crucial fact, page-84

Oh dear oh dear Sharks here we go again. Please read my posts, carefully, before trying to debate the argument I put forward.
Let me make my point very clearly - the reserves as currently quoted, in my opinion, require revision due to the fact that a large proportion of recent development wells were plugged and abandoned without producing commercial volumes, and (to a much lesser extent) due to the sale of reserves to GS under the farmout deal.
The dry wells I was referring to were drilled in Q3 2012, Q4 2012 and Q1 2013, all of which occurred after the June 2012 reserves restatement. Therefore, to assume that the June 2012 reserves restatement included those dry wells is of course inaccurate.
Yet again I reiterate that the methodology for the reserves calculations (and restatement) can be found in the prospectus. I do not in any way stand by the calculations made in either the IPO reserves report or the June 2012 reserves restatement, both of which, in my opinion, massively overstate the reserves and whose methodology is fundamentally flawed in that they do not demonstrate in any way whether the volumes of oil are economically recoverable (before coming back with vitriol I'd like long posters to refer specifically to type curves and economic forecasts in the reserve report which demonstrate that the volumes are economically recoverable).
With respect to the GS deal, re-read my post. I simply pointed out that the 'reserves' sold to GS are no longer owned by MAD and by implication MAD's reserves have gone down by that amount. I didn't make any statement to the effect that a farmout would necessarily make other volumes still owned by MAD uneconomic, which of course is nonesense.