A review of the company's recent and proposed remuneration structures reveals a concerning disconnect between executive incentives and the fundamental, long-term development of its tenements.
The strategy appears to prioritize share price appreciation, creating a risk of strategic drift where management is incentivized to chase market trends rather than deliver tangible exploration success.This concern is substantiated by two key components of the remuneration structure:
1. Director Share Issues in Lieu of Fees
As detailed in Resolutions 8, 9, and 10 for the upcoming AGM, directors are set to be issued 3,805,053 shares for services valued at $112,500.
Critically, these shares are issued at an average price of approximately $0.029.
Given the material appreciation of the stock to its current price of $0.071, this issuance now represents an unrealized value of approximately $2,701,587. While intended as payment for fees, this represents a substantial financial windfall tied directly to a rising share price that has occurred before the AGM vote.
2. Performance Rights Based on Share Price, Not Project Milestones
Furthermore, the long-term incentive plan is entirely detached from performance on the company’s land holdings. The vesting of all 2,500,000 Performance Rights is contingent on only two factors: length of service and share price hurdles.Service-based vesting: 30% of rights vest upon completion of 12 and 24 months of service.Market-based vesting: The vast majority, 70% of the rights, vest only when the 20-day VWAP of the company's shares exceeds $0.15. Subsequent tranches are similarly tied to a VWAP of $0.20.
Furthermore,
(a) 15% ofPerformanceRights shall vestupon thecompletion of36 months ofservice;
(b) 15% ofPerformanceRights shall vestupon the4 years from thedate of issue.17Recipient Class Quantum Vesting Condition Expiry Datecompletion of48 months ofservice; and
(c) 70% ofPerformanceRights shall vestupon the 60-dayVWAP of Sharesbeing greaterthan $0.20 perShare.
If you were the director of the company and if you were indeed sitting on great land holdings, and that's what you truly believed you should focus on creating incentives that match those actions.
--- I have before offered objective criticism on this issuing of shares for director fees and now you can see that the stock price has materially appreciated before the AGM. The other side of this is that long term performance incentive are not designed to find gold but on stock price performance. This is problematic because once again this means that we will be chasing the next new shiny toy.. By linking both director payments and long-term incentives to share price performance rather than to exploration milestones—such as drilling success or resource definition—the company incentivizes the pursuit of market-exciting narratives over the difficult work of proving asset value. This structure encourages a "we will see where the wind blows" approach to strategy, where chasing the "next new shiny toy" becomes more financially rewarding for management than delivering on the stated goal of developing its tenements. This is a significant concern for long-term shareholders who are invested in the intrinsic potential of the company's land.
Of course open to criticism or receiving factual errors in my analysis. My opinion only. Not financial advice.
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