I havent yet come across a situation where there is such a price gap as between ARR in the USA and Australia.
For other stocks I have owned the price has approximated the closing price of the previous night.
It will be interesting to see if the USA price moves down tonight to meet 0.165.
As Little Cogs tables show there is a relentless use of algos taking the price down with tiny numbers of shares especially near the close.
There are multiple behaviours affecting any individual stock on any one day. Selling can be for many reasons- taxation, shorting, needing funds for other commitments, suppression to accumulate or more suspicious reasons
See the article below. Just as trolls are used to spread uncertainty to suppress share prices of REEs why wouldn't sophisticated algos hidden behind nominee companies be used.
You can google Mandiant Cyber Security.
Mandiant’s security researchers have been tracking influencecampaigns that a Chinese threat actor named Dragonbridge has been conductingagainst rare earth mining companies in Australia, Canada, and the UnitedStates.
Active since at least 2019, Dragonbridge has been using a networkof thousands of inauthentic accounts on social platforms, websites, and forumsto promote narratives in support of China’s political interests.
More recently, the threat actor has started a social media campaign focused on rare earthmining companies, including Lynas Rare Earths Ltd (Australia), Appia Rare Earths & Uranium Corp (Canada), and USA Rare Earth.
As Mandiant notes, the targeted industry is of strategicsignificance to China, with the three victim companies challenging thecountry’s supply chain dominance in the industry. Rare earth metals represent acritical component of consumer and military products, including aircraftengines and missile guidance systems.
The targeting of these companies falls in line with recent eventsthat clearly impacted China: Lynas, the largest rare earths mining andprocessing company outside China, has signed a contract with the US Departmentof Defense for the construction of a Texas processing facility, USA Rare Earthis planning a processing facility in Oklahoma, and Appia has discovered a newrare earths bearing zone.
As part of the influence campaign, fake accounts, including somepretending to be of Texas residents, were used to call for protests andcritique President Biden’s invocation of the Defense Production Act on March31, 2022, to accelerate the production of critical minerals in the US.
“While the activity we detail here does not appear to have beenparticularly effective and received only limited engagement by seemingly realindividuals, the campaign’s microtargeting of specific audiences suggest thepossibility of using similar means to manipulate public discourse surroundingother U.S. political issues to the PRC’s advantage,” Mandiant noted.
ADVERTISEMENT. SCROLL TOCONTINUE READING.
The campaign claimed that the building of a rare earths processingfacility in Texas would have a negative impact on the environment, exposing thelocal population to radioactive contamination and health problems.
The suspected inauthentic accounts posted messages on Twitter andon the public Facebook group “STOP LYNAS! NO to Lynas Exporting and CreatingAnother Toxic Legacy,” but received little engagement.
The posts were mainly in English, with some of the content inChinese and Malay. The threat actor posted photos of Malaysian demonstrationsagainst Lynas due to controversy regarding the disposal of radioactive waste atits facility in Kuantan. The influence campaigns targeting Appia and USA RareEarth started in June.
“Accounts leveraged commentary by real individuals, such as U.S.politicians and commentators, to support their arguments against Lynas, itsplanned processing facility in Texas, and the Biden administration’s decisionto expedite production of critical minerals,” Mandiant noted.
The security researchers discovered that the threat actor had creatednew accounts to promote the same narratives promoted by previously identifiedDragonbridge accounts, all of which have shown similar indicators ofinauthenticity and coordination, such as the use of photos from online sources,the use of seemingly random numeric strings in account names, and the creationof accounts in clusters.
“In addition to the accounts’ posting of identical or similar rareearths-related content, we also observed some of the accounts post identical orsimilar apolitical content, such as inspirational quotes, wellness, travel, andsports content,” Mandiant said.
(20min delay)