It is not easy to derive an exact picture of CCP's long runway...

It is not easy to derive an exact picture of CCP's long runway in the USA, because there are too many different things that could happen there, so I abandoned my attempt to do so.

Suffice to say, CCP has the cash and borrowing leeway to grow in the USA at the pace that Management decides is wise. It is the fast pace of growth that nearly wiped CCP out in 2009, and Thomas Beregi was there to witness the disaster, and clean up the mess afterwards. He has also seen the woes that CLH and PNC have inflicted on themselves. CCP's US business, with Canada probably attached thereto, will soon be larger than CCP's ANZ business. It does not make much difference how CCP chooses to grow in the USA within the confines of PDL collections, agency collections and the loan business, as long as the target returns reconcile, and are achieved.

Before I threw in the towel this afternoon, I looked at PRA's 2020 results, so I may as well paste what I had written.

PRA is similar to CCP in that its principal business consists of purchasing and collecting on charged-off loans, with, mainly credit cards, with major credit cards, private label credit cards and other debt being loosely in the ratio of 35%, 60% and 5%. PRA pays a little over 10c in the dollar for this debt, which is more than Encore Capital pays, suggesting slightly better quality.

PRA buys circa $US500 million PDLs a year in the USA, and as much again in non-USA geographies, mainly Europe. PRA's 30 June 2020 market cap was $US1,729,557,356. Like many USA listed companies, PRA does not pay dividends. I imagine its 2021 Annual Report should be published circa 1 March 2020, and it should be very positive. Encore Capital's report, I seem to recall, is scheduled for 27 February.