coinage was further debased until the time of Gallienus and...

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    coinage was further debased until the time of Gallienus and Postumus, after whom the currency
    collapsed. Eisenschmidt is among the first to outline a scheme that reminds us of the decline and

    fall of the ‘Augustan’ system, and once again, the period of debasement extended over a period

    of about thirty years.

    A more empirical study was Jean-Baptiste-Louis Romé de l’Isle’s
    Metrologie(1789),
    which tabulated the weights of hundreds of individual coins (he was later criticised for having

    privileged the material evidence - the weights of coins - over texts
    41).he too saw a weight
    decline of the denarius under the Julio-Claudians, followed by stability afternero. However,

    he found it difficult to determine weights accurately after Caracalla, probably because it

    remained unclear whether or not larger coins with radiate portraits should be distinguished

    from the smaller denarii.

    Scholars were only just beginning to debate the relationship of this larger radiate coin, which

    had been introduced bycaracalla and was generally thought to be a denarius, to the smaller

    laureate denarius.
    42it was now clear that not only had the larger denarius been the commonest
    denomination for most of the third century, but by the middle of that century it had also become

    hugely debased.if not a denarius, what denomination did it represent?eighteenth century

    scholars were undecided, and a general consensus would only emerge in the middle of the

    twentieth century, though this would not be a legacy of any of those early opinions.the history

    of scholarship concerning the value of this coin in many ways encapsulates thinking about the

    character of change inroman imperial coinage, and even about the function of that coinage, but

    more on that in a moment.

    The eighteenth century had, of course, seen the publication of Edward Gibbon’s monumental

    work,
    The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, published in six volumes between 1776
    and 1789. It was now possible to view Roman decline as a protracted process extending over

    centuries. Curiously, Gibbon hardly mentions debasement of the coinage at all – possibly because

    the supporting scholarly evidence for the decadence of the currency had yet to be presented in a

    coherent fashion.nor does debasement feature in Montesquieu’s 1734 essay
    Considérations sur
    les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence
    (a work which provided some of the
    inspiration for Gibbon’s
    Decline and Fall), even though chapter 16 of this work acknowledged
    the escalating cost of the army.either the parallelism between the condition of coinage and the

    State had not yet gained wide recognition, or perhaps the notion of debasement to cover war

    expenses was too banal to be worthy of comment.

    In the early nineteenth century scientific analyses of Roman silver coins helped to supply

    that parallelism. Between 1810 and 1815 Marti Heinrich Klaproth published a set of analyses

    demonstrating that Roman silver coinage had been debased long before the Severans, or

    Balbinus and Pupienus. His earliest coin, of Domitian, was only 80% fine.
    43Filippo Schiassi in
    1811 confirmed that Augustus’s denarii were as pure as Republican ones (excluding the debased

    legionary denarii of Mark Antony).
    44therepublican and Augustan denarii therefore represented
    r
    oman coinage in its pristine state. As more analyses were conducted, the case for a protracted

    decline of the imperial coinage arose.
    45
    DEBASEMEnTAnDTHEDECLInEOFROME

    41
    Hussey 1836: 7-8.
    42
    Eckhel 1792: xxvi-xxvii.
    43
    Klaproth 1815.
    44
    Schiassi 1820: 33-7.
    45
    For these analyses see Butcher and Ponting 2015, chapter
    3.

    187

    The evidence was first assembled into a coherent picture by Theodor Mommsen.46his
    method underpins modern numismatics, and he provided the framework within whichroman

    numismatists still operate.nevertheless, his explanations for change were broader in scope than

    those that have come to dominate today, encompassing both monetary adjustments, intended

    to maintain the stability of the coinage, and fiscal debasements, intended to cover deficits or to

    make profits. Up to the reign ofnero the denarius had maintained its Republican weight and

    fineness and had full intrinsic value, but, thanks to the presence of a gold coinage also of full

    intrinsic value, this system was becoming unsustainable.nero therefore debased the denarius

    and reduced its weight, creating a kind of token silver coin backed up by a plentiful supply of

    full-bodied gold coins.
    47roman currency was thus operating with gold as the standard of value.48
    i
    n this way Mommsen posited that the coinage fromnero onwards was a different kind of

    currency from the strictly ‘Augustan’: it was in part fiduciary. Trajan maintained the weight but

    reduced the fineness further. This was the first occasion that Trajan had been proposed as a point

    of change.nevertheless thetrajanic changes would seem to belong to Mommsen’sneronian

    system, rather than constituting a separate phase. Trajan also recalled and reminted the finer

    Republican coins still in circulation, and by doing so profited.
    49However, public confidence in
    the denarius was sustained because it was backed by plenty of gold of full value.
    50Mommsen
    thus made it clear that the value of the silver coinage did not depend on intrinsic worth.

    A monetary crisis commenced when Septimius Severus debased the denarius to about 50%-

    60% fine, threatening the stability of the whole monetary system.
    51its credibility was further
    undermined whenelagabalus ordered that all taxes be paid in gold and when emperors began

    issuing gold coins of varying weight.
    52
    Crucially, Mommsen identified Caracalla’s new coin as the one that precipitated the crisis.
    53
    Although its weight and fineness suggested it was worth one-and-a-half denarii, as earlier

    scholars had proposed,
    54he argued that it was ‘einbiniooder Doppeldenar’.55it was thus a form
    of debasement, albeit one that did not involve reducing the fineness. He also argued that it could

    not have been called a denarius, and proposed two other possible names, both taken from the

    Historia Augusta
    : ‘aurelianus’ or ‘antoninianus’.56neither name is regarded as credible today,
    but the latter one stuck, while the term ‘aurelianus’ is now applied to the reformed radiates

    of Aurelian and his successors.in spite of modern scholarly attempts to rebrand the coin as a

    ‘radiate’, Mommsen’s ‘antoninianus’ remains common currency.

    t
    he new coin thus took centre stage in the account of the collapse of theroman monetary

    system. Its introduction by Caracalla had signified a major debasement but subsequent reductions

    in fineness reduced its value still further. Proof that it was heavily overvalued could be adduced

    from the number of contemporary forgeries.not only was quality to blame, but quantity too: for

    Mommsen, the huge size of antoninianus hoards illustrated the oversupply of currency and its

    general worthlessness.
    57eventually the coin became a valueless token, like paper money, that
    confirmed the State’s bankruptcy between the reign of Gallienus and Diocletian’s reforms:

    Kevin Butcher

    46
    Mommsen 1851; 1860.
    47
    1851: 218; 1860: 767-9.
    48
    Mommsen 1860: 767.
    49
    1860: 758-9.
    50
    1860: 826.
    51
    1860: 826.
    52
    elagabalus:SHASeverus Alexander 39; Mommsen 1860:
    827; gold of varying weight: 1860: 826.

    53
    1860: 830.
    54
    E.g. Pinkerton 1808: 141-2.
    55
    1860: 828.
    56
    Aurelianus:SHAProbus4.5-6;antoninianus:SHA
    Bonosus 15.8.

    57
    Mommsen 1860: 830.
    188

    ‘Das gesammte römische Münzwesen in der Epoche von Gallienus bis auf die Mitte der Regierung
    Diocletians lässt sich dahin charakterisieren, dass der Bankerott in Permanenz und die Münze, die diesen

    Bankrott ausdrückte und in der er sich vollzog, das Papiergeld jener Zeit, der Antoninianus war.’
    58
    i
    n the Duc de Blacas’s French translation of the
    Münzwesenthis passage is faithfully
    reproduced, but with a significant embellishment:

    “Le système monétaire romain, depuis l’époque de Gallienus jusqu’au milieu du règne de Diocletien,

    peut être considéré comme une banqueroute en permanence. La monnaie qui servit à consommer cette

    banqueroute fut l’Antoninianus que l’on pourrait appeler l’
    assignatde cette époque.”59
    t
    he reference to ‘assignats’ in this context is interesting.these were paper notes issued by

    the French revolutionary authorities between 1789 and 1796, and initially were backed up by

    property confiscated from the church and (later) the aristocracy.
    60to begin with, they were
    successful in reducing government debt, but later, with the government unable to plug the gap

    between income and expenditure, the State came to rely on the issue of assignats to cover its

    debts. With no proper restriction of their supply, the value of the assignats came to surpass

    the value of the property, and they were seen as the cause of hyperinflation. Like Diocletian,

    the Government tried to halt rising prices by setting price ceilings in the
    maximum général
    of September 1793 and, like Diocletian’s Edict, the
    maximumultimately failed. Hyperinflation
    reached 80% in June 1795.
    61this comparison with the assignat established a direct association
    between the antoninianus, fiscal deficits, and hyperinflation caused by oversupply of money –

    themes still associated with the denomination today.

    n
    ot everyone agreed with Mommsen’s argument about the value ofcaracalla’s antoninianus.

    Friederich Hultsch considered its weight and fineness to be an indicator of its value (which he

    argued was 1¼ denarii or 5 sestertii), so that its introduction did not represent a debasement.
    62
    The story of third century hyperinflation, so central to modern accounts of the evolution of

    r
    oman coinage, had yet to achieve notoriety.it seems to have been of little interest to the

    majority of nineteenth-century numismatists, still less was the idea of the antoninianus as an

    overvalued double denarius considered a key fact in the history ofroman coinage.henricohen,

    whose
    Description historique des monnaies frappées sous l’empire romainbecame the standard
    reference until the publication of
    RIC, had almost nothing to say on matters of fineness and
    metrology.
    63Stevenson’sDictionary of Roman Coins(1889) has no entry for ‘antoninianus’,
    nor does he mention the denomination under the entries for ‘caracalla’ or ‘
    denarius’; the only
    acknowledgement appears to be under the entry for ‘Balbinus’ (one of the emperors of AD 238

    who reintroduced the antoninianus), where he noted that ‘the large-sized silver of this emperor

    has the head with radiated crown’ whereas ‘the smaller size has the head laureated’, and under

    the entry for ‘Pupienus’.
    64Perhaps this lack of interest in the inflationary potential of debasement
    and overproduction of coins need occasion no surprise.in the late nineteenth century the leading

    world economies (Britain, the United States and Germany) had no inflation; instead, from about

    DEBASEMEnTAnDTHEDECLInEOFROME

    58
    Mommsen 1860: 830.
    59
    Mommsen 1873: 147.
    60
    On the assignat inflation, see White 1995; on the objects
    themselves, see Lafaurie 1981.

    61
    White 1995: 246.
    62
    1862: 242-3.
    63
    Cohen 1880.
    64
    Stevenson 1889: 122, referencing Akerman 1834 I: 462.
    Under Pupienus Stevenson notes ‘the silver is of two sizes,

    the larger of which exhibits the head of this emperor with

    the radiated crown’ (1889: 670).

    189

    1880 to 1913 they were experiencing slight deflation.65the assignats were a distant memory;
    besides, they had been made of paper, not precious metal.

    The first volume of
    Paulys Real-Encyclopädie(1894) contained an entry on the ‘antoninianus’
    by Wilhelm Kubitschek.he reported Mommsen’s idea that it was a double denarius and noted

    h
    ultsch’s argument that it was worth 1¼, but conceded that there was no agreement on the

    denomination’s value.
    66the uncertainty, or indifference, carried over from the nineteenth to the
    twentieth centuries. George Francis Hill in his handbook of 1899 noted the ‘degradation of the

    silver coinage in the third century’ but has little to say about its effects.
    67
    h
    owever, some were in favour of Mommsen’s interpretation, even if they did not credit him

    with the idea. Sir John Evans, who published a large mixed hoard of denarii and antoniniani in

    1898, argued (without much substance) that the ‘argenteus Antoninianus’ was worth two denarii.
    68
    Francesco Gnecchi’s handbook
    Roman Coins(which may have influenced Evans) had more to
    say, and his brief overview owes much to Mommsen.
    69Gnecchi’s sketch outlined a gradual but
    continuous degradation of its silver content.nero was the first to lower the weight and fineness

    of the denarius; then the base metal content rose to 15%-18% under Trajan; 20% under Hadrian;

    25% under Marcus Aurelius; 30% under Commodus; and 50%-60% under Septimius Severus: the

    incremental decline with which we are all familiar.he stated as fact Mommsen’s proposal that

    c
    aracalla’s new coin was ‘a Double Denarius or Argenteus Antoninianus’, thereby implying that

    Double Denarius had been its original name. The Double Denarius was only 20% fine (a false

    claim that even contemporaries could correct), but ‘very soon degenerated until it did not contain

    more than 5% of silver and at last was hardly to be distinguished from bronze’. A brief mention was

    made of a loss of public confidence, mainly because of the State’s supposed refusal to accept the

    debased coin in taxes, but we find none of the drama that pervades twentieth-century accounts.
    70
    Gradually, however, a new consensus appeared to be forming, but it was one that refuted

    Mommsen’s idea that the antoninianus was a double denarius.in his own contribution to the

    subject of the ‘decline and fall’ of the coinage, Sir Charles Oman argued that, since the weight of

    the antoninianus was one-and-a-half times that of the denarius, it had been worth one and a half

    denarii or six sestertii.
    71nevertheless, Oman referred to the purchasing power of ‘wretched’ later
    antoniniani under Gallienus having ‘dwindled away to next to nothing’.
    72even so, he viewed
    Caracalla’s coin as monetary adjustment, not a fiscal debasement.

    More followed.in his important article on theroman monetary system, published in the

    same year that the
    Daily Chroniclereported Lenin’s plan to destroy the power of money,e.h.
    Sydenham followed the opinion of Charles Oman. The antoninianus was worth 1.5 denarii, and

    its introduction represented an adjustment to the silver and gold coinage.
    73Sydenham reported
    that his colleague,harold Mattingly, had proposed accordingly thatcaracalla’s aureus was worth

    20 antoniniani or 30 denarii.
    74it was true that later the antoninianus became ‘a mere apology of
    Kevin Butcher

    65
    Bordo et al. 2009.
    66
    REi,s.v.antoninianus:‘keineeinigungüberdie
    ursprüngliche Wertung des A.’

    67
    hill 1899: 51.
    68
    Evans 1898: 2: ‘It is difficult to say what relation these
    larger pieces bore in the currency to the smaller ordinary

    denarii
    , though not improbably they were doubledenarii’.
    n
    o mention is made of Mommsen.

    69
    For what follows, see the English translation of Gnecchi
    1903 (based on his 1896 Italian version): 121-3. Again,

    Mommsen is not mentioned.

    70
    Gnecchi 1903: 122-3: ‘The discredit to which this silver
    coinage had fallen was the result of greed and indeed we

    may say of the dishonesty of the State which issued these

    valueless coins but refused to accept them and as early as

    the reign ofelagabalus ... issued a decree that the public

    payments of taxes should be made in gold.’

    71
    Oman 1916: 45.
    72
    1916: 51.
    73
    Sydenham
 
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