This is a top down view of the coalition and a possible consequence to a breakdown in Hadi's Legitimacy for the coalitions senior partners. Some good thoughts on the Yemeni Unity ticket vs secession of the South but I sense it is bias against the UAE (or 'for' Yemen's unity).
I get the feeling reading this that people of the South should have no say on how they live. I see words like "bullying" with the South's STC and really start to understand why there were two Yemens to start with:
"However, the thrilling element of the UAE game is that, far from the stated goal of the coalition, it has financed and nurtured a bullying and dangerous separatist group for Yemen and the region on all sides. The issue in southern Yemen is more than a second coup against a weak legitimacy that everybody knows is untouchable."
This last sentence is linked to the KSA as it explains elsewhere.
This is a The Sana'a Center publicationThe issue in southern Yemen: beyonda second coup against Hadi
Mohammed Al Alai *
The Saudi-UAE alliance in Yemen faces the toughest exams. OnAugust 29, UAE warplanes launched a series of raids to halt the advance of themilitary units of the internationally recognized Yemeni president, AbdrabuMansour Hadi, who is currently based in Riyadh, when they were about torecapture their positions in the temporary capital of Aden.
Facts
Between 7 and 10 August, the camps loyal to Hadi weredismantled and expelled from Aden in a painful defeat by the forces of theseparatist Transitional Council, backed by the United Arab Emirates, the secondmember of the military coalition formed by Saudi Arabia in March 2015, Monthsafter the Houthis seized the capital Sanaa.
On August 20, ten days after their military victory in Aden,southern separatists moved their forces to take control of Abyan province,Hadi's hometown. The battle of Abyan cost them only some clashes, and thenproceeded to the province of Shabwa in order to march on Hadramaut, and thusput their hands on the oil fields in the two governorates.
It was clear that Saudi Arabia was quick to remedy thesituation in Shabwa by sending military reinforcements to Hadi's forces. In theaftermath of fierce fighting, it ended with the defeat of the TransitionalCouncil forces not only from A'taq, but from all areas of Shabwa. By 26 and 28August, forces loyal to Hadi had regained the initiative and, from Shabwa, hadlaunched a counterattack towards Abyan to the entrances to Aden, and hadalready penetrated a number of neighborhoods in the city. There was laterinformation about Saudi warnings issued to Hadi's forces against entering thecity.
It seemed to the followers that Saudi Arabia was respondingto the blow by its ally, the UAE. But the next day, August 29, what happenedwas not counted: UAE airstrikes targeting pro-Hadi forces gatherings at theentrances to Aden, claiming dozens of lives!
Thus, events took the opposite course in which the southerntransition regained control of what it had lost in and around Aden. In thefollowing days, the separatists embarked on a second offensive to achievepartial victories in Abyan. Later, fighting erupted in the city of Azan, aprovince of Shabwa, where the southern transition forces claimed control of thecity, and soon lost it to Hadi forces. The situation has temporarily stabilizedat this point, on all fronts, under Saudi-Emirati understandings whose contenthas not been disclosed, regardless of public statements confirming thestrategic relationship between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, the support of thelegitimate government, etc.
Confused Saudi position
The events, in part, seemed to be a live scene of aSaudi-Emirati fight through local agents. The most confusing thing was theconfusion of the Saudi position. The most pressing question was: Did the UAEstrike on the positions of Saudi-backed Hadi forces with Saudi approval?
The other question raised by these developments was theextent of the conflict there, and what is the subject of it (the MuslimBrotherhood, separatism, legitimacy, terrorism, or influence and aspirations ofall kinds). What is the meaning of such a conflict, from the perspective of theSaudi war in Yemen?
For Saudi Arabia, it is not certain that secession in itselfis a concern in the activities of the southern transition, but that the timingchosen by the separatists to escalate, is what irritates Riyadh in the firstplace.
A coup against Hadi's legitimacy in southern Yemen is notthe problem in itself for the Saudis, but a coup d'état at this time meansstripping Saudi military intervention in Yemen of the legal basis provided bythe subject of “legitimacy”.
Saudi Arabia, under its current leadership, is unlikely tohave any degree of sympathy for Islah (the Muslim Brotherhood), as the SouthernTransitional Discourse, which takes the fight against “terrorism” and theBrotherhood as a media pretext for most of its actions against the Hadigovernment, suggests that this claim provides a subtle tone Her adult sings inthe world.
In Yemen, talk of “beating the Muslim Brotherhood” does not,in political and practical terms, have the meaning and motivation that suchtalk can have in Egypt or even in Saudi Arabia itself. Not only is the IslamicReform Party a key part of Hadi's government, which Riyadh embraces and wagingwar in its name, not only because its members and leaderships are integratedinto the government's civilian and military formations in Marib, Taiz and areasin Shabwa and Hadramaut, but also because the talk of “beating the MuslimBrotherhood” Yemen will not be tempting, reasonable and possible, unless ittakes place in historical circumstances different from the current ones, suchas in the presence of a regular Yemeni force with a degree of legitimacy andeffective deployment nationwide [as with the Egyptian army], which makes it (ifIt is necessary) capable of facing both the Brotherhood Al-Qaeda and the Houthiin one time, and to ensure that the interests of Yemen and Saudi Arabia'sinterest together, assuming the compatibility between the two interests. Aforce with these specifications does not exist, and is not expected to exist inthe foreseeable future.
It is not certain that the separation itself is what worriesSaudi Arabia in the activities of the southern transition, but what isirritating Riyadh in the first place is the timing chosen by the separatists toescalate. A coup at this time means stripping Saudi military intervention inYemen of the legal basis provided by the issue of “legitimacy”.
On the other hand, there is no evidence that the activitiesof the UAE's anti-Hadi legitimacy and anti-Yemeni unity were carried out allthe time with Saudi blessing. However, Riyadh cannot keep pace with the Hadigovernment and Islah in showing discontent with the UAE at this time. It isundoubtedly a bitter choice, and the consequences are unknown, given that SaudiArabia is burdened with a number of hot spots, and its focus is dispersedbetween simultaneous regional conflict fronts.
Besides, in the Gulf-Gulf relations, there is something likecustom to keep the differences secret, while maintaining the manifestations offriendship and reverence. Everything in Gulf politics is taken personallywithin the narrow circle of the ruling classes. When disagreements are madepublic, it is difficult to address them diplomatically (the shortcomings ofGulf diplomacy are reflected in the crisis with Qatar). In the relationshipwith the world, the Gulfs have a more mature and efficient diplomaticexperience, both in terms of methods and discourse, especially with Westerncountries, compared to the traditional nature of Gulf-Gulf diplomaticrelations.The modern concept of non-personal politics is still alien to theleaders of these rich kingdoms.
Southern Transition from an InteriorYemeni Perspective
What do the Southern Transitional Movements mean from theperspective of Yemeni domestic politics? Why did it seem that the anger inYemen focused on the UAE?
If we imagine that the Yemeni faction supported by theUnited Arab Emirates is engaged in an insurgency and a split on the legitimacyof President Abd Rabbo Mansour Hadi, in the name of Yemen, all of Yemen, not inthe name of the "South Arab" or any other South. Would it have beenless bad? Yes, of course, at least for many Yemenis who supported the Saudi-ledcoalition, not because they were fully convinced of Hadi's legitimacy or hisability to fulfill the requirements of this legitimacy, but because Houthi gavethem no other choice. It would be even less embarrassing for Saudi Arabia inthe face of the masses it had envisioned, wary of any sign of let-down orabandonment!
From what angle would it be less bad and less embarrassing?
First, in the sense that a faction is moving in the name ofRepublican Yemen, and in the name of Yemeni nationalism, even if it is a coup(and preferably not!), It can ensure that the cities and areas it controls areprepared to be hospitable for Yemenis, regardless of their regionalaffiliation. Second, from the perspective that a faction moving in the name ofYemen, through any form of Yemeni patriotism, would gain the moral and moralimpetus it so desperately needs in its war with al-Houthi, to cover the gloomin the national image of any domestic effort directly supported by foreigncountries.
However, the thrilling element of the UAE game is that, farfrom the stated goal of the coalition, it has financed and nurtured a bullyingand dangerous separatist group for Yemen and the region on all sides. The issuein southern Yemen is more than a second coup against a weak legitimacy thateverybody knows is untouchable.
The passive attitudes that have recently escalated againstthe UAE on social media pages are not caused solely by a state of solidaritywith Islah, or with terrorism as the Emiratis say, nor with Qatar (the commonenemy of Saudi Arabia and the UAE), or even with the legitimate government,although some of these Dimensions exist in one form or another and are steadilyincreasing, but they are not the foundation. The most important source of theseattitudes is that the UAE-backed southern transition presented itself as aninfamous organization, with its blunt behavior driven by a noisy separatist tendencyto monopolize the representation of the south with a flurry of politicalchildishness and vauntedness.
Riyadh cannot keep up with the Hadi government and the Islahparty in showing discontent with the UAE at this time. It is undoubtedly abitter and unknown option, given that Saudi Arabia is burdened with a number ofhot spots, and its focus is dispersed between simultaneous regional conflictfronts.
Northern and southern citizens have been affected by thisbehavior. It is easy to see how the sentiment of the population in Yemeniareas, such as Taiz, which was predominantly in its attitude towards thesecession of the south, or what some call “disengagement”, became understood,and sometimes closer to advocating the demands of the southern movement, whichdates back to 2007 - This position, recently, into a wave of severe rejectionof separation and division.
The most common explanation for this change in the popularmood is the issue of unity, the kind of practices best known for the southerntransition in Aden against Yemenis of northern origin, and the citizens of Taiz(near Aden) in particular have suffered the most damage.
So, not everything that is escalating these days against theUAE and the Southern Transition comes from Islah exclusively, as you wouldprefer to say the novel of the Southern Transition and the activists of AbuDhabi.
Controversy of unity and separation
Recent events in southern Yemen have demonstrated that if“secession” is a political issue capable of mobilizing sentiment in the south,“unity” in turn has not become a dead issue, as some have imagined, norcompletely missing this capacity for popular mobilization, north and south. Justas the slogan of “secession” returns to the political and moral gain of itsusers in southern Yemen, “unity” remains a long-standing slogan with ahistorically proven political and moral force, and its moral profits are notnegligible.
However, if the war on “terrorism” or the war against theMuslim Brotherhood is a sufficient claim to legitimize armed entities andorganizations, whatever their political objectives, rhetoric and methods, thenHouthi holds all the conditions of legitimacy granted by the UAE to theSouthern Transition.
Recent events in southern Yemen have demonstrated that if“secession” is a political issue capable of mobilizing sentiment in the south,“unity”, in contrast, has not become a dead issue as some had imagined, nor isit completely lacking in this capacity for popular mobilization, north andsouth.
Both Houthi and the Southern Transitional Council bothturned against Hadi, both against the Brotherhood, and both marketed themselvesabroad, especially the United States, as a reliable counterterrorism partner,both separatist in terms of rhetoric and political project, albeit withdifferent tactics and tactics. Finally, it is certain that the complexities ofthe Yemeni file are testing the Saudi-UAE relationship more than the two sidesrecognize.
* Yemeni writer and researcher
The Sana'a Center publishes this text in conjunction withthe “ Arab Ambassador ”.
