The Australian Army must ensure all its soldiers understand the danger posed by small, cheap drones and train them to counter that threat. To best support our forces, a centre of excellence that gathers existing knowledge and provides timely intelligence to Defence is needed.
Such drones, typically based on consumer products or their parts, are called small uncrewed aerial systems (sUASs). They’re widely available, easily operated and well suited to performing surveillance and kinetic attacks on modern battlefields. So they are difficult to sense and defeat, and military forces unprepared for adversarial uses of then have suffered devastating effects in combat.
In October 2023, operators in Ukraine’s Army of Drones project damaged 220 Russian military vehicles and depots in a single week. Referring to the battle for Mosul in 2016, the commander of US Special Operations Command, General Raymond Thomas called small drones operated by Islamic State the ‘most daunting problem’ his forces faced. By the spring of 2017, the Islamic State was conducting 60 to 100 drone strikes a month in Syria and Iraq against US and allied forces.
Traditional air defence capabilities designed to target helicopters and fighter aircraft cannot effectively detect and engage many small drones, and shooting one down costs far more than the drone itself.
At a 2017 military symposium, US General David Perkins relayed the story of an unnamed ally’s use of a US$3 million air defence missile. ‘That quadcopter that cost 200 bucks from Amazon.com did not stand a chance against a Patriot,’ he said.
It was clear then that much cheaper methods were needed, and it’s even clearer after two-and-a-half years of fighting in Ukraine.
The centre of excellence that Australia needs would prepare the Australian Defence Force and other national security agencies for the threat of small drones on home soil and during overseas operations. It should either be part of the defence establishment or be an interdepartmental agency with representatives from CASA, intelligence organisations, the Department of Home Affairs and the Australian Federal Police. And it should focus on four specific areas to improve Australia’s capability to counter sUASs:
—Forecasting developments in technology of sUASs and ways to counter them;
—Gathering global lessons learned from nefarious employment of them;
—Maintaining databases of known sUAS capabilities and vulnerabilities; and
—Assessing suspicious or captured sUASs and exploiting their weaknesses.
The centre would be attuned to the quickly evolving threat of such drones, providing Defence and other government agencies with timely intelligence on the latest sUAS capabilities, tactics and vulnerabilities.
In developing methods to counter small drones, Australia should build on existing technology and knowledge. While a variety of counter-sUAS technologies and commercial systems have emerged, each with its own strengths and limitations, none is ideal in all environments against all threats.
For detecting and tracking small drones, a combination of imaging, radar and passive radiofrequency systems is preferable as it can use the strengths of each technology to detect and identify drones. For the engagement of sUASs, the preferred technology depends on the environment, expected target and likely collateral effects. For example, high-powered microwave weapons might be suitable for defending ground forces in a remote environment against sUAS swarms, but a deployment to a civilian airfield might risk collateral damage to aircraft or air traffic control systems.
Building countermeasures against small drones is challenging, because their technology and the ways of using them are evolving rapidly due to their low cost and ease of development. Operating countries or organisations can easily modify their drones to improve survivability and mission success.
So Australia must develop a layered defence system, combined with continuous research and development on emerging sUAS and counter-sUAS technologies. Passive defences must also be used, including concealment, deception, hardening and dispersion. Passive measures are particularly important in the near term while the Department of Defence works to deliver active means.
The challenge of countering the small-drone threat on Australian territory is even more complex than doing so in overseas deployments, due to Australian regulatory obstacles. Australia was once a global pioneer in establishing rules that govern flights of uncrewed aircraft, but now it must review them in light of the wide proliferation of small drones, rapid advances in their technology and the evolving threats they pose.
Globally, small drones continue to cause significant national security concerns. Some were recently detected flying over a US Air Force plant that makes B-21 bombers, and the gunman who tried to kill Donald Trump used one in advance to study the scene.
By establishing a counter-sUAS centre of excellence and providing training to ADF members, Defence can improve its capabilities based on the latest knowledge and technology and prepare the ADF to counter sUAS threats at home and abroad.
