My assumption of the scenario is, BCC has modelled a price it is willing/able to pay to acquire, and this is based on a capacity funded through debt (seems more like all or almost all, than a "split"). They went as far as to literally underline that word in recent announcements.
JV agreement exit clauses are usually well defined processes, particularly to resolve deadlocks in 50:50 JVs. While we do not know the specifics we can make some educated guesses about it. It makes sense there are defined mechanisms given BCC were the initiators of this divorce process and it is in arbitration and not before open-ended courts.
There is most likely a put/call mechanism (right to put/sell to RP, or call/buy RP). We know at least that BCC is the triggering party, who also claim RP have breached various conditions (which is probably the trigger clause).
I think the BCC Board is probably motivated to be the acquirer but RP is putting up enough resistance to suggest they also want to hang on to it. It could be the scenario that Beam has its price, and RP has a right to beat it to win out as the non-triggering party. There is likely some definitions in the agreement to value things too. Either way, I think under most of the common JV exit clause scenarios, there should be value generation for BCC out of each of the scenarios, particularly at these depressing prices.
The best scenario would of course be a surprisingly high payout, which is immediately returned to shareholders, then slash ongoing CAPEX and show some prudent capital allocation.
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