re: iraq-drone bombshell?? - get real!
Yidrus posted:
"cobby - good info - dont expect any reply from the rabble.
It simply doesnt fit into their view of the conflict so they ignore it!!!
I posted it earlier and although there were many reads - not a single reply.
All you'll get is the Yanks are the aggressor without cause!"
Well yids, I bit my tongue , bit my cheeks (facial), and couldnt resist it, so here goes:
This is a typical example of the propaganda you guys like to run with because it suits your cause. Is there any truth in it? No!
" posted it earlier and although there were many reads - not a single reply." What is the use? You guys dont listen. You just try to smother us with your pro-war Zionist blurb. So once again, I am not ant-war! I am anti attacking someone who is being made a scapegoat over oil and Israeli agendas. So read below and see what you think:
"And while public attention is focused on ballistic missiles, Iraq has even more effective and lethal platforms of the delivery of its weapons of mass destruction. In late December 1996, German intelligence confirmed that Iraqi weapons technicians developed a drone described as "the little guy's cruise missile." This unmanned aircraft is made of plastics and plywood -- simple and cheap to produce without any tell-tale equipment that can attract the UN inspectors. The drone has a range of about 700 kilometers and is equipped with a very accurate GPS navigation system illegally purchased in the West. Each drone can carry 30 to 40 kilograms of biological or chemical warfare agents to the intended target. It is almost impossible to detect this drone by radar because of its size, slow speed and lack of metal parts. The BND's experts are most alarmed by the Iraqi fielding of a version of this drone that can be also launched from ships. Consequently, one cannot rule out the possibility of an Iraqi-controlled commercial ship suddenly launching these drones outside the coasts of Europe -- from where these missiles can reach and threaten London, Paris or Berlin -- as well as the Atlantic coast of the US. "
So this is the "Bombshell", is it?The "Latest Scoop?"
Now read the document it came from and look at the date:
"TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM & UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE U.S. House of Representatives Washington, D.C. 20515 THE IRAQI WMD CHALLENGE -- Myths and Reality February 10, 1998 *
Nobody likes the idea of Saddam Hussein having weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and missiles capable of delivering their lethal warheads. The ramifications of their potential use in anger -- the numbers of fatalities and injured they might inflict -- are horrendous. However, as the US is getting ready to bomb in Iraq in order to address the challenge of that country's remaining WMD arsenal, one should examine dispassionately what might be conceivably accomplished, and what would be the ramifications of the massive bombing campaign the Clinton Administration is advocating.
*
Despite Baghdad's protestations, Iraq does have a small but very lethal operational arsenal of WMD and platforms capable of delivering them throughout the Middle East and even beyond. Although Iraq has been subjected to an unprecedented regimen of UN inspection and destruction of strategic military programs since the end of the Gulf War in the Spring of 1991, the international community has proven incapable of learning the entire scope of the Iraqi programs for fielding weapons of mass destruction, let alone eliminate these programs as mandated by the Security Council.
Significantly, the first major independent study of the possible magnitude of the Iraqi undeclared and concealed WMD arsenal was not conducted until the Summer of 1994. For this study, the BND (German Intelligence) relied on KNOWN Iraqi post-Gulf War illegal acquisitions of technology, sub-systems, and strategic materials in Western Europe (mainly Germany, Austria and Switzerland) to assess what could be done with these acquisitions. Even without taking into consideration such diverse inputs as Iraqi acquisitions from countries of the former Soviet Union, the PRC and Iran, as well as rumored but unproven acquisitions in Europe, the results of the BND study were startling for they pointed to several specific programs that not only had the UN inspectors been unaware of in mid 1994, but they have so far proven unable to discover and stop. For example, the Iraqi purchase of a special kind of igniter, with a short shelf-life, for SCUD-type warheads, strongly suggested that the Iraqis used these igniters for operational SCUD- type missiles, as they are capable of increasing the range. The BND thus concluded that it was "difficult to assess" the magnitude of the current Iraqi weapons program. There was no doubt that not only "some of the material equipment" was excluded from discovery and destruction by the UN, but certain projects were being revived and run clandestinely.
A new approach to studying the Iraqi WMD programs was adopted in the aftermath of the "defection" of Lt.Gen. Hussein Kamal in the Summer of 1995. Originated as an audacious ploy to destroy the anti-Saddam movement from within, the "defection" went sour when Baghdad panicked over reports of contacts between Kamal and the CIA in Amman. Consequently, Baghdad was compelled to surrender to the UN large quantities of material Kamal might have divulged while in Amman. Consequently, Kamal and his brother were lured back to Baghdad where they were promptly assassinated. Meanwhile, the entire perception of the extent of the Iraqi WMD program had to be reevaluated.
Most important was the realization that there is an on going Iraqi program the UN inspections team is highly unlikely to discover and stop. In January 1996, the assessment of the Israeli Military Intelligence was that within the next four years, Iraq would have ten SCUD launchers and some 150 SCUD-type missiles. Some of these missiles are to be equipped with warheads containing WMD. A major aspect of the Iraqi program as of the mid-1990s was the organization of a highly mobile transportation system for the operational elements. Thus, by late 1997, the Iraqis were capable of transferring a few thousand liters of biological materials to new concealed sites within two or three weeks without supervision. As far as Baghdad was concerned, once the materials were hidden, supervision may be permitted to resume as usual. Another indication of an anticipated expansion of Iraq's ballistic missile activities came in late 1997/early 1998 with the appointment of two senior officers -- Abd-al-Rizzaq Shihab of the Army and Muzahm Tassab al-Hassan of the Air Force -- as deputy heads of the Military Industries authority. Both generals held senior command positions of Iraqi missile forces during the Gulf War and are considered Iraq's leading experts in ballistic missile operations. Moreover, during 1997, Iraqi military units conducted several simulated deployments and launching of ballistic missiles of the type and range Iraq is not permitted to have.
Meanwhile, despite the ongoing presence of UN inspectors and the threat of resumed bombing, the Iraqi strategic arsenal continued to expand as the current British Government's threat assessment testifies. In early 1998, Iraq is known to possess 48 SCUD-type missiles and six launchers. (Gen. Wafiq Samarraj, the former chief of Iraqi Military Intelligence, knew of at least 45 SCUD-type missiles with range of over 600 km and several others being repaired at the time of his defection in 1994.) A large portion of the 45 BW warheads/bomb containers Iraq acknowledged constructing in the late 1980s are believed to have survived the Gulf War and still elude the UN inspectors. The British Government estimates that the Iraqis still have 30 warheads capable of carrying chemical and\or biological weapons' material. For these warheads and other weapons, Iraq has at least 8,400 liters of Anthrax, as well as 600 tons of chemicals that are sufficient for the production of 200 tons of VX nerve gas -- where a single droplet can kill. (Samarraj reported that in 1994 Iraq concealed 200 containers with biological weapons, more than half of which are still considered in operational condition.)
And while public attention is focused on ballistic missiles, Iraq has even more effective and lethal platforms of the delivery of its weapons of mass destruction. In late December 1996, German intelligence confirmed that Iraqi weapons technicians developed a drone described as "the little guy's cruise missile." This unmanned aircraft is made of plastics and plywood -- simple and cheap to produce without any tell-tale equipment that can attract the UN inspectors. The drone has a range of about 700 kilometers and is equipped with a very accurate GPS navigation system illegally purchased in the West. Each drone can carry 30 to 40 kilograms of biological or chemical warfare agents to the intended target. It is almost impossible to detect this drone by radar because of its size, slow speed and lack of metal parts. The BND's experts are most alarmed by the Iraqi fielding of a version of this drone that can be also launched from ships. Consequently, one cannot rule out the possibility of an Iraqi-controlled commercial ship suddenly launching these drones outside the coasts of Europe -- from where these missiles can reach and threaten London, Paris or Berlin -- as well as the Atlantic coast of the US.
Another type of chemical weapons known to be in the Iraqi arsenal is "Agent 15" nerve agent. According to British Government sources, Agent 15 is a non-lethal psychochemical nerve gas designed to stupefy enemy forces. It is a derivative of BZ. The agent can be disseminated in various forms -- from artillery and rocket warheads to pouring into water supplies. Depending on the concentration, Agent 15 can cause weakness, dizziness, disorientation, hallucinations and loss of co-ordination. At the level of concentration likely to affect unprotected troops on a battlefield, Agent 15 is expected to disorientate and disable soldiers for a relatively short time (measured in hours). Iraq is known to have experimented with BZ and various derivatives since at least 1985. The British learned that Iraq had built up large stocks of an operational version -- Agent 15 -- only in late 1997.
Thus, Iraq still has a small, diverse, but very deadly operational arsenal of WMD. If used operationally, the Iraqi weapons of mass destruction can cause heavy casualties among both civilian population and military forces not just in the Middle East, but even in the US. The key warhead and bomb components are very small and can be easily moved from one place of concealment to another. Furthermore, if the bulky protective measures of these components are removed, at a risk to the Iraqi troops and nearby population, the movement and concealment of these key warhead and bomb components becomes even more easy. Moreover, it is then virtually impossible to distinguish from afar between these warheads and comparable high-explosive systems -- say, artillery shells.
Assuming that the US located these clandestine WMD, it is still far from certain the US will be able to bomb and destroy all the Iraqi operational weapons. And this has nothing to do with the accuracy of aircraft or the penetrability of smart munitions. The problem lies in the ruthlessness of Saddam's regime and his desperate clinging to power. For example, what if the bulk of the chemical warhead components are stored in, say, the Baghdad Presidential Palace -- two miles southeast of the edge of the Baghdad West Airport. The eruption of any such warhead, let alone a larger storage container, as a result of bomb damage will devastate the heart of Baghdad -- killing countless innocent people. Is this a legitimate outcome of a US bombing campaign? The argument that Saddam is to be blamed for such a tragedy just because he had placed these weapons at the heart of Baghdad carries water only up to a certain point. Besides, Washington should dread the reverberations of such a justifiable act throughout the Muslim World. And what about an Iraqi "retaliation" against a US city using terrorists or a ship- borne drone?
*
Significantly, however, even if the US and its allies will have managed to destroy the bulk of Saddam WMD operational arsenal, this will provide only a short term solution. No bombing campaign against Iraq, and even an occupation of that country for that matter, is capable of destroying the hard core of Saddam Hussein's primary WMD development and production programs. The reason is that under current conditions these programs are run outside of Iraq -- mainly in Sudan and Libya, as well as Algeria (storage of some hot nuclear stuff). Thus, once the bombing campaign is over, the Iraqis can be expected to smuggle new weapons from Iraq's development sites and production lines - sites that remain untouched by allied bombing as well as unchecked by UN inspection teams. And, for as long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, this charade called disarming Saddam will continue.
One should not be surprised by this sad state of affairs.
The transfer of Iraqi WMD overseas started even before the outbreak of the Gulf War. Back in late 1990, when Baghdad realized Iraq would be subjected to intense bombing, key sensitive elements were smuggled out. Then, in the Spring of 1991, once the extent of the post-War inspection regime became clarified, especially given the type and amount of data provided to the West by numerous defectors, a second round of hasty smuggling took place. Essentially, the core of the next-generation projects of the Iraqi WMD programs was moved to safe-havens. A lot of know-how and key subsystems were shipped out with the idea of building alternate production facilities in the host countries.
Most important are the programs transferred to Libya and Sudan -- two of Iraq's closest allies during the Gulf War that have strong aspirations for WMD of their own. Libya, long struggling to overcome embargoes and the cancellation of arrangements for the supply of technology and systems from Western Europe, has been looking for the Iraqi embargo-busting knowledge and for Iraqi proven solutions for Libyan problems. Sudan needs WMD in order to hit the Black rebels in the south and deter Western intervention against the Islamist terrorism empire. Hence, Iraq found eager and willing partners for its efforts to circumvent the world's campaign against its WMD.
While the initial movements of WMD stuff were emergency measures or by- products of other considerations, Baghdad reexamined its posture by late 1993. By then, Saddam Hussein had already realized that the UN inspections were not going away, and that the US remained determined to continue the policy of containment and sanctions. Moreover, the US retaliation for the June 1993 narrowly averted an attempt on the life of former President Bush by Iraqi intelligence convinced Baghdad that there would be no reconciliation with the US in the foreseeable future. Hence, Baghdad adopted a long term strategy to endure the global pressure. In March 1994, Babil (a newspaper run by Saddam Hussein's eldest son Uday) declared that it would be "desirable for the leaders of Iraq, Libya and Sudan to hold a summit meeting ... and adopt a common stance" to meet the challenges facing the Arab World.
Meanwhile, Iraq was reviving the international support system for its WMD development and production programs. By late 1994, Iraq's secret purchasing system was completely restored. It was operating energetically not only to just restore previous capabilities but to support new projects -- mostly outside Iraq. Anticipating that the sanctions would be lifted from Iraq, many European firms were rushing to grab a good share of what used to be a very lucrative market. Presently, the Iraqi-run system is made up of an endless and redundant web of Western firms and technology plants, liaison people, banks and financial institutes, secret merchants and middlemen -- so that it is virtually impossible to discover all components, let alone bring down the system. The procurement system of the Iraqi intelligence has been resurrected, it functions, and it feels good. The present system has not only arose on the ruins of the previous one, but it has learned and overcome all the errors of the system of the 1980s. Significantly, virtually all the firms and plants that had worked for Iraq before the Gulf War have already found their way into the fold of the new system. This time however, many support and sustain programs in Libya and Sudan, as well as in third countries from where the Iraqis ship the goods on their own. Thus, when Lt.Gen. Hussein Kamal "defected" in the Summer of 1995, he was bringing data of what was left behind in Iraq -- not on the wave of the future already being constructed in Sudan and Libya."
The URL is http://www.eretzyisroel.org/~jkatz/wmd.html
I read about this drone in our media and the possibility of its use within the last 6 weeks. Ah! You overlooked it, you say?
This is a typical example of "new discoveries" that are really old news resurfacing in desperate attempts to justify an attack.
So come on! Discredit this, especially the source! I have no intention of continuing with debate on these issues. A post by Duff made me see you guys as you really are. he reckoned people "with Jewish friends are anti-semites". Ok, I will not renounce my friends, but from now on I am anti-Semite. You guys made me one!
As for the war? BRING IT ON! Zap Iraq, may the Yanks learn from their masters, the Israelis, and target the women and children in an attempt to demoralise them completely.I couldnt care less any more. I am not a Saddam fan, I just hate being fed "bulls*it. And may unfolding events in the war turn around and bite those who instigated it for perverse reasons.
And dont worry too much about throwing b/dust back at me- I wont be here, i'll be painting my letterbox.
