Also, forget about oil, it is just a bonus in Iraq. There is a...

Also, forget about oil, it is just a bonus in Iraq. There is a much bigger stake at play.

Dave R.

yes Dave, it's Israel's security, that what's at play

shalom Dave R


> The war on Iraq:
> Conceived in Israel (Part I)
> By STEPHEN J. SNIEGOSKI
>
> In a lengthy article in The American Conservative criticizing the
> rationale for the projected U.S. attack on Iraq, the veteran diplomatic
> historian Paul W. Schroeder noted (only in passing) "what is possibly
> the unacknowledged real reason and motive behind the policy - security
> for Israel." If Israel's security were indeed the real American motive
> for war, Schroeder wrote,
>
> It would represent something to my knowledge unique in history.
> It is common for great powers to try to fight wars by proxy, getting
> smaller powers to fight for their interests. This would be the first
> instance I know where a great power (in fact, a superpower) would
> do the fighting as the proxy of a small client state. [1] Is there any
> evidence that Israel and her supporters have managed to get the
> United States to fight for their interests? To unearth the real motives
> for the projected war on Iraq, one must ask the critical question:
> How did the 9/11 terrorist attack lead to the planned war on Iraq,
> even though there is no real evidence that Iraq was involved in 9/11?
> From the time of the 9/11 attack, neoconservatives, of primarily
> (though not exclusively) Jewish ethnicity and right-wing Zionist
> persuasion, have tried to make use of 9/11 to foment a broad war
> against Islamic terrorism, the targets of which would coincide with
> the enemies of Israel. Although the term neoconservative is in common
> usage, a brief description of the group might be helpful. Many of the
> first-generation neocons originally were liberal Democrats, or even
> socialists and Marxists, often Trotskyites. They drifted to the right in
> the 1960s and 1970s as the Democratic Party moved to the antiwar
> McGovernite left. And concern for Israel loomed large in that rightward
> drift. As political scientist Benjamin Ginsberg puts it:
>
> One major factor that drew them inexorably to the right was their
> attachment to Israel and their growing frustration during the 1960s
> with a Democratic party that was becoming increasingly opposed to
> American military preparedness and increasingly enamored of Third
> World causes [e.g., Palestinian rights]. In the Reaganite right's hard-line
> anti-communism, commitment to American military strength, and
> willingness to intervene politically and militarily in the affairs of
> other nations to promote democratic values (and American interests),
> neocons found a political movement that would guarantee Israel's
> security. [2]
>
> For some time prior to September 11, 2001, neoconservatives had
> publicly advocated an American war on Iraq. The 9/11 atrocities
> provided the pretext. The idea that neocons are the motivating force
> behind the U.S. movement for war has been broached by a number
> of commentators. For instance, Joshua Micah Marshall authored an
> article in The Washington Monthly titled: "Bomb Saddam?: How the
> obsession of a few neocon hawks became the central goal of U.S.
> foreign policy." And in the leftist e-journal CounterPunch, Kathleen
> and Bill Christison wrote:
>
> The suggestion that the war with Iraq is being planned at Israel's behest,
> or at the instigation of policymakers whose main motivation is trying to
> create a secure environment for Israel, is strong. Many Israeli analysts >
> believe this. The Israeli commentator Akiva Eldar recently observed
> frankly in a Ha'aretz column that Perle, Feith, and their fellow strategists
> "are walking a fine line between their loyalty to American governments
> and Israeli interests." The suggestion of dual loyalties is not a verboten
> subject in the Israeli press, as it is in the United States. Peace activist
> Uri Avnery, who knows Israeli Prime Minister Sharon well, has written
> that Sharon has long planned grandiose schemes for restructuring the
> Middle East and that "the winds blowing now in Washington remind me
> of Sharon. I have absolutely no proof that the Bushies got their ideas
> from him. But the style is the same." [3]
>
> In the following essay I attempt to flesh out that thesis and show the
> link between the war position of the neoconservatives and the long-time
> strategy of the Israeli Right, if not of the Israeli mainstream itself. In brief,
> the idea of a Middle East war has been bandied about in Israel for many
> years as a means of enhancing Israeli security, which revolves around an
> ultimate solution to the Palestinian problem.
>
> War and expulsion
>
> To understand why Israeli leaders would want a Middle East war, it is
> first necessary to take a brief look at the history of the Zionist movement
> and its goals. Despite public rhetoric to the contrary, the idea of expelling
> (or, in the accepted euphemism, "transferring") the indigenous Palestinian
> population was an integral part of the Zionist effort to found a Jewish
> national state in Palestine. Historian Tom Segev writes:
>
> The idea of transfer had accompanied the Zionist movement from its
> very beginnings, first appearing in Theodore Herzl's diary. In practice,
> the Zionists began executing a mini-transfer from the time they began
> purchasing the land and evacuating the Arab tenants.... "Disappearing"
> the Arabs lay at the heart of the Zionist dream, and was also a necessary
> condition of its existence.... With few exceptions, none of the Zionists
> disputed the desirability of forced transfer - or its morality.
>
> However, Segev continues, the Zionist leaders learned not to publicly
> proclaim their plan of mass expulsion because "this would cause the
> Zionists to lose the world's sympathy." [4]
>
> The key was to find an opportune time to initiate the expulsion so it
> would not incur the world's condemnation. In the late 1930s, David
> Ben-Gurion wrote: "What is inconceivable in normal times is possible
> in revolutionary times; and if at this time the opportunity is missed
> and what is possible in such great hours is not carried out - a whole
> world is lost." [5] The "revolutionary times" would come with the first
> Arab-Israeli war in 1948, when the Zionists were able to expel 750,000
> Palestinians (more than 80 percent of the indigenous population), and
> thus achieve an overwhelmingly Jewish state, though its area did not
> include the entirety of Palestine, or the "Land of Israel," which Zionist
> leaders thought necessary for a viable state.
>
> The opportunity to grab additional land occurred as a result of the 1967
> war; however, that occupation brought with it the problem of a large
> Palestinian population. By that time world opinion was totally opposed
> to forced population transfers, equating such a policy with the unspeakable
> horror of Nazism. The landmark Fourth Geneva Convention, ratified in
> 1949, had "unequivocally prohibited deportation" of civilians under
> occupation.
>
> [6] Since the 1967 war, the major question in Israeli politics has been:
> What to do with that territory and its Palestinian population?
> It was during the 1980s, with the coming to power of the right-wing
> Likud government, that the idea of expulsion resurfaced publicly. And
> this time it was directly tied to a larger war, with destabilization of the >
> Middle East seen as a precondition for Palestinian expulsion. Such a
> proposal, including removal of the Palestinian population, was outlined
> in an article by Oded Yinon, titled "A Strategy for Israel in the 1980s,"
> appearing in the World Zionist Organization's periodical Kivunim in
> February 1982. Yinon had been attached to the Israeli Foreign Ministry
> and his article undoubtedly reflected high-level thinking in the Israeli
> military and intelligence establishment. The article called for Israel to
> bring about the dissolution and fragmentation of the Arab states into
> a mosaic of ethnic groupings. Thinking along those lines, Ariel Sharon
> stated on March 24, 1988, that if the Palestinian uprising continued,
> Israel would have to make war on her Arab neighbors. The war, he
> stated, would provide "the circumstances" for the removal of the entire
> Palestinian population from the West Bank and Gaza and even from
> inside Israel proper. [7]
>
> Israeli foreign policy expert Yehoshafat Harkabi critiqued the
> war/expulsion scenario - referring to "Israeli intentions to impose a
> Pax Israelica on the Middle East, to dominate the Arab countries and
> treat them harshly" - in his very significant work, Israel's Fateful Hour,
> published in 1988. Writing from a realist perspective, Harkabi
> concluded that Israel did not have the power to achieve that goal,
> given the strength of the Arab states, the large Palestinian population
> involved, and the vehement opposition of world opinion. He hoped that
> "the failed Israeli attempt to impose a new order in the weakest Arab state
> - Lebanon - will disabuse people of similar ambitions in other territories."
> [8] Left unconsidered by Harkabi was the possibility that the United States
> would act as Israel's proxy to achieve the overall goal.
>
> U.S. Realpolitik
>
> In the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. Middle Eastern policy, although sympathetic
> to Israel, was not identical to that of Israel. The fundamental goal of U.S.
> policy was to promote stable governments in the Middle East that would
> allow oil to flow reliably to the Western industrial nations. It was not
> necessary for the Muslim countries to befriend Israel - in fact they could
> openly oppose the Jewish state. The United States worked for peace between
> Israel and the Muslim states in the region, but it was to be a peace that
> would accommodate the demands of the Muslim nations - most crucially
> their demands involving the Palestinians.
>
> Pursuing its policy of ensuring the security of Middle East oil supplies,
> by the mid 1980s Washington was heavily supporting Iraq in her war
> against Iran, although for a while the United States had also provided
> some aid to Iran (viz. the Iran-contra scandal). Ironically, Donald
> Rumsfeld was the U.S. envoy who in 1983 paved the way for the
> restoration of relations with Iraq, relations which had been severed in
> 1967. The United States along with other Western nations looked upon
> Iraq as a bulwark against the radical Islamism of the Ayatollah's Iran,
> which threatened Western oil interests. U.S. support for Iraq included
> intelligence information, military equipment, and agricultural credits.
> And the United States deployed the largest naval force since the Vietnam
> War in the Persian Gulf. Ostensibly sent for the purpose of protecting
> oil tankers, it ended up engaging in serious attacks on Iran's navy.
>
> It was during this period of U.S. support that Iraq used poison gas
> against the Iranians and the Kurds, a tactic that the U.S. government
> and its media supporters now describe as so horrendous. In fact, U.S.
> intelligence facilitated the Iraqi use of gas against the Iranians. In addition,
> Washington eased up on its own technology export restrictions to Iraq,
> which allowed the Iraqis to import supercomputers, machine tools, >
> poisonous chemicals, and even strains of anthrax and bubonic plague.
> In short, the United States helped arm Iraq with the very weaponry of
> horror that administration officials are now trumpeting as justification
> for forcibly removing Saddam from power. [9]
>
> When the Iran/Iraq war ended in 1988, the United States continued its
> support for Iraq, showering her with military hardware, advanced
> technology, and agricultural credits. The United States apparently
> looked to Saddam to maintain stability in the Gulf. But American
> policy swiftly changed when Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990.
> Neoconservatives were hawkish in generating support for a U.S. war
> against Iraq. The Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf, headed
> by Richard Perle, was set up to promote the war. [10] And neoconservative
> war hawks such as Perle, Frank Gaffney, Jr., A.M. Rosenthal, William
> Safire, and The Wall Street Journal held that America's war objective
> should be not simply to drive Iraq out of Iran but also to destroy Iraq's
> military potential, especially her capacity to develop nuclear weapons.
> The first Bush administration embraced that position. [11]
>
> But beyond that, the neocons hoped that the war would lead to the
> removal of Saddam Hussein and the American occupation of Iraq.
> However, despite the urgings of then-Defense Secretary Richard Cheney
> and Undersecretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, the full conquest of
> Iraq was never accomplished because of the opposition of General
> Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and General Norman
> Schwarzkopf, the field commander. [12] Moreover, the United States
> had a UN mandate only to liberate Kuwait, not to remove Saddam.
> To attempt the latter would have caused the U.S.-led coalition to
> fall apart. America's coalition partners in the region, especially Turkey
> and Saudi Arabia, feared that the elimination of Saddam's government
> would cause Iraq to fragment into warring ethnic and religious groups.
> That could have involved a Kurdish rebellion in Iraq that would have
> spread to Turkey's own restive Kurdish population. Furthermore, Iraq's
> Shiites might have fallen under the influence of Iran, increasing the
> threat of Islamic radicalism in the region.
>
> Not only did the Bush administration dash neoconservative hopes by
> leaving Saddam in place, but its proposed "New World Order," as
> implemented by Secretary of State James Baker, conflicted with
> neoconservative/Israeli goals, being oriented toward placating the
> Arab coalition that supported the war. That entailed an effort to curb
> Israeli control of her occupied territories. The Bush administration
> demanded that Israel halt the construction of new settlements in the
> occupied territories as a condition for receiving $10 billion in U.S.
> loan guarantees for Israel's resettlement of hundreds of thousands of
> immigrants from the former Soviet Union. Although Bush would cave
> in to American pro-Zionist pressure just prior to the November 1992
> election, his resistance disaffected many neocons, causing some, such
> as Safire, to back Bill Clinton in the 1992 election. [13]
>
> The network
>
> During the Clinton administration, neoconservatives promoted their
> views from a strong interlocking network of think tanks - the American
> Enterprise Institute (AEI), Middle East Media Research Institute (Memri),
> Hudson Institute, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Middle East
> Forum, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA), Center
> for Security Policy (CSP) - which have had great influence in the media
> and which have helped to staff Republican administrations. Some of the
> organizations were originally set up by mainline conservatives and only
> later taken over by neoconservatives; [14] others were established by >
> neocons, with some of the groups having a direct Israeli connection.
> For example, Colonel Yigal Carmon, formerly of Israeli military
> intelligence, was a co-founder of the Middle East Media Research
> Institute (Memri). And the various organizations have been closely
> interconnected. For example, the other co-founder of Memri, Meyrav
> Wurmser, was a member of the Hudson Institute, while her husband,
> David Wurmser, headed the Middle East studies department of AEI.
> And Perle was both a "resident fellow" at the American Enterprise
> Institute (AEI) and a trustee of the Hudson Institute. [15]
>
> In a recent article in the The Nation, Jason Vest discusses the immense
> influence in the current Bush administration of people from two major
> neocon research organizations, JINSA and CSP. Vest details the close
> links among the two organizations, right-wing politicians, arms merchants,
> military men, Jewish billionaires, and Republican administrations. [16]
> Regarding JINSA, Vest writes:
>
> Founded in 1976 by neoconservatives concerned that the United States
> might not be able to provide Israel with adequate military supplies in the
> event of another Arab-Israeli war, over the past twenty-five years JINSA
> has gone from a loose-knit proto-group to a $1.4-million-a-year operation
> with a formidable array of Washington power players on its rolls. Until the
> beginning of the current Bush administration, JINSA's board of advisors
> included such heavy hitters as Cheney, John Bolton (now Under Secretary
> of State for Arms Control) and Douglas J. Feith, the third-highest-ranking
> executive in the Pentagon. Both Perle and former Director of Central
> Intelligence James Woolsey, two of the loudest voices in the attack-Iraq
> chorus, are still on the board, as are such Reagan-era relics as Jeane
> Kirkpatrick, Eugene Rostow, and [Michael] Ledeen - Oliver North's
> Iran/contra liaison with the Israelis. [17]
>
> Vest notes that "dozens" of JINSA and CSP "members have ascended to
> powerful government posts, where their advocacy in support of the same
> agenda continues, abetted by the out-of-government adjuncts from which
> they came. Industrious and persistent, they've managed to weave a number
> of issues - support for national missile defense, opposition to arms control
> treaties, championing of wasteful weapons systems, arms aid to Turkey and
> American unilateralism in general - into a hard line, with support for the
> Israeli right at its core." And Vest continues: "On no issue is the
> JINSA/CSP hard line more evident than in its relentless campaign for
> war - not just with Iraq, but 'total war,' as Michael Ledeen, one of the
> most influential JINSAns in Washington, put it last year. For this crew,
> 'regime change' by any means necessary in Iraq, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia
> and the Palestinian Authority is an urgent imperative." [18]
>
> Let's recapitulate Vest's major points. The JINSA/CSP network has
> "support for the Israeli right at its core." In line with the views of the
> Israeli right, it has advocated a Middle Eastern war to eliminate the
> enemies of Israel. And members of the JINSA/CSP network have gained
> influential foreign policy positions in Republican administrations, most
> especially in the current administration of George W. Bush.
>
> "Securing the realm"
>
> A clear illustration of the neoconservative thinking on war on Iraq is
> a 1996 paper developed by Perle, Feith, David Wurmser, and others
> published by an Israeli think tank, the Institute for Advanced Strategic
> and Political Studies, titled "A clean break: a new strategy for securing
> the realm." It was intended as a political blueprint for the incoming
> government of Benjamin Netanyahu. The paper stated that Netanyahu
> should "make a clean break" with the Oslo peace process and reassert >
> Israel's claim to the West Bank and Gaza. It presented a plan whereby
> Israel would "shape its strategic environment," beginning with the
> removal of Saddam Hussein and the installation of a Hashemite
> monarchy in Baghdad, to serve as a first step toward eliminating the
> anti-Israeli governments of Syria, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. [19]
>
> Note that these Americans - Perle, Feith, and Wurmser - were advising
> a foreign government and that they currently are connected to the George
> W. Bush administration: Perle is head of the Defense Policy Board; Feith
> is Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy; and Wurmser is special
> assistant to State Department chief arms control negotiator John Bolton.
> It is also remarkable that while in 1996 Israel was to "shape its strategic
> environment" by removing her enemies, the same individuals are now
> proposing that the United States shape the Middle East environment by
> removing Israel's enemies. That is to say, the United States is to serve as
> Israel's proxy to advance Israeli interests.
>
> On February 19, 1998, in an "Open Letter to the President," the
> neoconservative Committee for Peace and Security in the Gulf proposed
> "a comprehensive political and military strategy for bringing down Saddam
> and his regime." The letter continued: "It will not be easy - and the course
> of action we favor is not without its problems and perils. But we believe
> the vital national interests of our country require the United States to
> [adopt such a strategy]." Among the letter's signers were the following
> current Bush administration officials: Elliott Abrams (National Security
> Council), Richard Armitage (State Department), Bolton (State Department),
> Feith (Defense Department), Fred Ikle (Defense Policy Board), Zalmay
> Khalilzad (White House), Peter Rodman (Defense Department), Wolfowitz
> (Defense Department), David Wurmser (State Department), Dov Zakheim
> (Defense Department), Perle (Defense Policy Board), and Rumsfeld
> (Secretary of Defense). [20] In 1998 Donald Rumsfeld was part of the
> neocon network and already demanding war with Iraq. [21]
>
> Signers of the letter also included such pro-Zionist and neoconservative
> luminaries as Robert Kagan, William Kristol, Gaffney (Director, Center
> for Security Policy), Joshua Muravchik (American Enterprise Institute),
> Martin Peretz (editor-in-chief, The New Republic), Leon Wieseltier
> (The New Republic), and former Rep. Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.). [22]
> President Clinton would only go so far as to support the Iraq Liberation
> Act, which allocated $97 million dollars for training and military
> equipment for the Iraqi opposition. [23]
>
> In September 2000, the neocon think tank Project for the New American
> Century (PNAC) [24] issued a report, "Rebuilding America's Defenses:
> Strategy, Forces and Resources for a New Century," that envisioned an
> expanded global posture for the United States. In regard to the Middle
> East, the report called for an increased American military presence in the
> Gulf, whether Saddam was in power or not., maintaining that "the United
> States has for decades sought to play a more permanent role in Gulf
> regional security. While the unresolved conflict with Iraq provides the
> immediate justification, the need for a substantial American force presence
> in the Gulf transcends the issue of the regime of Saddam Hussein." [25]
> The project's participants included individuals who would play leading
> roles in the second Bush administration: Cheney (Vice President),
> Rumsfeld (secretary of defense), Wolfowitz (deputy secretary of defense),
> and Lewis Libby (Cheney's chief of staff). Weekly Standard editor William
> Kristol was also a co-author.
>
> In order to directly influence White House policy, Wolfowitz and Perle
> managed to obtain leading roles on the Bush foreign policy/national >
> security advisory team for the 2000 campaign. Headed by Soviet specialist
> Condoleezza Rice, the team was referred to as "the Vulcans." Having no
> direct experience in foreign policy and little knowledge of the world, as
> illustrated by his notorious gaffes - confusing Slovakia with Slovenia,
> referring to Greeks as "Grecians," and failing a pop quiz on the names of
> four foreign leaders - George W. Bush would have to rely heavily on his
> advisors.
>
> "His foreign policy team," Kagan observed, "will be critically important
> to determining what his policies are." And columnist Robert Novak noted:
> "Since Rice lacks a clear track record on Middle East matters, Wolfowitz
> and Perle will probably weigh in most on Middle East policy." [26] In
> short, Wolfowitz and Perle would provide the know-nothing Bush with
> a ready-made foreign policy for the Middle East. And certainly such
> right-wing Zionist views would be reinforced by Cheney and Rumsfeld
> and the multitude of other neocons who would inundate Bush's administration.
> Neocons would fill the key positions involving defense and foreign policy.
> On Rumsfeld's staff are Wolfowitz and Feith. On Cheney's staff, the
> principal neoconservatives include Libby, Eric Edelman, and John Hannah.
> And Cheney himself, with his long-time neocon connections and views,
> has played a significant role in shaping "Bush" foreign policy. [27]
>
> A Perle among men
>
> Perle is often described as the most influential foreign-policy
> neoconservative, their eminence grise.[28] He gained notice in the 1970s
> as a top aide to Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson (D-Wash.), who was one
> of the Senate's most anti-Communist and pro-Israeli members. During the
> 1980s, Perle served as deputy secretary of defense under Ronald Reagan,
> where his hard-line anti-Soviet positions, especially his opposition to any
> form of arms control, earned him the moniker "Prince of Darkness" from
> his enemies. However, his friends considered him, as one put it, "one of
> the most wonderful people in Washington." That Perle is known as a man
> of great intellect, a gracious and generous host, a witty companion, and a
> loyal ally helps to explain his prestige in neoconservative circles. [29]
>
> Perle isn't just an exponent of pro-Zionist views; he has also had close
> connections with Israel, being a personal friend of Sharon's, a board
> member of the Jerusalem Post, and an ex-employee of the Israeli weapons
> manufacturer Soltam. According to author Seymour M. Hersh, while
> Perle was a congressional aide for Jackson, FBI wiretaps picked up Perle
> providing classified information from the National Security Council to
> the Israeli embassy. [30]
>
> Although not technically part of the Bush administration, Perle holds
> the unpaid chairmanship of the Defense Policy Board. In that position,
> Perle has access to classified documents and close contacts with the
> administration leadership. As an article in Salon puts it: "Formerly an
> obscure civilian board designed to provide the secretary of defense
> with non-binding advice on a whole range of military issues, the Defense
> Policy Board, now stacked with unabashed Iraq hawks, has become a
> quasi-lobbying organization whose primary objective appears to be
> waging war with Iraq." [31]
>
> "Actions inconceivable at present"
> As Bush and his people came into office in January 2001, press reports
> in Israel quoted government officials and politicians speaking openly
> of mass expulsion of the Palestinians. Ariel Sharon was elected prime
> minister of Israel in February 2001; noted for his ruthlessness, he had
> said in the past that Jordan should become the Palestinian state where
> Palestinians removed from Israeli territory would be relocated. [32]
> Public concern was mounting in Israel over demographic changes that >
> threatened the Jewish nature of the Israeli state. Haifa University professor
> Arnon Sofer released the study, "Demography of Eretz Israel," which
> predicted that by 2020 non-Jews would be a majority of 58 percent in
> Israel and the occupied territories. [33] Moreover, it was recognized that
> the overall increase in population would exceed what the land, with its
> limited supply of water, could support. [34]
>
> It appeared to some that Sharon intended to achieve expulsion through
> militant means. As one left-wing analyst put it at the time: "One big war
> with transfer at its end - this is the plan of the hawks who indeed almost
> reached the moment of its implementation." [35] In the summer of 2001,
> the authoritative Jane's Information Group reported that Israel had
> completed the planning for a massive and bloody invasion of the
> Occupied Territories, involving "air strikes by F-15 and F-16 fighter
> bombers, a heavy artillery bombardment, and then an attack by a
> combined force of 30,000 men ... tank brigades and infantry." Such
> bold strikes would aim at far more than simply removing Arafat and
> the PLO leadership. But the United States vetoed the plan, and Europe
> made its opposition to Sharon's plans equally plain. [36]
>
> As one close observer of the Israeli-Palestinian scene presciently wrote
> in August 2001, "It is only in the current political climate that such
> expulsion plans cannot be put into operation. As hot as the political
> climate is at the moment, clearly the time is not yet ripe for drastic
> action. However, if the temperature were raised even higher, actions
> inconceivable at present might be possible." [37] Once again,
> "revolutionary times" were necessary for Israel to achieve its policy
> goals. And then came the September 11 attacks.
>
> Revolutionary September
>
> The September 11 atrocities provided the "revolutionary times" in which
> Israel could undertake radical measures unacceptable during normal
> conditions. When asked what the attack would do for U.S.-Israeli relations,
> former prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu responded: "It's very good."
> Then he edited himself: "Well, not very good, but it will generate immediate
> sympathy." Netanyahu correctly predicted that the attack would "strengthen
> the bond between our two peoples, because we've experienced terror over
> so many decades, but the United States has now experienced a massive
> hemorrhaging of terror." Sharon placed Israel in the same position as the
> United States, referring to the attack as an assault on "our common values"
> and declaring, "I believe together we can defeat these forces of evil." [38]
> In the eyes of Israel's leaders, the September 11 attacks had joined the
> United States and Israeli together against a common enemy. And that
> enemy was not in far-off Afghanistan but was geographically close to
> Israel. Israel's traditional enemies would now become America's as well.
> And Israel would have a better chance of dealing with the Palestinians
> under the cover of a "war on terrorism."
>
> Immediately after the 9/11 attacks, the neoconservatives began to publicly
> push for a wider war on terrorism that would immediately deal with Israel's
> enemies. For example, Safire held that the real terrorists that America
> should focus on were not groups of religious fanatics "but Iraqi scientists
> today working feverishly in hidden biological laboratories and underground
> nuclear facilities [who] would, if undisturbed, enable the hate-driven,
> power-crazed Saddam to kill millions. That capability would transform
> him from a boxed-in bully into a rampant world power." [39]
>
> Within the administration, Wolfowitz clearly implied a broader war against
> existing governments when he said: "I think one has to say it's not just
> simply a matter of capturing people and holding them accountable, but >
> removing the sanctuaries, removing the support systems, ending states
> who sponsor terrorism. And that's why it has to be a broad and sustained
> campaign. It's not going to stop if a few criminals are taken care of." [40]
>
> On September 20, 2001, neocons of the Project for the New American
> Century sent a letter to President Bush endorsing the war on terrorism
> and stressing that the removal of Saddam was an essential part of that war.
> They maintained that "even if evidence does not link Iraq directly to the
> attack, any strategy aiming at the eradication of terrorism and its
> sponsors must include a determined effort to remove Saddam Hussein
> from power in Iraq. Failure to undertake such an effort will constitute
> an early and perhaps decisive surrender in the war on international terrorism."
> Furthermore, the letter-writers opined, if Syria and Iran failed to stop
> all support for Hezbollah, the United States should "consider appropriate
> measures against these known sponsors of terrorism." Among the letter's
> signatories were such neoconservative luminaries as William Kristol,
> Midge Decter, Eliot Cohen, Francis Fukuyama, Gaffney, Kagan, Kirkpatrick,
> Charles Krauthammer, Perle, Peretz, Norman Podhoretz, Solarz, and
> Wieseltier. [41]
>
> FOCUS ON ZIONIST GENOCIDE: THE WAR ON IRAQ CONCEIVED IN ISRAEL - PART 2
>
> The war on Iraq:
> Conceived in Israel (Part II)
> By STEPHEN J. SNIEGOSKI
>
>
> World War IV
> In the October 29, 2002, issue of The Weekly Standard, Kagan and Kristol
> predict a wider Middle Eastern war:
>
> When all is said and done, the conflict in Afghanistan will be to the war
> on terrorism what the North Africa campaign was to World War II: an
> essential beginning on the path to victory. But compared with what looms
> over the horizon - a wide-ranging war in locales from Central Asia to the
> Middle East and, unfortunately, back again to the United States -
> Afghanistan will prove but an opening battle.... But this war will not end
> in Afghanistan. It is going to spread and engulf a number of countries in
> conflicts of varying intensity. It could well require the use of American
> military power in multiple places simultaneously. It is going to resemble
> the clash of civilizations that everyone has hoped to avoid. [42]
> Kagan and Kristol seem to be looking forward to this gigantic conflagration.
> In a November 20, 2002, article in The Wall Street Journal, Eliot Cohen
> dubs the conflict "World War IV," a term picked up by other neocons. Cohen
> proclaims that "The enemy in this war is not 'terrorism' ... but militant
> Islam.... Afghanistan constitutes just one front in World War IV, and the
> battles there just one campaign." Cohen calls not only for a U.S. attack on
> Iraq but also for the elimination of the Islamic regime in Iran, which
> "would be no less important a victory in this war than the annihilation of
> bin Laden." [43]
> Critics of a wider war in the Middle East quickly recognized the
> neoconservative war-propaganda effort. Analyzing the situation in September
> 2002, paleoconservative [44] Scott McConnell wrote: "For the
> neoconservatives ... bin Laden is but a sideshow.... They hope to use
> September 11 as pretext for opening a wider war in the Middle East. Their
> prime, but not only, target is Saddam Hussein's Iraq, even if Iraq has
> nothing to do with the World Trade Center assault." [45]
> However, McConnell mistakenly considered the neocon stance to be only a
> minority view within the Bush administration:
>
> The neocon wish list is a recipe for igniting a huge conflagration between
> the United States and countries throughout the Arab world, with
> consequences no one could reasonably pretend to calculate. Support for such
> a war - which could turn quite easily into a global war - is a minority
> position within the Bush administration (assistant secretary of state Paul >
> Wolfowitz is its main advocate) and the country. But it presently dominates
> the main organs of conservative journalistic opinion, the Wall Street
> Journal, National Review, the Weekly Standard, and the Washington Times, as
> well as Marty Peretz's neoliberal New Republic. In a volatile situation,
> such organs of opinion could matter. [46]
> Expressing a similar view, veteran columnist Georgie Anne Geyer observed:
>
> The "Get Iraq" campaign ... started within days of the September
> bombings.... It emerged first and particularly from pro-Israeli hard-liners
> in the Pentagon such as Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz and advisor
> Richard Perle, but also from hard-line neoconservatives, and some
> journalists and congressmen.
> Soon it became clear that many, although not all, were in the group that is
> commonly called in diplomatic and political circles the "Israeli-firsters,"
> meaning that they would always put Israeli policy, or even their perception
> of it, above anything else.
> Geyer believed that this line of thinking was "being contained by cool
> heads in the administration, but that could change at any time." [47]
>
> Lighting up the recesses of Bush
> Neoconservatives have presented the September 11 atrocities as a lightning
> bolt to make President Bush aware of his destiny: destroying the evil of
> world terrorism. Ironically enough, Podhoretz adopted Christian terminology
> to describe a changed Bush:
>
> A transformed - or, more precisely, a transfigured - George W. Bush
> appeared before us. In an earlier article ... I suggested, perhaps
> presumptuously, that out of the blackness of smoke and fiery death let
> loose by September 11, a kind of revelation, blazing with a very different
> fire of its own, lit up the recesses of Bush's mind and heart and soul.
> Which is to say that, having previously been unsure as to why he should
> have been chosen to become President of the United States, George W. Bush
> now knew that the God to whom, as a born-again Christian, he had earlier
> committed himself had put him in the Oval Office for a purpose. He had put
> him there to lead a war against the evil of terrorism. [48]
> In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, administration heavyweights debated the
> scope of the "war on terrorism." According to Bob Woodward's Bush at War,
> as early as September 12 Rumsfeld "raised the question of attacking Iraq.
> Why shouldn't we go against Iraq, not just al Qaeda? he asked. Rumsfeld was
> speaking not only for himself when he raised the question. His deputy, Paul
> D. Wolfowitz, was committed to a policy that would make Iraq a principal
> target of the first round in the war on terrorism." [49]
> Woodward adds, "The terrorist attacks of September 11 gave the United
> States a new window to go after Hussein." On September 15, Wolfowitz put
> forth military arguments to justify a U.S. attack on Iraq rather than
> Afghanistan. Wolfowitz expressed the view that "attacking Afghanistan would
> be uncertain," voicing the fear that American troops would be "bogged down
> in mountain fighting.... In contrast, Iraq was a brittle, oppressive regime
> that might break easily. It was doable." [50]
> However, the neoconservatives were not able to achieve their goal of a
> wider war at the outset, in part because of the opposition of Secretary of
> State Powell, who held that the war should focus on the actual perpetrators
> of September 11. (That was how most Americans actually envisioned the war.)
> Perhaps Powell's most telling argument was his declaration that an American
> attack on Iraq would lack international support. He claimed that a U.S.
> victory in Afghanistan would enhance the United States's ability to deal
> militarily with Iraq at a later time, "if we can prove that Iraq had a
> role" in September 11. [51]
> Powell diverged from the neocon hawks in his emphasis on the need for >
> international support, as opposed to American unilateralism, but an even
> greater difference lay in his contention that the "war on terror" had to be
> directly linked to the perpetrators of September 11 - Osama bin Laden's
> network. Powell publicly repudiated Wolfowitz's call for "ending states"
> with the response that "we're after ending terrorism. And if there are
> states and regimes, nations, that support terrorism, we hope to persuade
> them that it is in their interest to stop doing that. But I think 'ending
> terrorism' is where I would leave it and let Mr. Wolfowitz speak for
> himself." [52]
> Very significantly, however, while the "war on terrorism" would not begin
> with an attack on Iraq, military plans were being made for just such an
> endeavor. A Top Secret document outlining the war plan for Afghanistan,
> which Bush signed on September 17, 2001, included, as a minor point,
> instructions to the Pentagon to also start making plans for an attack on
> Iraq. [53]
> Bush's public pronouncements evolved rapidly in the direction of expanding
> the war to Iraq. On November 21, 2001, in a speech at Fort Campbell,
> Kentucky, he proclaimed that "Afghanistan is just the beginning of the war
> against terror. There are other terrorists who threaten America and our
> friends, and there are other nations willing to sponsor them. We will not
> be secure as a nation until all these threats are defeated. Across the
> world, and across the years, we will fight these evil ones, and we will
> win." [54]
> On November 26, in response to a question whether Iraq was one of the
> terrorist nations that he had in mind, Bush said: "Well, my message is, is
> that if you harbor a terrorist, you're a terrorist. If you feed a
> terrorist, you're a terrorist. If you develop weapons of mass destruction
> that you want to terrorize the world, you'll be held accountable." Note
> that Bush included possession of weapons of mass destruction as an
> indicator of "terrorism." And none of that terrorist activity necessarily
> related to the September 11 attacks. [55]
>
> Transformation complete
> The transformation to support of a wider war was complete with Bush's
> January 29, 2002, State of the Union speech, in which he officially
> decoupled the "war on terrorism'' from the specific events of 9/11. Bush
> did not even mention bin Laden or al Qaeda. The danger now was said to come
> primarily from three countries - Iran, Iraq, and North Korea - which he
> dubbed "an axis of evil" that allegedly threatened the world with their
> weapons of mass destruction. According to Bush:
>
> States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil,
> arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass
> destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could
> provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their
> hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United
> States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be
> catastrophic. [56]
> The phrase "axis of evil" was coined by Bush's neoconservative
> speechwriter, David Frum. [57]
> By April 2002, Bush was publicly declaring that American policy was to
> secure "regime change" in Iraq. And in June, he stated that the United
> States would launch preemptive strikes on those countries that threatened
> the United States. [58] According to what passes as the conventional
> wisdom, Iraq now posed such a threat. Moreover, by the spring of 2002,
> General Tommy R. Franks, chief of U.S. Central Command, began giving Bush
> private briefings every three or four weeks on the planning for a new Iraq
> war. [59]
> Neoconservatives both within and without the administration sought a
> unilateral U.S. attack on Iraq that would not be encumbered by the
> conflicting goals of any coalition partners. That push was countered by >
> Powell's efforts to persuade Bush that UN sanction would be necessary to
> justify a U.S. attack, which the President ultimately found persuasive.
> That slowed the rush to war, but it also represented a move by Powell away
> from his original position that Washington should make war on Iraq only if
> Baghdad were proven to have been involved in the September 11 terrorism.
>
> The UN Security Council decided that UN inspectors, with sweeping
> inspection powers, would determine whether Iraq was violating her pledge to
> destroy all of her weapons of mass destruction. UN Security Council
> Resolution 1441 (November 8, 2002) places the burden of proof on Iraq to
> show that she no longer possesses weapons of mass destruction. The
> resolution states that any false statements or omissions in the Iraqi
> weapons declaration would constitute a further material breach by Iraq of
> her obligations. That could set in motion discussions by the Security
> Council on considering the use of military force against Iraq.
> While some have claimed that this might mean that war would be put off,
> [60] it also allows the United States to use the new UN resolution as a
> legal justification for war. In fact, the United States could choose to
> enforce the resolution through war without additional UN authorization. As
> British journalist Robert Fisk writes: "The United Nations can debate any
> Iraqi non-compliance with weapons inspectors, but the United States will
> decide whether Iraq has breached UN resolutions. In other words, America
> can declare war without UN permission." [61]
> Armchair strategists
> Neoconservatives not only have determined the foreign policy leading to war
> against Iraq but have played a role in molding military strategy as well.
> Top military figures, including members of the Joint Chiefs, initially
> expressed opposition to the whole idea of such a war. [62] But Perle and
> other neoconservatives have for some time insisted that toppling Saddam
> would require little military effort or risk. They pushed for a war
> strategy dubbed "inside-out" that would involve attacking Baghdad and a
> couple of other key cities with a very small number of airborne troops, as
> few as 5,000 in some estimates. According to the plan's supporters, such
> strikes would cause Saddam's regime to collapse. American military leaders
> adamantly opposed that approach as too risky, offering in its stead a plan
> to use a much larger number of troops - about 250,000 - who would invade
> Iraq in a more conventional manner, marching from the soil of her
> neighbors, as was done during the Gulf War of 1991.
> Perle and the neoconservatives, for their part, feared that no neighboring
> country would provide the necessary bases, so that this approach would
> likely mean that no war would be initiated or that, during the lengthy time
> needed to assemble this large force, opposition to war would so burgeon as
> to render the operation politically impossible. Perle angrily responded to
> the military's demurral by saying that the decision to attack Iraq was "a
> political judgment that these guys aren't competent to make." [63] Cheney
> and Rumsfeld went even further, referring to the generals as "cowards" for
> being insufficiently gung-ho about an Iraq invasion. [64]
> Now, one might be tempted to attribute Perle and the other neocons'
> rejection of the military's caution to insane hubris - how could amateurs
> pretend to know more about military strategy than professional military
> men? However, Richard Perle may be many things, but insane is not one of
> them. Nor is he stupid. Undoubtedly he has thought through the implications
> of his plan. And it is apparent that the "inside-out" option would be a
> win-win proposition from Perle's perspective.
> Let's assume that it works - that a few American troops can capture some >
> strategic areas and the Iraqi army quickly folds. Perle and the neocons
> appear as military geniuses and are rewarded with free rein to prepare a
> series of additional low-cost wars in the Middle East.
> On the other hand, let's assume that the mini-invasion is a complete
> fiasco. The American troops are defeated in the cities. Many are captured
> and paraded around for all the world to see. Saddam makes bombastic
> speeches about defeating the American aggressor. All the Arab and Islamic
> world celebrates the American defeat. American flags are burned in massive
> anti-American celebrations throughout the Middle East. America is totally
> humiliated, depicted as a paper tiger, and ordinary Americans watch it all
> on TV. How do they react?
> Such a catastrophe would be another Pearl Harbor in terms of engendering
> hatred of the enemy. The public would demand that American honor and
> prestige be avenged. They would accept the idea fed to them by the
> neoconservative propagandists that the war was one between America and
> Islam. Washington would unleash total war, which would involve heavy
> bombing of cities. And the air attacks could easily spread from Iraq to the
> other neighboring Islamic states. A war of conquest and extermination is
> the neocons' fondest dream since it would destroy all of Israel's enemies
> in the Middle East. (It appears that the Pentagon has augmented the
> magnitude of the Iraq strike force to reduce the risk of the aforementioned
> scenario.) [65]
>
> "Our Enemies, the Saudis"
> Indications are plentiful that the war will not be limited to Iraq alone.
> On July 10, 2002, Laurent Murawiec, at Perle's behest, briefed the Defense
> Policy Board about Saudi Arabia, whose friendly relationship with the
> United States has been the linchpin of American security strategy in the
> Middle East for more than 50 years. Murawiec described the kingdom as the
> principal supporter of anti-American terrorism - "the kernel of evil, the
> prime mover, the most dangerous opponent." It was necessary, he claimed,
> for the United States to regard Saudi Arabia as an enemy. Murawiec said
> Washington should demand that Riyadh stop funding fundamentalist Islamic
> outlets around the world, prohibit all anti-U.S. and anti-Israeli
> propaganda in the country, and "prosecute or isolate those involved in the
> terror chain, including in the Saudi intelligence services." If the Saudis
> refused to comply with the ultimatum, Murawiec contended that the United
> States should invade and occupy the country, including the holy sites of
> Mecca and Medina, seize her oil fields, and confiscate her financial
> assets. [66]
> Murawiec concluded the briefing with the astounding summary of what he
> called a "Grand Strategy for the Middle East:" "Iraq is the tactical pivot.
> Saudi Arabia the strategic pivot. Egypt the prize." In short, the goal of
> the war on Iraq was the destruction of the United States' closest allies.
> It would be hard to envision a policy better designed to inflame the entire
> Middle East against the United States. But that is exactly the result
> sought by neoconservatives. [67]
> Predictably, the day after the briefing, the Bush administration disavowed
> Murawiec's scenario as having nothing to do with actual American foreign
> policy and pronounced Saudi Arabia a loyal ally. [68] However, the White
> House did nothing to remove or even discipline Perle for holding a
> discussion of a plan for attacking a close ally - and individuals have
> frequently been removed from administrations for much smaller faux pas. We
> may be certain that the Bush administration's inaction failed to assure the
> Saudis that Murawiec's war plan was beyond the realm of possibility.
> Murawiec's anti-Saudi scenario simultaneously emerged in the neocon press.
> The July 15, 2002, issue of The Weekly Standard featured an article titled >
> "The Coming Saudi Showdown," by Simon Henderson of the neoconservative
> Washington Institute for Near East Policy. And the July/August issue of
> Commentary, published by the American Jewish Committee, contained an
> article titled, "Our Enemies, the Saudis." [69]
> The leading neoconservative expert on Saudi Arabia, Stephen Schwartz, made
> his views known, too, though he did pay a price for it. Schwartz has
> written numerous articles as well as a recent book, The Two Faces of Islam:
> The House of Sa'ud from Tradition to Terror, in which he posits a
> Saudi/Wahhabist conspiracy to take over all of Islam and spread terror
> throughout the world. As a result of his anti-Saudi comments, Schwartz was
> dismissed from his brief tenure as an editorial writer with the Voice of
> America at the beginning of July 2002, thus becoming a martyr in
> neoconservative circles. [70]
> As Thomas F. Ricks points out in the Washington Post, the anti-Saudi
> bellicosity expressed by Murawiec "represents a point of view that has
> growing currency within the Bush administration - especially on the staff
> of Vice President Cheney and in the Pentagon's civilian leadership - and
> among neoconservative writers and thinkers closely allied with
> administration policymakers." [71]
> By November 2002, the anti-Saudi theme had reached the mainstream - with an
> article in Newsweek alleging financial support for the 9/11 terrorists from
> the Saudi royal family, and commentary on the subject by such leading
> figures in the Senate as Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.), John McCain (R-Ariz.),
> Charles Schumer (D-New York), and Richard Shelby (R-Ala.). [72]
> Bush administration policy has come a long way but has still not reached
> what neocons seek: a war by the United States against all of Islam.
> According to Podhoretz, doyen of the neoconservatives: "Militant Islam
> today represents a revival of the expansionism by the sword" of Islam's
> early years. [73] In Podhoretz's view, to survive resurgent Islam the
> United States must not simply stand on the defensive but must stamp out
> militant Islam at its very source in the Middle East:
>
> The regimes that richly deserve to be overthrown and replaced are not
> confined to the three singled-out members of the axis of evil. At a
> minimum, this axis should extend to Syria and Lebanon and Libya, as well as
> "friends" of America like the Saudi royal family and Egypt's Hosni Mubarak,
> along with the Palestinian Authority, whether headed by Arafat or one of
> his henchmen.
> After the great conquest, the United States would remake the entire region,
> which would entail forcibly re-educating its people to fall into line with
> the thinking of America's leaders. Podhoretz acknowledges that the people
> of the Middle East might, if given a free democratic choice, pick
> anti-American and anti-Israeli leaders and policies. But he proclaims that
> "there is a policy that can head it off" provided "that we then have the
> stomach to impose a new political culture on the defeated parties. This is
> what we did directly and unapologetically in Germany and Japan after
> winning World War II." [74]
>
> Expulsion redux
> Within Israel herself, however, the Arabs would not be expected to adopt a
> "new political culture"; they would be expected to vanish.
> Expulsion of the Palestinians is inextricably intertwined with a Middle
> Eastern war - or, in Ben-Gurion's phrase, "revolutionary times." As the
> post-September 11 "war on terror" has heated up, the talk of forcibly
> "transferring" the Palestinians has once again moved to the center of
> Israeli politics. According to Illan Pappe, a Jewish Israeli revisionist
> historian, "You can see this new assertion talked about in Israel: the
> discourse of transfer and expulsion which had been employed by the extreme
> Right, is now the bon ton of the center." [75]>
> Even the dean of Israel's revisionist historians, Benny Morris, explicitly
> endorsed the expulsion of the Palestinians in the event of war. "This land
> is so small," Morris exclaimed, "that there isn't room for two peoples. In
> fifty or a hundred years, there will only be one state between the sea and
> the Jordan. That state must be Israel."
> According to a recent poll conducted by Israel's Jaffee Center for
> Strategic Studies, nearly one-half of Israelis support expulsion of West
> Bank and Gaza Palestinians, and nearly one-third support expulsion of
> Israeli Arabs. Three-fifths support "encouraging" Israeli Arabs to leave. [76]
> In April 2002, leading Israeli military historian Martin van Creveld held
> that a U.S. attack on Iraq would provide the cover for Prime Minister
> Sharon to forcibly remove the Palestinians from the West Bank. In Creveld's
> view, "The expulsion of the Palestinians would require only a few
> brigades," which would rely on "heavy artillery." Creveld continued:
> "Israeli military experts estimate that such a war could be over in just
> eight days. If the Arab states do not intervene, it will end with the
> Palestinians expelled and Jordan in ruins. If they do intervene, the result
> will be the same, with the main Arab armies destroyed.... Israel would
> stand triumphant, as it did in 1948, 1956, 1967, and 1973." [77]
> Although Creveld did not express any opposition to this impending
> expulsion, in September 2002, a group of Israeli academics did issue a
> declaration of opposition, stating, "We are deeply worried by indications
> that the 'fog of war' could be exploited by the Israeli government to
> commit further crimes against the Palestinian people, up to full-fledged
> ethnic cleansing." [78]
> The declaration continued:
>
> The Israeli ruling coalition includes parties that promote "transfer" of
> the Palestinian population as a solution to what they call "the demographic
> problem." Politicians are regularly quoted in the media as suggesting
> forcible expulsion, most recently [Knesset members] Michael Kleiner and
> Benny Elon, as reported on Yediot Ahronot website on September 19, 2002. In
> a recent interview in Ha'aretz, Chief of Staff Moshe Ya'alon described the
> Palestinians as a "cancerous manifestation" and equated the military
> actions in the Occupied Territories with "chemotherapy," suggesting that
> more radical "treatment" may be necessary. Prime Minister Sharon has backed
> this "assessment of reality." Escalating racist demagoguery concerning the
> Palestinian citizens of Israel may indicate the scope of the crimes that
> are possibly being contemplated. [79]
> In the fall of 2002, the Jordanian government, fearing that Israel might
> push the Palestinian population into Jordan during the anticipated U.S.
> attack on Iraq, asked for public assurances from the Israeli government
> that it would not make such a move. The Sharon regime, however, has refused
> to publicly renounce an expulsion policy. [80]
>
> Simply a pretext
> As is now apparent, the "war on terrorism" was never intended to be a war
> to apprehend and punish the perpetrators of the September 11 atrocities.
> September 11 simply provided a pretext for government leaders to implement
> long-term policy plans. As has been pointed out elsewhere, including in my
> own writing, oil interests and American imperialists looked upon the war as
> a way to incorporate oil-rich Central Asia within the American imperial
> orbit. [81] While that has been achieved, the American-sponsored government
> of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan is in a perilous situation. Karzai's power
> seems to be limited to his immediate vicinity, and he must be protected by
> American bodyguards. The rest of Afghanistan is being fought over by
> various war lords and even the resurgent Taliban. [82] Instead of putting >
> forth the effort to help consolidate its position in Central Asia,
> Washington has shifted its focus to gaining control of the Middle East.
> It now appears that the primary policymakers in the Bush administration
> have been the Likudnik neoconservatives all along. Control of Central Asia
> is secondary to control of the Middle East. In fact, for the leading
> neocons, the war on Afghanistan may simply have been an opening gambit,
> necessary for reaching their ultimate and crucial goal: U.S. control of the
> Middle East in the interests of Israel. That is analogous to what
> revisionist historians have presented as Franklin D. Roosevelt's "back door
> to war" approach to World War II. Roosevelt sought war with Japan in order
> to be able to fight Germany, and he provoked Japan into attacking U.S.
> colonial possessions in the Far East. Once the United States got into war
> through the back door, Roosevelt focused the American military effort on
> Germany. [83]
>
> The oil motive
> But what about the American desire for controlling Iraqi oil? Iraq
> possesses the world's second-largest proven oil reserves, next to Saudi
> Arabia. Moreover, many experts believe that Iraq possesses vast
> undiscovered oil reserves, making her the near-equal of Saudi Arabia. Most
> critics of war allege that American oil companies' desire to gain control
> of Iraqi oil is what motivates U.S. war policy. Some, mostly proponents of
> war, have also argued that, once in control of Iraqi oil, the United States
> could inundate the world with cheap oil, thus boosting the American and
> world economies out of recession. [84]
> Although the arguments have a prima facie plausibility, the oil motive for
> war has a couple of serious flaws. First, oil industry representatives or
> big economic moguls do not seem to be clamoring for war. According to oil
> analyst Anthony Sampson, "oil companies have had little influence on U.S.
> policy-making. Most big American companies, including oil companies, do not
> see a war as good for business, as falling share prices indicate." [85]
> Further, it is not apparent that war would be good for the oil industry or
> the world economy. Why would Big Oil want to risk a war that could ignite a
> regional conflagration threatening their existing investments in the Gulf?
> Iraq does indeed have significant oil reserves, but there is no reason to
> believe that they would have an immediate impact on the oil market. Daniel
> Yergin, chairman of Cambridge Energy Research Associates, points out:
>
> In terms of production capacity, Iraq represents just 3 percent of the
> world's total. Its oil exports are on the same level as Nigeria's. Even if
> Iraq doubled its capacity, that could take more than a decade. In the
> meantime, growth elsewhere would limit Iraq's eventual share to perhaps 5
> percent, significant but still in the second tier of oil nations. [86]
> A war would pose a great risk to the oil industry in the entire Gulf
> region. As William D. Nordhaus, Sterling Professor of Economics at Yale and
> a member of the President Carter's Council of Economic Advisers, writes:
>
> War in the Persian Gulf might produce a major upheaval in petroleum
> markets, either because of physical damage or because political events lead
> oil producers to restrict production after the war.
> A particularly worrisome outcome would be a wholesale destruction of oil
> facilities in Iraq, and possibly in Kuwait, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. In the
> first Persian Gulf War, Iraq destroyed much of Kuwait's oil wells and other
> petroleum infrastructure as it withdrew. The sabotage shut down Kuwaiti oil
> production for close to a year, and prewar levels of oil production were
> not reached until 1993 - nearly two years after the end of the war in
> February 1991.
> Unless the Iraqi leadership is caught completely off-guard in a new war, >
> Iraq's forces would probably be able to destroy Iraq's oil production
> facilities. The strategic rationale for such destruction is unclear in
> peacetime, but such an act of self-immolation cannot be ruled out in
> wartime. Contamination of oil facilities in the Gulf region by biological
> or chemical means would pose even greater threats to oil markets. [87]
> Nordhaus's forecasts may be excessively bleak. However, the point is that
> the experts simply cannot gauge what will happen. War poses tremendous
> risk. In his evaluation of the possible economic impact of a war on Iraq,
> economic analyst Robert J. Samuelson concludes: "If it's peace and
> prosperity, then war makes no sense. But if fighting now prevents a
> costlier war later, it makes much sense." [88]
> None of this to deny that certain oil companies might benefit from a Middle
> East war, just as some businesses profit from any war. Particular oil
> companies could stand to benefit from American control of Iraq, since under
> a postwar U.S.-sponsored Iraqi government, American companies could be
> expected to be favored and gain the most lucrative oil deals. However, that
> particular oil companies could derive some benefits does not undercut the
> overall argument that war is a great risk for the American oil industry and
> the American economy as a whole.
> An American-imperialist strategic motive might be more plausible than the
> economic interests of the oil industry and the economy in general. Instead
> of the current informal influence over the oil producing areas of the
> Middle East, the United States would move into direct control, either with
> a puppet government in Iraq providing enough leverage for Washington to
> dictate to the rest of the Middle East, or actual direct U.S. control of
> other parts of the Middle East as well as Iraq. Presumably that state of
> affairs would provide greater security for the oil flow than exists under
> the current situation, where the client states enjoy some autonomy and face
> the possibility of being overthrown by anti-American forces.
> Neoconservative Robert Kagan maintains, "When we have economic problems,
> it's been caused by disruptions in our oil supply. If we have a force in
> Iraq, there will be no disruption in oil supplies." [89]
> Neoconservatives often try to gloss over this projected American
> colonialism by claiming that the United States would be simply spreading
> democracy. They imply that "democratic" Middle East governments would
> support American policies, including support of Israel and an oil policy
> oriented toward the welfare of the United States. However, given popular
> anti-Zionist and anti-American opinion in the region, it seems highly
> unlikely that governments representative of the popular will would ever
> pursue such policies. Only a non-representative dictatorship could be
> pro-American and pro-Israeli. Zionist U.S. Rep. Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) put
> it candidly in calming the worries of an Israeli member of the Knesset:
> "You won't have any problem with Saddam. We'll be rid of the bastard soon
> enough. And in his place we'll install a pro-Western dictator, who will be
> good for us and for you." [90]
>
> The new foreign imperialism
> Control of the Middle East oil supply would certainly augment U.S.
> domination of the world. However, American imperialists who are in no way
> linked to the Likudnik position on Israel - e.g., Zbigniew Brzezinski and
> Brent Scowcroft - are cool to such a Middle East war. [91] If such a war
> policy would be an obvious boon to American imperialism, why isn't it
> avidly sought by leading American imperialists?
> Direct colonial control of a country's internal affairs would be a
> significant break with American policy of the past half-century. America
> might have client states and an informal empire, but the direct imperialism >
> entailed by an occupation of the Middle East would be, as Mark Danner put
> it in the New York Times, "wholly foreign to the modesty of containment,
> the ideology of a status-quo power that lay at the heart of American
> strategy for half a century." [92]
> Moreover, a fundamental concern of American global policy has been to
> maintain peace and stability in the world. Washington preaches probity and
> restraint to other countries regarding the use of force. Hence, for the
> United States to launch a preemptive strike on a country would undoubtedly
> weaken her ability to restrain other countries, which would also see a need
> to preemptively strike at their foes. In short, the launching of preemptive
> war would destabilize the very world order that the United States allegedly
> seeks to preserve in her "war on terrorism." In fact, world stability is
> often seen as central to the global economic interdependence that is the
> key to American prosperity. [93]
> Since America already exercises considerable power in the oil-producing
> Persian Gulf region through her client states - Saudi Arabia and the Gulf
> emirates - it is difficult to understand why American imperialists would
> make a radical change from their status-quo policy. Would the benefits to
> be gained from direct control of the region outweigh the risks involved?
> War could unleash virulent anti-American forces that could destabilize
> America's Middle East client states and incite terrorist attacks on the
> American homeland. Moreover, American military occupation of Iraq, not to
> mention other Middle Eastern countries, would place a heavy burden on the
> U.S. government and people. [94]
> Would such a burden be acceptable to the American people? Would they
> support the brutal policies needed to suppress any opposition? In the 1950s
> the people of France would not support the brutality necessary to retain
> the colonial empire in Algeria. Even in the totalitarian Soviet Union,
> popular opinion forced the abandonment of the imperialistic venture in
> Afghanistan, which contributed to the break-up of the entire Soviet empire.
> In short, the move from indirect to direct control of the Middle East would
> strike men who were simply concerned about enhancing American imperial
> power as the gravest sort of risk-taking, because it could undermine
> America's entire imperial project.
> Direct American control of the Middle East would not only prove burdensome
> to the American people but would also undoubtedly provoke a backlash from
> other countries. That almost seems to be a law of international relations -
> operating since the time of the balance-of-power politics practiced during
> the Peloponnesian War. As Christopher Layne points out:
>
> The historical record shows that in the real world, hegemony never has been
> a winning grand strategy. The reason is simple: The primary aim of states
> in international politics is to survive and maintain their sovereignty. And
> when one state becomes too powerful - becomes a hegemon - the imbalance of
> power in its favor is a menace to the security of all other states. So
> throughout modern international political history, the rise of a would-be
> hegemon always has triggered the formation of counter-hegemonic alliances
> by other states. [95]
> The British Empire, which might seem an exception to the rule of the
> inevitable failure of hegemons, achieved its success because of its
> caution. Owen Harries, editor of the National Interest, has pointed out
> that England's imperial successes stemmed from her rather cautious
> approach. "England," observed Harries in the Spring 2001 issue, "was the
> only hegemon that did not attract a hostile coalition against itself. It
> avoided that fate by showing great restraint, prudence and discrimination
> in the use of its power in the main political arena by generally standing >
> aloof and restricting itself to the role of balancer of last resort. In
> doing so it was heeding the warning given it by Edmund Burke, just as its
> era of supremacy was beginning: 'I dread our own power and our own
> ambition. I dread being too much dreaded.'" Notes Harries, "I believe the
> United States is now in dire need of such a warning." [96]
> Obviously, the American takeover of the major oil-producing area of the
> world would be anything but a cautious move. It would characterize a
> classic example of what historian Paul Kennedy refers to as "imperial
> over-stretch." Tied down in the Middle East, the United States would find
> it more difficult to counter threats to its power in the rest of the world.
> Even now it is questionable whether the U.S. military has the capability to
> fight two wars at once, a problem (from the standpoint of the U.S. regime)
> that has now come to the fore with the bellicosity of North Korea. [97] In
> essence, it is not apparent that intelligent American imperialists
> concerned solely about the power status of the United States, which holds
> preeminence in the world right now, would want to take the risk of a Middle
> East war and occupation.
>
> No American motive
> The previous analysis leads to the conclusion not only that the
> neoconservatives are obviously in the forefront of the pro-war bandwagon
> but also that pro-Israeli Likudnik motives are the most logical, probably
> the only logical, motives for war. As I have noted, Likudniks have always
> sought to deal in a radical fashion with the Palestinian problem in the
> occupied territories - a problem that has gotten worse, from their
> standpoint, as a result of demographic changes. A U.S. war in the Middle
> East at the present time provides a window of opportunity to permanently
> solve that problem and augment Israel's dominance in the region. The
> existing perilous situation, as Likud thinkers see it, would justify the
> taking of substantial risks. And a look at history shows that countries
> whose leaders believed they were faced with grave problems pursued risky
> policies, such as Japan did in 1941. [98]
> In contrast, no such dire threats face the United States. American
> imperialists should be relatively satisfied with the status quo and averse
> to taking any risks that might jeopardize it.
> ***
> The deductions drawn in this essay seem obvious but are rarely broached in
> public because Jewish power is a taboo subject. As the intrepid Joseph
> Sobran puts it: "It's permissible to discuss the power of every other
> group, from the Black Muslims to the Christian Right, but the much greater
> power of the Jewish establishment is off-limits." [99]
> So in a check for "hate" or "anti-Semitism," let's recapitulate the major
> points made in this essay. First, the initiation of a Middle East war to
> solve Israeli security problems has been a long-standing idea among Israeli
> rightist Likudniks. Next, Likudnik-oriented neoconservatives argued for
> American involvement in such a war prior to the atrocities of September 11,
> 2001. Since September 11, neocons have taken the lead in advocating such a
> war; and they hold influential foreign policy and national security
> positions in the Bush administration.
> If Israel and Jews were not involved, there would be nothing extraordinary
> about my thesis. In the history of foreign policy, it has frequently been
> maintained that various leading figures were motivated by ties to business,
> an ideology, or a foreign country. In his Farewell Address, George
> Washington expressed the view that the greatest danger to American foreign
> relations would be the "passionate attachment" of influential Americans to
> a foreign power, which would orient U.S. foreign policy for the benefit of
> that power to the detriment of the United States. It is just such a >
> situation that currently exists.
> We can only look with trepidation to the near future, for in the ominous
> words of Robert Fisk, "There is a firestorm coming." [100]
>