Let the legal games begin, page-25

Looks like the Independent Scientific Panel and Linc were aware of and discussed the issues with the earlier pilot gasifiers in good faith and had taken steps to rectify shortcomings. i.e. no cover up.

As with any pilot program researching and developing new technology you expect to learn some lessons the hard way but IMO it looks like they didnt just live with the problems - they improved safety and monitoring systems and shared the data openly with the QLD govt appointed ISP investigation.

Havent seen any further updates from the court. When is the next sitting day of the hearing?

QUOTE FROM ISP report
Linc Energy manages a site that is clearly an experimental facility (of world leading standard). Linc Energy makes no pretence that the site was selected and characterised with the risks associated with a particular commercial-ready design in mind. Therefore, it is not reasonable to expect that the site characterisation necessarily meets the optimal requirements of first layer of protection for all the designs tested to date. In this regard it is important to observe that the most recent pilot (gasifier 5) is substantially different to gasifier 4 in a number of non-trivial design respects. Carbon Energy has managed their site with a view to scale up of their operation to multiple panels. The failure of the first panel to progress beyond a short distance before collapse of a critical underground pathway required design change for the second gasifier (which appears to be functioning more effectively). Clearly, Carbon Energy is still evolving towards a final design. Once this is achieved it will be possible to assess the site selection in terms of a multiple panel design. It is clear that both companies have learned a lot about gasifier design as would be hoped from well run pilot programmes. Optimal site characterisation (careful and comprehensive matching of site characterisation and process design) is yet to be convincingly demonstrated. The ISP is of the opinion that both companies have gained sufficient knowledge to be able to demonstrate this in selecting a new site.

Pilot Trial Issue and Lesson Learned The pilot trials have been subject to mechanical design problems relating to the ignition, injection and production wells. Mechanical failures of the well casings and / or well heads resulting from inadequate design, selection of materials and construction have been experienced. Deviations caused by temperature and pressure resulted in weakening of the liners or lifting of the wells that subsequently failed. Whilst petroleum engineering designs were adopted, these did not account sufficiently for the higher temperatures associated with UCG operation and there is a clear need for a shift to design standards that do, such as for those associated with geothermal wells. Carbon Energy and Linc Energy have evolved their well designs to account for UCG operations to enable operation and acceptable deviation within appropriate temperature regimes and in situ removal of well blockages. This greatly reduces the risk of well head failure.

Pilot trials have corroborated conventional understanding that monitoring systems are an integral component of the UCG process design. For example, the operating pressure of the cavity should not exceed the hydrostatic pressure of the surrounding groundwater. When the hydrostatic pressure is exceeded for a sustained period an increased presence of contaminants in the monitoring wells has been observed and reported. Carbon Energy and Linc Energy acknowledge that operating pressures greater than the hydrostatic pressure lead to gas and vapour diffusion into the surrounding strata resulting in detection of products of pyrolysis in groundwater. Therefore groundwater monitoring wells should be setup prior to the construction or drilling of any panel. The pilot trials have included monitoring wells which have been setup as regulatory and reporting requirements from the various regulatory bodies, or as deemed appropriate by the individual UCG proponents. Carbon Energy has provided data indicating that when operating pressure dropped below hydrostatic groundwater pressure, contaminants migrated and that these could be redirected to the cavity by control of the rate of air injection and thereby internal cavity pressure. This is an important lesson of successful monitoring, deviation detection and corrective action.

Incidents occurred during the pilot trials that indicate that sufficient safety instrument systems were not in place. One example of this may be emergency shutdown buttons for the injection compressors following over-pressurisation of the cavity and failure of pressure control systems. This may include provisions for emergency depressurisation of the cavity, sending the syngas to the flare. The pilot trial reports do not indicate such a sophisticated level of process control. However, the risk assessment reports for both Carbon Energy and Linc Energy have indicated that the UCG proponents have learned the necessary awareness of these issues and plan to have provisions in place in the future.

ENDQUOTE