I've also been trying to value the remaining mobile business....

I've also been trying to value the remaining mobile business. Slide 10 indicates 30 June ARR of $210m vs reported mobile revenue of $191m -- the difference being the inclusion of Jeenee and OVO (both of whom did not contribute for the full FY20).

On that basis, taking the existing $11.4m (post AASB16) EBITDA, and adding say 35% of the additional $19m in mobile ARR, they'll get to about ~$18m in EBITDA for FY21.

Weighing this against the current EV of ~$145m AYS produces a EV/EBITDA of ~8x which on the cheap side given the competitive tensions that will arise alongside the new wholesale tender.

The part I can't figure out, and which I find your (theInquisitor) analysis most interesting, is how much the AYS subscriber base is worth strategically to TPG/Vodafone and Optus.

Optus is 61% of COGS so Optus stands to lose >$70m of revenue if AYS goes to Vodafone. If your 30% margin is correct then that's at >$21m of EBITDA for Optus going across to Vodafone.

With the $18m EBITDA AYS itself generates this thing is potentially worth almost $40m in EBITDA to an MNO when fully owned.

Given TPG trades at >15x EV/EBITDA this suggests a purchase price anything up to $550m ($1.80+/AYS share) is still EPS accretive. Although I would not be crazy enough to suggest TPG would pay anything close to that.

But it does show there is a big gap between the current EV of $145 and something >$250m.

As for risk of no deal proceeding -- current prices seem quite reasonable given that we're trading at a multiple of ~8x and the mobile market is generally heading back into a cycle of rising prices. Evidence of this is Telstra's already increased their prices, and Optus' hilarious marketing of "look at us, we're your friends, no price rises for the rest of 2020!" which is to be read as "we intend to increase our prices in 2021".

I feel like this is a too good to be true story for AYS right now so would welcome any corrections.