As I'm not a native speaker I wasn't aware of the (double?) meaning of "to shop sth". In my former understanding it clearly pointed to MS and BofA being the buyers. Also I was ignorant about the fact that MLI belongs to BofA. This knowledge clears things up. I have to correct my post on two further details: GFL holds 172.7m PLS shares. They lent 105.4m shares (61%, as you already pointed out correctly).
I cannot say this is the perfect answer to the problem with the Puts that you rose: What if MLI's and MS's short position was already so big that they are willing to give up some of the profits on the downside to cover (to some extent) their risks on the upside (with GFL's calls)?
Scenario: Initially, their short position is huge and they face a squeeze. GFL then writes them Calls and buys their Puts (i. to secure the collateral (PLS shares) of their new loan or ii. for other balance sheet/accounting optimization purposes, without a loan) and provides them with collateral and/or shares via a lending agreement.
MS and MLI dump the shares on the market (instant improvement for them because they got cash (to maybe lend to GFL) and the value of their short position (which could be a significant part of the $1.9bn = 600m x $3.16) improves instantly by up to $120m = $0.20 x 600. (that number is just an example) They know that the Puts they wrote for GFL are worthless because they will buy shares on market to reduce their huge short position every time when the valuation date comes close (that's why it would be of great importance for retail to know these dates!). And because their great financial models say so, they generated more cash by selling those Puts than they spent for the Calls because of the respective out-of-moneyness.
Ganfeng on the other hand could believe that they have means to make the market believe that PLS is not worth more than $3.92 (lowest of the three Call option strike prices)...
PLS Price at posting:
$3.05 Sentiment: Buy Disclosure: Held
(20min delay)