Kicking our SAS, page-81

Snippets from SMH.

Systemic failure is also identified with patrol commanders deliberately keeping officers at a distance from the close fight. A further problem was higher in the command chain. Australian national leadership "did not have the degree of command and control over Special Operations Task Group".

The Australian Special Operators were instead more accountable to their brethren in International Security Assistance Force Special Operations Command – principally the Americans.

Pommie SAS are also accused of war crime and probably reported to the Americans.

The first recommendation of the IGADF report is that, "in future, so far as is practicable, Australia should retain operational command over its deployed forces, including Special Forces, rather than assigning them under command to other entities".

Privately, there was little faith in the detention option. Suspected insurgents were frequently released for lack of evidence, thereby posing a further threat.

Interviewing 510 witnesses and "eliciting truthful disclosures in the closed, closely bonded and highly compartmentalised Special Forces community, in which loyalty to one’s mates, immediate superiors and the unity are paramount, in which secrecy is at a premium, and in which those who ‘leak’ are an anathema", does take a while.

The bloodying of newer members maybe the result of changes to training techniques at home, after a SAS members was killed in simulated rescues of a hostage using live ammunition.

The following is simply my interpretation of why this practice possibly eventuated...it is probably to remove hesitation in killing someone during close combat situation...especially amongst a group whose life depends on their mates reaction.

I believe more SAS members have been killed in training at home then in combat.