|
Column 1 |
Column 2 |
Column 3 |
Column 4 |
Column 5 |
Column 6 |
Column 7 |
Column 8 |
0 |
|
Capex |
Purchases of intangible assets |
Payment for deferred consideration |
Purchase of businesses, net of cash acquired |
NPAT |
Equity |
ROE |
1 |
2009 |
$1,035,000 |
$0 |
$0 |
$79,000 |
$3,810,000 |
$9,208,000 |
41.38% |
2 |
2010 |
$1,535,000 |
$0 |
$0 |
$734,000 |
$4,327,000 |
$13,013,000 |
33.25% |
3 |
2011 |
$2,918,000 |
$0 |
$0 |
$1,151,000 |
$5,144,000 |
$15,690,000 |
32.79% |
4 |
2012 |
$2,622,000 |
$945,000 |
$0 |
$1,540,000 |
$6,175,000 |
$26,013,000 |
23.74% |
5 |
2013 |
$672,000 |
$532,000 |
$0 |
$557,000 |
$6,367,000 |
$27,952,000 |
22.78% |
6 |
2014 |
$1,605,000 |
$1,003,000 |
$0 |
$8,375,000 |
$4,987,000 |
$29,219,000 |
17.07% |
7 |
2015 |
$571,000 |
$434,000 |
$430,000 |
$0 |
$6,580,000 |
$31,800,000 |
20.69% |
8 |
2016 |
$593,000 |
$401,000 |
$161,000 |
$1,000,000 |
$7,441,000 |
$34,221,000 |
21.74% |
9 |
2017 |
$1,005,000 |
$586,000 |
$0 |
$1,525,000 |
$7,270,000 |
$36,105,000 |
20.14% |
10 |
2018 |
$2,802,000 |
$585,000 |
$280,000 |
$5,983,000 |
$7,633,000 |
$38,114,000 |
20.03% |
11 |
2019 |
$1,968,000 |
$488,000 |
$1,030,000 |
$4,917,000 |
$7,772,000 |
$40,085,000 |
19.39% |
I believe I now have long enough history of ONT to determine whether or not its business model is of top quality or not.
There are a lot of people who believe that a consolidator like ONT is able to take advantage of the difference in the valuation of private companies vs public companies. In other words, when ONT buys a clinic, the P/E it pays is a lot lower than the P/E the stock market assigns to ONT in **promotion blocked**. By keeping the acquisition train going, on theory ONT is able to keep generating above average return for as long as there are acquisitions to be made. Considering that the dental industry is still dominated by independent practices, this train can keep going for a very long time.
The negating force against this easy money to be made is the argument that the dental industry is different from a typical retail consolidator, whereby dental patients value their relationship with their dentists more than with the clinic where the dentists work.
On paper, ONT seems to be able to reconcile these two opposing forces, its profit seems to grow consistently as its acquisition rate increases. However, the track record of the company for the past few years starts to show that it's not as easy as it looks.
The above table shows some of the important numbers related to ONT's investing spending for the past 11 financial years.
For the past 11 years, ONT spent a grand total of $50 million on investing in its business, in the form of: maintenance capex, growth capex, payments for clinics acquired, payments for intangibles and payments for deferred consideration.
What did ONT get from this $50 million investment?
Well, its NPAT did grow from $3.8m in 2009 to $7.7m in 2019, approximately double.
I don't know about most of you, but I don't think that's a very impressive return on investment. Even if we take into account that $11 million out of that $50 million was only spent in FY2018 & 2019, it's still a very ordinary rate of return.
This low rate of return can be confirmed by looking at the steady decline of the ROE from 41% back in 2009 to less than half of it, 19% in 2019.
Looking at this, I'm pretty sure that the existing clinics are lucky to be standing still, chances are they are going backwards financially.
This suggests that the theory about experienced dentists not staying on after the end of their 5 year stay clause (after their business is bought by ONT) might be true. And as they leave ONT, the financial performance of the clinics is negatively affected.
The other thing to point out is this year (2019) is the first time in many years, ONT has gone into a net debt position. The halast timeing it was in net debt position was in FY2011. At that time, the following year it went back to net cash position not because of its internally generated cashflows, but due to ONT issuing shares to repay the debt.
One thing encouraging from this report is the fact that the 2 senior people are still around: Natalie Duve & Patrick Wyatt.
So, to conclude:
I don't think ONT is a very high quality business. It doesn't face any solvency issues, but it definitely doesn't deserve a P/E around 20.
It's also very dependent on one person, its management depth is very shallow and there is too much fluff in its reporting.