Every 9 months or since it listed, I re-visit the investment...

Every 9 months or since it listed, I re-visit the investment thesis for this company and every time I ask myself, "Are we nearly there yet?"

And every time the answer to my question is either, "No", or it is "I can't tell".

What I can't fathom is how a company operating in the employee wellness space is incapable of making money an absolute poultice of money, let alone not even breaking even.

And its not just a matter of Covid which is to blame - in terms of Free Cash Flow this company hasn't been able to wash its face for years.

It's not as if it is unable to attract custom; it generates lots of revenue - in excess of US$50m pa of it, from 150 customers across a broad range of economic sectors.

The problem is that it fails to turn those meaningful revenues to account.
(Since being founded 15 years ago, it has amassed a substantial US$43m in Accumulated Losses.)

It's almost like it is run as a not-for-profit organisation.

So on an EV/Revenue basis, it looks very interesting, but unless it gets to a point where it reports some profits, that will be irrelevant.

Footnote: The Appendix 4C for the current quarter is likely to look very good - certainly the best in many quarters - given a ~US$4m subscription payment from a large enterprise customer was received in October, and the recently-acquired TINYPulse business will make its first full-period contribution.
(The loss of cash receipts from the terminated American Airlines contract will occur only from 1 January 2022 - if the termination isn't reversed by then given the normalising air travel conditions in the northern hemisphere.

But what happens in the next few quarters is anyone's guess, and I'll like to see some potential for free cash flow sustainability before contemplating buying shares in the company, as tempting as it now might appear after the significant fall in its market value since it IPO.'d

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