I suspect all that inventory they 'bought' in the lead in to...

I suspect all that inventory they 'bought' in the lead in to Jun-15 was stuff they couldn't move (i.e. private label product customers don't want to buy) or leftovers from Christmas 2014 which should have been liquidated much earlier. I suspect they had to take on more debt / get cash wherever they could so they had stock people wanted to buy. The revelation that they borrowed $30m from Macquarie Bank to buy Apple stock is concerning.

I think the below table is interesting, provides a breakdown of 12 monthly reporting periods for DSH under Anchorage ownership and following listing. The financials have been broken down to average store level data to (at best attempt) remove the distortions of growth in the store network from the financials (however we all know that newly opened store have different financial profiles to established stores)

	Column 1	Column 2	Column 3	Column 4	Column 5
0	Store metrics ($'000)	2H13-1H14	1H14-2H14	2H14-1H15	1H15-2H15
1	Reporting entity[/B]	DSSH	DSSH/DSH	DSH	DSH
2	Stores (period end)	369	377	385	393
3	Sales per store	3,288	3,256	3,336	3,358
4	Gross margin per store	807	817	828	832
5	Overheads per store	799	702	636	650
6	Depreciation per store	32	34	37	38
7	Net working capital per store
8	Debtors	75	124	207	136
9	Inventory	647	673	872	746
10	Creditors	-715	-657	-878	-581
11		7	140	201	300

Whilst the analysis is crude I think it demonstrates that:
• Little improvement occurred with store profitability
• Overheads reduced but was probably thanks to the benefits of scale (though management did seek overhead reductions)
• New PPE acquisitions had little impact on dep'n charges
• Question needs to be asked about whether or not Anchorage left sufficient cash after IPO to fund working capital needs