I thought about what you brought forward, whytee. Yet, I...

I thought about what you brought forward, whytee. Yet, I disagree with your overall conclusions regarding the latest developments in OPT’s P3 costs and management‘s responsibility for it.

While you are totally right in that OPT-302 has to be manufactured in a facility meeting FDA standards, in that every single injection is carried out at an expensive specialist ophtalmologist site, in that OPT has to pay for all Lucentis and Eylea used in the trials ecetera, ecetera, all those points did held true back in August 2022 already when OPT explicitely communicated being financed through topline readout with an implicit annual cash burn of around $US120 MN.

None of the points you listed appeared new on the scene which is why I would not accept them as an excuse onto why the annual cash burn now increases to around $US180 MN.

Back in August 2022, either management was unable to better model the P3 costs which would be a pitty. Or - much worse - unwilling to admit being underfinanced straight from the start to get anywhere close to topline readout.

I continue hoping for the best but cannot help but feeling increasingly desillusioned by management‘s ability to execute on targets set by themself regarding trial costs and enrollment timelines.