Catrowland. You must have skipped over this from EGO's last quarterly. Most who have read and understood the implications of these dot points, in particular first point.
All are pertinent as to the design of the RG plant and what needs to be done to fix it.
There are several areas which are to blame for many of the outages, such as:
o it does not appear that the facility has been designed to be inherently reliable.
o the Process Control Philosophy appears poorly developed and does not consider the facility as an integrated operation from the wellhead to discharge pipeline. In addition, it does not appear to consider the wide range of potential conditions under which the facility is likely to operate. This has led to the implementation of limited facility control system and a lack of integration with the compressor control system.
? The characteristics of the facility that limit its reliability include:
o single train operation with limited capability to bypass or recycle around components, even where that component is not critical to achieving on-specification sales gas.
o a tendency to shut down rather than go into fail safe operating mode protecting the critical process - producing on specification sales gas.
o the LTS and the Export Gas Compressor are the components most susceptible to process upsets and the current control system does not seem to be tailored to isolating these items from process upsets.
? The reliability of the facility is likely to be substantially improved and the manpower required for operation will be reduced by careful attention to the facility control system. Improvements to the Facility Control System could be undertaken as a three step process.
? It is not possible to overcome the failure to adopt an inherently reliable design philosophy until a parallel facility is constructed and it likely that the manning required to operate reliably will always be higher.
? The most significant issue in the short-term is the facility control system, including the interfaces between the various facility control systems. Troubleshooting shutdowns is difficult and the control systems for the compressors and the remainder of the facility appear poorly interconnected.
? The recording of shutdowns and the reasons for the shutdowns are poor and need to be improved. Better recording and analysis of shutdowns is required to ensure that those issues causing the greatest problems can be addressed early.
? Identify those services which continue to cause nuisance level trips, either high or low and determine an appropriate alternative. A review of the causes of recent shutdowns indicates that significant improvements in reliability and reductions in operating manpower can be economically achieved.
? A number of work arounds have already been implemented to solve some of the more trying reliability issues and there are a number of other modifications that are in the earlier stages of implementation.
Perhaps this dot point leads to what Momentum will be forced to do.
"It is not possible to overcome the failure to adopt an inherently reliable design philosophy until a parallel facility is constructed and it likely that the manning required to operate reliably will always be higher."
DYOR Whatever the outcome the JV partners come to I will only be mildly gobsmacked.
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