I have a second page of trades dating back to early 2021. So your assertion that you were the only "one" buying requires introspection.
I appreciate the point about hindsight being 20/20. However, my concern isn't about a risk that paid off; it's about the structure of these incentives and what it means for our long-term strategy.
The core of the issue is a misalignment between how management is rewarded and the successful execution of the company's stated goals.Firstly, let's address the idea that issuing shares for fees was the only option. With cash reserves significantly exceeding the $112k owed in director fees, the company was not in a position where it was forced to do this. The argument that the company had to issue shares for the $112,000 in director fees is incorrect. The company had ample cash reserves—roughly 15 or more times that amount—and had already indicated a placement wasn't necessary. This wasn't a choice born of necessity; it was an opportunity to acquire stock at a very low price using pre-existing fee obligations.
More importantly, let's talk about genuine shareholder alignment. This is where the performance rights come in. This is the most critical point. True alignment is not just about directors getting a windfall. It's about ensuring their success is tied to the project's success. A well-designed incentive plan would tie rewards directly to project milestones—the very things that create fundamental, lasting value for all shareholders. As noted, I have been a long-term buyer because I believe in the potential value of the assets and the managements credential.Instead, our plan rewards share price movement. It incentivizes a focus on market perception rather than on the ground results. After several strategic pivots by the company, a structure that rewards tangible success (like finding gold) would provide much more confidence than one that simply rewards a higher stock price, regardless of the reason.
True alignment means the board's rewards are a direct consequence of delivering on the project's potential, benefiting everyone together. The glaring issue here is that the performance shares are not tied to performance. They are not linked to drill results, resource discovery, or anything to do with finding gold in the tenements. They are linked to service time and an arbitrary share price.That structure incentivizes chasing market hype to pump the share price, not the hard work of actual discovery. When the company's pathway has changed multiple times, this is a major red flag. Real "skin in the game" aligns actions with the goals of all shareholders, not just materially favouring individuals through structures disconnected from the core business.
