civil war possible, page-61

re: civil war possible/a long answer Atomu,

Overwhelmingly yes! The potential for beneficial change in the ME has been shortened by decades if not centuries. Any bloodshed is regretable but it is not as though the Iraqis were not subject to even greater ongoing bloodshed while the Ba'athists remained in power.

I think it was Miles who said the Iraqis were OK, under Saddam if they kept there heads down. Even that is not true as many innocents were tortured to inform on others, including innocents. Then there were the bloody campaigns of pre-emption to ensure that no one was even game to put their head up. All this I am sure will come out in Mr. Hussein's trial.

As far as the Yanks go these are pretty small numbers given the nature of the war. There was an anticipation(calculation by the military) of many thousands of US deaths before the war. I think they relaxed after the main war phase and are just now getting technically on top of the insurgents.(I read the other day that they are now detecting about three quarters of the land mines and defusing them).

My position has always been that the only moral reason for invading Iraq was to overthrow the Ba'ath regime. However the way the nuclear weapon's program was being developed in Libya, as confirmed by the UN inspector, gives some weight to the removal of Saddam on the grounds that once the US military threat had been removed, he could have used the same nuclear weapons black market to get back into the game. (That is for another argument about the WMDs).

I think few have failed to notice that the whole of the ME has been shocked by the power of the US military, and though we like to think that it is an inferior motive for change,there is no doubt that the collective ME and North African Arab mind, that thinks in terms power and authority, (eg Sistani. could you ever imagine Aussies chanting with wild eyes "we give our blood and souls to you John Howard" and the same for other Westerners) has been given a sufficient jolt to think about "freedom and democracy". If you read the Arab commentators you will find that these themes constantly crop up in their media columns as they try to work out a Middle East version.

There is more in the US policy pipeline for the ME as a result of this war:

A MULTILATERAL Mr.BUSH

Friday, January 23, 2004 (washpost)

PRESIDENT BUSH didn't expand, in his State of the Union address, on how he plans to promote democratization in the greater Middle East, beyond a worthy proposal to double funding for the National Endowment for Democracy. But the White House is considering several potentially important new initiatives. One envisions a charter for freedom for the Middle East -- a mutual commitment by countries in the region to embrace the principles and institutions of democracy, linked to a follow-up process. Another centers on a possible program by NATO to forge training and other security cooperation agreements with Arab states. A third would promote economic links between Middle Eastern countries and the United States and European Union. The ideas are nascent and face a few obstacles. But the fact that the administration is discussing them with key European governments is encouraging.

One important advantage of the initiatives is that they are based on democratization programs that proved successful during and after the Cold War in Europe. The Middle East freedom charter would build on the model of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, an East-West security agreement that formally committed the Soviet Union and its satellites to respecting human rights and provided for monitoring and follow-up diplomacy. The "Helsinki process" played a critical role in the rise of indigenous pro-democracy groups in communist states. After the collapse of the Soviet bloc, NATO's Partnership for Peace program helped to reform the military and security institutions of the East Bloc and encouraged a transition to democracy. So did the economic partnership agreements negotiated by the European Union.

Unlike the war in Iraq or the transitional mission that has followed it, the democracy programs are designed to be multilateral and would probably attract bipartisan support in the United States. They envision the United States joining with European governments, including those that opposed the war, in a long-term effort to encourage change that would be conducted through transatlantic institutions -- which would be invigorated by a vital new mission. The White House did not cook up its ideas in isolation: Discussions about a Helsinki-like initiative in the Middle East or a role for NATO have been underway in think tanks and ad hoc groups for some time. Two weeks ago Democratic presidential candidate Sen. John Edwards proposed a similar set of ideas; other candidates, including retired Gen. Wesley K. Clark, have endorsed the same principles.

At best, the Middle East initiatives could form the basis for a common European-American strategy for addressing one of the world's most serious challenges. For now, the White House's soundings of European governments have generated interest and skepticism. European policymakers tend to doubt whether Mr. Bush's goal of democratic government in the Middle East is achievable in the near future; they also point out that Arab governments might be reluctant to sign up for cooperation with NATO or pledge themselves to political change. Some European officials appear interested in pursuing a diplomacy toward the Middle East that is distinctly separate from Washington's. That would be unfortunate. It will be hard enough for Western governments working together to address the political and economic malaise that lies at the root of the Middle East's extremist and terrorist movements. The Bush administration's attempt to forge a policy that is both ambitious and multilateral is the right approach.