michael costello on iraq.

Michael Costello: The war was Saddam's fault

February 06, 2004
THE case for war against Iraq remains as strong as ever - on legal grounds, moral grounds and security grounds.

This might seem a big statement in the light of widespread reports that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction at the time of military action in 2003.

If these reports prove correct, that would be relevant if that had been known at the time of the attack last March.

But the fact is the world did not know this at the time of the attack, and it did not know because Saddam Hussein had made sure that it could not know.

This is the key fact. The cause of the Iraq war was the Iraqi dictator's lying, manipulation and obstruction of the truth.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Security Council authorised UN member states under Resolution 678 of 1990 "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and to restore international peace and security in the area". (Resolution 660 had called on Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.)

The first Gulf War fulfilled Resolution 678 only in part. Even after driving Iraq out of Kuwait, the Security Council considered that the two tasks set out in Resolution 678 had not been completed. That is why it agreed not to a final peace settlement with Iraq, but only to a conditional ceasefire under Resolution 687 of 1991.

In Resolution 687, the Security Council spoke of "the need to be assured of Iraq's peaceful intentions in the light of its unlawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait". That is why the ceasefire was conditional on Iraq undertaking destruction of

its WMD.

It was to provide assurance that Iraq, after the withdrawal of allied forces from the region, would not go ahead full tilt with its WMD program and invade Kuwait again a few years down the track.

And who knew whether in that event it would stop at Kuwait or perhaps continue on to Saudi Arabia, which it had threatened? In this eventuality, anyone wishing to drive it out again would have to confront an Iraq armed with nuclear weapons.

If you have any doubts that Saddam still harboured ambitions against Kuwait, remember this. In October 1994, Saddam again deployed Republican Guard divisions towards Kuwait. Massive American reinforcements forced their withdrawal. But if he had been left alone to develop nuclear weapons, would he have stopped? That is a bet you don't want to have to make.

So, the WMD provision of Resolution 687 related directly to Kuwait's security and to restoring peace and security in the area, the two tasks set down in the original Security Council resolution which authorised the use of force.

Resolution 687 also set out a short and long-term verification regime to ensure that Iraqi weapons were destroyed. Further, on the nuclear front the resolution provided for the indefinite monitoring of Iraq.

So the relevant question is not whether the world knew that Saddam did have WMD. Such knowledge was not required to justify military action. Under the Security Council resolution, the world needed to be certain, and was entitled to be certain, that he did not have them.

Is there anybody who suggests that, at the time of the invasion of Iraq last year, the world knew with confidence what it was entitled to know under the Security Council resolution -- namely that Saddam had definitely got rid of all his WMD and would co-operate in future in ensuring there was no resumption of WMD programs?

The reason the world could not be so assured was Saddam's manipulation of facts, outright lies and 12 years of obstructionism of the UN.

His behaviour was even more worrying this time because as early as 1991, and certainly by 1995, it

was apparent that Iraq's chemical and biological weapons capability was far greater than anyone had thought before the first Gulf War.

More worrying still, it turned out that in 1991 Iraq was much further down the track in developing nuclear weapons than had been thought. In other words, the intelligence agencies had seriously underestimated Iraq's WMD capability at the time, just as, we now know, the intelligence community has seriously underestimated Libya and Iran's nuclear weapons programs.

So the world needed to be doubly sure the weapons had been accounted for, and the UN Security Council, as a condition of the ceasefire, had demanded that Iraq take the necessary action to do so.

Resolution 1441 of 2002 stated "Iraq has not provided an accurate, full, final and complete disclosure, as required by resolution 687 (1991), of all aspects of its programmes to develop weapons of mass destruction".

It further said that "Iraq has been and remains in material breach of its obligations under relevant resolutions, including resolution 687 (1991)". Hans Blix, the UN weapons inspector, said in 2003 that Iraq had failed to account for a long list of WMD, even though it had the means to do so.

To recap. The Security Council put the onus on Iraq to account for the destruction of all its weapons, as previously identified by UN inspectors, or risk the end of the ceasefire and resumption of hostilities.

Iraq had 12 years to do so and refused. A fundamental ceasefire condition was thus breached. Hostilities were resumed by those authorised to do so in 1990.

The war was legal. And the war was right. The fact that John Howard, Tony Blair and George W. Bush say so does not make it wrong.

As Arthur Koestler said just after World War II: "This fear of finding oneself in bad company is not an expression of political purity; it is an expression of a lack of self-confidence. If you are sure of yourself - politically and ideologically - you will no longer be frightened to say that twice two makes four," even if someone like senator Joe McCarthy says the same.


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