@anotherserf on my rough spreadsheet, which reports within...

@anotherserf on my rough spreadsheet, which reports within significant figures for 2017 and 2019 DFS financials, 2022 DFS Update revenue reports ~30% below the revenue required to generate HAS reported annual average $295M EBITDA (or put differently HAS gets approx 45% higher revenue than I get at US$112/kg NdPr with 72% payability, or the US$31.1/kg Net Payable reported in the July 2021 MRE JORC table). I have explained the spreadsheet reasonably well, although the formulas are verifiable to readers.

I wouldn't be so reckless as to accuse HAS of fudging, but the discrepancy remains an open question. What I did notice is that if I used the US$45/kg Gross (before VAT and off-take fees/margin) that US$112/kg NdPr calculates, then the spreadsheet falls into rough agreement with the 2022 DFS HAS financials. If that was the mistake, well forgiveness and all that, even though it beggars' belief management wouldn;t question how a $9/kg rise in LOM NdPr prices with falling grades and rising costs would bring about a ~250% rise in LOM Free Cashflow... I tried hard to find an explanation for how an error of this magnitude could have happened, if indeed there was an error did and not a mistake/misunderstanding on my behalf?

I'm sure time will tell, as the 2022 DFS outcome is measured against the 2023 DFS Update when it is made. Without a lot of time and energy nobody could form an opinion about the HAS feasibility studies. 2017 was the last one actually well laid out with ALL the required information. Wouldn;t get away with shoddy summaries in Nth America, which require virtually the entire study to be released in it's 500 page glory. The reason I'm going to so much effort is because it brings me up to speed on hard rock RE project economic analysis with some accuracy and confidence. With 4 or 5 companies all singing the Gascoyne's praises as the next big RE centre, it's worth my time to look under the hood.

Speaking of rising costs, I was looking into the financials of stripping out the hydromet plant and selling just the RE-con as an alternative development path this morning. I know they moved the hydromet to Onslow for the 2022 DFS, but hydromet processing costs drop from 2019 looks very generous, especially viewed against it jumping over 150% higher again in 2023. This close to actually pulling the trigger on funding, I wonder if the lenders (NAIF & private) independent expert review might have had something to do with it?