https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrco...

https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/documents/hrbodies/hrcouncil/sessions-regular/session56/a-hrc-56-crp-4.pdf
10 June 2024

Human Rights CouncilFifty-sixth session

Detailed findings on the military operations and attackscarried out in the Occupied Palestinian Territory from 7October to 31 December 2023*
Independent International Commission of Inquiry on theOccupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, andIsrael

I. Introduction1.
The Commission investigated attacks carried out on 7 October 2023 onseveral civilian targets in Israel, an attack on one military base, and rocket andmortar attacks. The Commission also investigated Israeli attacks on the Gazastrip up to 31 December 2023, with a focus on the siege, attacks on evacuatingcivilians and attacks on residential buildings and refugee camps. Thisconference room paper provides detailed findings on acts committed by Israeltowards Palestinians in the Occupied Palestinian Territory up to 31 December2023. The conference room paper also examines some incidents that took placeafter this date when they were relevant to the topics under discussion and wereseen to represent a similar trend. This conference room paper also includessome acts carried out by Palestinian armed groups in the Gaza strip and theoccupied West Bank. The Commission examines acts committed by Palestinianarmed groups in Israel in its first conference room paper A/HRC/56/CRP.3.2. The Commission sent four requests for information to Israel and onerequest to the State of Palestine. Israel did not respond. The State of Palestineprovided the Commission with information. The Commission submitted sixrequests for access to Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory. Israelpersists in not responding to the Commission’s requests for access to itsterritory and in preventing access to the Occupied Palestinian Territory. TheCommission considers that Israel is obstructing its investigation s into eventson and since 7 October 2023, both in Israel and in the Occupied PalestinianTerritory. The State of Palestine has indicated that it would welcome a visit bythe Commission.3. The Commission undertook a mission to the Republic of Türkiye andthe Arab Republic of Egypt from 28 February to 8 March 2024 to meet withPalestinians evacuated from the Gaza Strip on medical grounds and theirrelatives. In this regard, the Commission thanks the Governments of bothcountries for giving it access to their territories and the support provided duringits mission. The Commission also thanks other States and organisations thathave supported the implementation of its mandate since its last report

IV. Factual Findings - acts committed by Israel in theOccupied Palestinian Territory from 7 October to 31December 202320

A. Israeli statements
24. The Commission notes at the outset that senior Israeli public officials,including the President, the Prime Minister, Ministers in Government,Members of the State Security Cabinet, Members of the War ManagementCabinet, Members of the Knesset, other politicians, ISF officials andcommanders, and others in their official public capacity have usedinflammatory language in their comments on and since 7 October. Their wordsshape the public narrative and garner widespread public support for theirpositions. Their words also affect the development and implementation ofpublic policies. This power, inherent in holding public office or militarycommand, comes with the corresponding heavy responsibility to use theirplatforms (both traditional media and social media) with the utmost cautionand abstain from incitement to violence, discrimination, hatred and otherserious international crimes.

25. In addition to public officials, those in the public sphere, such asjournalists, celebrities, television commentators and social media influencers,among others, are obligated to refrain from incitement to violence, hatred,discrimination and other serious international crimes. Finally, the Commissionnotes that social media companies such as X (formerly Twitter) and Meta(Facebook and Instagram’s parent company) are under a duty to rigorously review and strengthen their content moderation policies, review accounts andposts that do not adhere to such standards, and deplatform those who violatesuch standards

26. The Commission has collected more than 40 statements by Israelipolitical and military officials and other public and media figures. TheCommission finds that, alongside statements indicating military and politicalstrategy, Israeli officials and public figures made statements of incitement toviolence, hatred, discrimination and even more serious statements proclaiminga new Nakba or calling for the erasure of the Palestinian people from Gaza.These statements systematically dehumanize the Palestinians in Gaza, portrayall Palestinians as Hamas militants or supporters and arguably reflect the IsraeliGovernment modus operandi of giving little or no regard to the protections towhich civilians are entitled under international humanitarian law. TheCommission considers that such statements can produce an atmosphere ofhatred, violence and vengeance that may have a causal connection to thecommission of violations of international human rights law, internationalhumanitarian law and international crimes.

Statements alluding to military and political goals and strategy

27. Israeli leaders have emphasised the threat to Israel and harm and traumato Israelis as a result of the 7 October attack, when referring to why they startedthe military operations in the Gaza Strip. Israeli leaders have consistentlydescribed the military operations in the Gaza Strip as “self-defence” and a “justwar”, framing it as Israel’s second independence war, and comparing it toIsrael’s wars of 1948, 1967 and 1973, among others. Israel’s impetus forstarting its large-scale operation was the Hamas-led attack of 7 October, which,as well as marking an unprecedented number of casualties in a one-day attackin Israel, also evoked for Israelis and Jews worldwide traumatic memories ofthe Holocaust and the deaths of six million Jews in Europe between 1933 and1945, as well as memories of millennia of persecution. Israeli leaders alsorepeatedly stated that the attack of 7 October 2023 presented an existentialthreat to Israel, as justification for the decision to conduct a large-scale militaryoperation in Gaza. Thus, for many Israelis and Israeli leaders, there was onlyone possible response to such an attack, a wide-scale and unprecedentedmilitary operation in Gaza to ensure the complete elimination of Hamas onceand for all.

28. The Commission observes in relation to such statements that, first, thereis no evidence suggesting that the events of 7 October, as tragic and outrageousas they were, at any time posed a real threat to the continued existence of theState of Israel or of the Jewish people. Second, Netanyahu‘s framing of theHamas-led attack as an existential threat to Israel and to Jewish peopleeverywhere appears to have been intended to strengthen the argument thatIsrael can engage in extreme measures in the Gaza Strip, to build external andinternal support for its hostilities and to reduce criticism for its impact onPalestinians. On 1 November 2023, a single Israeli military voice challengedthis narrative. The Head of the ISF Intelligence Division, Major GeneralAharon Haliwa, who has since resigned his post, stated: “This is a war of nochoice. But it is not an existential war. The existence of the State of Israel isnot at stake." The Commission agrees with this statement and notes that Israelhas the duty to protect its citizens and others under its control, subject tointernational humanitarian law and international human rights law.

28. The Commission observes in relation to such statements that, first, thereis no evidence suggesting that the events of 7 October, as tragic and outrageousas they were, at any time posed a real threat to the continued existence of theState of Israel or of the Jewish people. Second, Netanyahu‘s framing of theHamas-led attack as an existential threat to Israel and to Jewish peopleeverywhere appears to have been intended to strengthen the argument thatIsrael can engage in extreme measures in the Gaza Strip, to build external andinternal support for its hostilities and to reduce criticism for its impact onPalestinians. On 1 November 2023, a single Israeli military voice challengedthis narrative. The Head of the ISF Intelligence Division, Major GeneralAharon Haliwa, who has since resigned his post, stated: “This is a war of nochoice. But it is not an existential war. The existence of the State of Israel isnot at stake." The Commission agrees with this statement and notes that Israelhas the duty to protect its citizens and others under its control, subject tointernational humanitarian law and international human rights law.

29. On 20 October 2023, Defence Minister Yoav Gallant outlined threeprincipal stages in Israel’s military strategy in the Gaza Strip. First, Israel willdestroy the Hamas movement and its military and governance infrastructure.Second, it will stabilise the governance system in the Gaza Strip and eliminatepockets of resistance. Third, it will impose a new security regime, in which Israel is not responsible for the day-to-day life in the Gaza Strip but has fullfreedom of activity to ensure there is no threat coming from the Gaza Strip.

30. Prime Minister Netanyahu’s vision for the “day after Hamas”, presentedon 23 February 2024, echoed Galant’s statement. Netanyahu presented threephases in his plan. In the immediate phase, the ISF will continue its hostilitiesuntil reaching its objectives: destruction of Hamas’s military capacity and theHamas and PIJ governmental infrastructure, return of the hostages anddeterrence of any threats from the Gaza Strip. In the interim phase, Israel wouldkeep a military freedom of movement in the entire territory, will establish asecurity buffer zone in all areas bordering Israel and will maintain securitycontrol of all areas west of Jordan, including the Gaza Strip and the occupiedWest Bank. The Gaza Strip will be completely demilitarized. The managementof civil affairs in the Strip will be handed over to local community leaders withsuch experience. Israel will also work towards the closure of the United NationsRelief and Works Agency (UNRWA) and will promote a de-radicalizationprogram to be implemented in religious institutions, schools and welfareinstitutions. Netanyahu reiterated that, in the long-term, Israel will not bedictated to by third parties in relation to a permanent agreement with thePalestinians and it would continue opposing a one-sided recognition of aPalestinian state, noting that such recognition would mean a reward forterrorism. Netanyahu’s plan leads the Commission to question several ofIsrael’s stated goals in its Gaza operation and raises concern for Israel’s plansfor the future of the Gaza Strip and the Palestinian people as a whole.

31. The United Nations Secretary General’s spokesperson responded toNetanyahu’s plan, stating “we recognize Israel’s legitimate security needs, butfor the Secretary General, and I think he underscores and reiterates that anysustainable solution for long-term peace must be in the framework of a two-State solution and an end to the occupation, an establishment of a fullyindependent, democratic, contiguous, sovereign and viable Palestinian State ofwhich Gaza is an integral part, in line with international law, relevant UNresolutions, and existing bilateral agreements. And I would also add that weremain very concerned by the continuing rhetoric and plans and efforts that areundermining the work of UNRWA.”2132. The Commission notes that Netanyahu’s “Day after Hamas” plan maybe seen as implying a de facto annexation of the Gaza Strip, a move whichIsrael has considered on at least two occasions prior to 2023: during theLausanne conciliation talks in 1949 and after the 1967 war. Netanyahu’s planclearly indicates Israel’s intention for the military operations to extend wellbeyond removing Hamas as a military threat to the complete removal of anyformal Palestinian governmental functions in the Gaza Strip. It also clearlypresents an intention to occupy the Gaza Strip fully and militarily under theguise of security needs and to oppose Palestinian self-determination, includingpolitical independence, territorial integrity and permanent sovereignty. Theexpansion of Israel’s aims in this regard, coupled with the continuous emphasison the denial of the Palestinian people’s right to self-determination, suggeststhat its military operation has shifted to targeting the autonomy of thePalestinian people as a whole.