk’s request can be expected as soon as early 2018. Following that, there will be a period where the parties submit memorials to the arbitral tribunal. A final ruling may not occur until 2019 given that complex international arbitrations like these often take more than 24 months.

Now we can see what happened when someone tried to sell off part of an exisiting WDC JV and how that led to arbitration over the transfer of, or access granted to sensitive IP by competitors and clients alike..

Now unfortunately this report sits behind an expensive firewall but you can clearly see the battleground JD spoke of.

2014. 15 & 2016 is where HGST went mad on patents supplied by D Shepherd from Contour Semiconductors.... Just sayin

	Applicant	Inventor	Relationship	Date	Desc
1	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	ECC	US - 08.03.2018	20.20180069573-INCREMENTAL ERROR DETECTION AND CORRECTION FOR MEMORIES
2	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	Reram	US - 21.09.2017	60.201702714073-D PLANES MEMORY DEVICE
3	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	Reram ***	US - 11.05.2017	101.20170133435-METHOD FOR FORMING PCM AND RRAM 3-D MEMORY CELLS
4	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	RERAM 4F2 ***	US - 02.03.2017	120.20170062432-4F2 SCR MEMORY DEVICE
5	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	NVM-MASK Step	US - 01.12.2016	143.20160351627-EMBEDDED NON-VOLATILE MEMORY
6	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard		US - 06.10.2016	153.20160293667-SOLID STATE DEVICES HAVING FINE PITCH STRUCTURES
7	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	Reram ***	US - 28.07.2016	167.20160218147-METHOD FOR FORMING PCM AND RRAM 3-D MEMORY CELLS
8	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	Reram array***	US - 25.02.2016	204.201600562063-D PLANES MEMORY DEVICE
9	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	ECC	US - 21.01.2016	205.20160019112-INCREMENTAL ERROR DETECTION AND CORRECTION FOR MEMORIES
10	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	NVM-MASK Step	US - 21.01.2016	206.20160020253-EMBEDDED NON-VOLATILE MEMORY
11	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard		US - 14.01.2016	209.20160012889-MULTIPLE BIT PER CELL DUAL-ALLOY GST MEMORY ELEMENTS
12	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard		US - 18.06.2015	236.20150171864-BIPOLAR-MOS MEMORY CIRCUIT
13	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	Mem Array***	US - 04.06.2015	238.20150155033-OPERATING A RESISTIVE ARRAY
14	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard		US - 04.06.2015	239.20150155336-SOLID STATE DEVICES HAVING FINE PITCH STRUCTURES
15	HGST Inc	Daniel Shepard	Mem Array	US - 30.10.2014	254.20140321190-VERTICAL SWITCH THREE-DIMENSIONAL MEMORY ARRAY
16	D Shep	Daniel Shepard	Mem Selector	US - 19.04.2012	282.20120096331-MULTIPLE SECTOR PARALLEL ACCESS MEMORY ARRAY WITH ERROR CORRECTION

Now the doc above has obviously been redacted but from another chart of similar era and application we can see what blue, green and red IP relates to





Now we all know that if we talk Sandisk, or HGST then we talk WDC.. However the entities, hilst controlled by WDC are still separate from the parent company. i.e Sandisk patents no more attach to WDC than do those of HGST.. And it is HGST who by the way has the license option, not WDC as such..

HGST were engaged with to both expedite the R&D process and to underwrite the fact that 4DS only had to prove a fully functioning megabit array and not the far more costly (By in excess of $100M+) Gigabit memory array..

What is the benefit of working with HGST?
Our engagement with HGST enables us to demonstrate the necessary data to prove the value of our IP and the viability of our technology for GB silicon storage without incurring the expense of fabricating fully functional GB ReRAM prototypes.

Now how does HGST do that do we think? How does your involvement guarrantee that an outcome achieved on a megabit array is automatically accepted to have been proven on a gigabit array, or possibly greater (Terabit)

Note the slide from way back in 2010... As yet untapped licensing potential mostly 3D stacking etc..






Now I know you have the most accurate and up to date list of 4DS patents King, so do any of them refer to stacking, or 3D, or methods for forming 3D reram memory cells?

My guess is they don't, because HGST Neth BV has them..

HGST appear to have sewn up all the 3d stacking patents and ergo the IP req to take 4DS from Meg to Gig and poss Tyranasaureg capacity






Now 4DS has already proven it meets the criteria for SCM... All that was left was for IMEC to sign off on the official fabrication process that integrates the tech with your standard fab anywhere in the world...




But at this point the only place you could possibly manufacture a a megabit chip, gigabit chip or poss even a terabit chip is wherever WDC/HGST say you can...

For Western Digital (WD), the path to SCM is 3D ReRAM. The key for them is to combine their 3D NAND architecture with ReRAM. In essence, they intend to swap out the QM tunneling charge storage mechanism for the resistance change in ReRAM material. It appears that their 3D NAND may not have the required speed and endurance required for SCM. WD’s SanDisk arm has a lot of metal oxide ReRAM experience which culminated in a 32 Gbit 2-layer 24nm chip presented at the 2013 ISSCC. The challenge will be its integration into a cost effective BiCS-like architecture and of course control over ReRAM properties.

I was again struck by the same epiphany as last year as I escaped the Californian sun to reach the air-conditioned Flash Memory Summit (FMS). The major part of the solid state storage industry depends on NAND Flash. All NAND Flash, whether it be 2-D or 3-D, floating gate or charge trap, depends on a quantum mechanical effect called tunneling or barrier penetration. This effect, discovered in the late 1920’s and applied to silicon devices in the late 1960’s, has been at the heart of NAND Flash program and erase (P/E) since its inception in the late 1980’s. Since the same quantum barrier penetration turns out to form the basis of energy production in the sun, you could say I was escaping the effects of natural tunneling to reach tunneling harnessed by humanity.

To see why this is important, take a look at Fig. 1 which was part of Western Digital’s Siva Sivaram’s FMS keynote presentation entitled “Storage Class Memory: Learning from 3D NAND”.


This shows the gap between relatively fast, volatile, expensive, effectively infinite endurance DRAM on one side of the gap and relatively slow, nonvolatile, inexpensive, limited endurance NAND Flash on the other. What is needed is a relatively fast and inexpensive nonvolatile memory with excellent endurance. Differentiation between the storage manufacturers in how they intend to fill this storage class memory (SCM) gap has become clear.

Toshiba and SanDisk have licensed or otherwise invested in each other’s 3D technologies and today are co-developing both.
Then in Q1 2011, SanDisk “made an incremental strategic technology investment with Toshiba that covers a variety of technologies including a three-dimensional NAND architecture, known as Bit Cost Scalable or BiCS, which Toshiba had been developing independently.”

"Good patents on more advanced concepts exist (eg) Pt-replacement approaches, array architectures, doping, etc."

For Western Digital (WD), the path to SCM is 3D ReRAM. The key for them is to combine their 3D NAND architecture with ReRAM. In essence, they intend to swap out the QM tunneling charge storage mechanism for the resistance change in ReRAM material. It appears that their 3D NAND may not have the required speed and endurance required for SCM. WD’s SanDisk arm has a lot of metal oxide ReRAM experience which culminated in a 32 Gbit 2-layer 24nm chip presented at the 2013 ISSCC. The challenge will be its integration into a cost effective BiCS-like architecture and of course control over ReRAM properties.

The point here is that BiCS technology can be applied to various memories to produce low cost data storage devices. When applied to NAND, the result is 3D BiCS-style NAND. When applied to ReRAM, the result will be 3D BiCS-style ReRAM and so forth.

BiCS is short for Bit-Cost Scalable technology. It is a 3D design strategy and as such allows greater capacity per footprint, which in turn results in lower bit cost. BiCS uses “a multi-stacked memory array with a few constant critical lithography steps regardless of number of stacked layers to keep a continuous reduction of bit cost. In this technology, whole stack of electrode plate is punched through and plugged by another electrode material.”



Bottom Line:.. In the same way Sandisk controls the JV operation with Kioxia through the vast portfolio of flash related patent IP, I believe HGST will also have a controlling hand in the development and ultimately the production of Reram thus keeping it under the WDC umbrella.

Toshiba/Kioxia can't just go making Flash willy nilly, without JV (Sandisk) say so... 4DS Reram will be the same I wager via an HGST arrangement..

I wouldn't let the tech go so I don't see why Siva (WDC) would either. The question is not who will own the IP as much as what the consortium will look like because it seems very much that is key again to all of this?

Maybe the Dige does spin off HGST and then SPAC attacks a Kioxia consortium IPO listing and takes 4DS Reram with it as the value add proposition..

Cause like that the tech is worth billions IMHO, but without HGST I'm not so sure.....

WDC def sees a golden goose though (Or should I say baby swan? hehe) and is working hard to protect it.. I mean would you go to this level of trouble otherwise?? haha


Happy to hear others thoughts? 8tey