Weall agree that MZI operational performance is not reflected in its currentvaluation.
RCFhas an option to receive interest payments on its loans to MZI in cash orshares at its discretion. This means: IfMZI operations do well RCF decides for shares - increasing its shareholding, ifoperations turn sour RCF decides for cash, shifting the downside onto existingshareholders.
Thishas led to a dilution of existing shareholders of 11.4% only from June 2016 toJune 2018 according to the Annual Report. A low share price also makes a potential going private for RCF muchcheaper.
Ifully agree with Dr. Fouad’ valuation of MZI. However, I would not be surprised if the current quarter results disappoint,buying more time for RCF to continue its strategy.
Idisagree with Dr. Fouad’s analysis of RCF. RCF is de-risking its investment constantly by sucking out all cashgenerated in Keysbrook. They charge interest rates of 15% p.a. and arrangementfees of 3% (Term Loan May 2018).
TheRCF loan is almost double price compared to the RMB facilities (Libor + 5.35%)from 2014, even though the risk profile of Keysbrook has since significantlydecreased.
Existingshareholders must act together, put pressure on the MZI board and highlightpossible wrong-doings to ASX and ASIC. RCF should be excluded for voting insome resolutions at the AGM’s.
It is obvious that the current board actspredominately in the interest of RCF. This is underlined by its own announcementfrom April 30 2018: “MZI is satisfied that its negotiations with RCF havebeen strictly on an arm length basis”. Why would you mention something like that? This (should) go(es) withoutsaying!
