Disruption and the Nuclear Industry The New Era of Nuclear Energy
The civilian nuclear sector is undergoing a major transformation, driven by decarbonization, geopolitical tensions, and innovative technologies reshaping energy security. By Cindy Vestergaard Emerging Technology
September 3, 2024
As the world confronts the dual pressures of climate change and geopolitical instability, the nuclear industry finds itself at a crossroads. In August, the U.S. ban on imports of enriched uranium from Russia went into effect, accelerating efforts to expand commercial alternatives and diversify away from Russian fuel sources. Coupled with aggressive decarbonization goals, this disruption is challenging traditional supply chains and driving a wave of technological advancements, from small modular reactors to the use of artificial intelligence in reactor design and operation. Strategic partnerships like AUKUS and emerging nuclear markets in Asia and the Middle East are further complicating the global nuclear landscape, potentially leading to a re-bifurcation of the market. Amidst this turbulence, the industry faces the daunting task of navigating supply chain disruptions and regulatory challenges while capitalizing on the transformative opportunities that lie ahead. How the nuclear sector adapts to these forces will shape the future of global energy security and determine whether we can meet our climate goals in an increasingly fractured world.
Executive Summary
The global nuclear industry is undergoing a profound transformation driven by the pressures of decarbonization, conflict, and geopolitics. Countries and industries are exploring nuclear energy as part of the push to decarbonize economies against a backdrop of conflicts which are impacting the global supply of nuclear fuel. In August, the U.S. ban on imports of enriched uranium from Russia went into effect, accelerating efforts to diversify and scale up commercial alternatives to break a global reliance on Moscow for nuclear fuel and technology. At the same time, aggressive climate targets and energy security concerns are driving innovations in reactor types, designs, and fuels, challenging existing regulations and necessitating the creation of entirely new supply lines. This climate-conflict dyad is driving what one nuclear company called ‘transformative tailwinds’1 for the industry, with the diversification push being likened to a ‘Manhattan Project’ for reducing reliance on Russia’s uranium.2
But they are not the only factors. New strategic partnerships, such as AUKUS, U.S. nuclear deals with the Philippines, Singapore and potentially Saudi Arabia, and Russian nuclear deals with Bangladesh, Egypt, Hungary, and Turkey, are redrawing geopolitical alliances. Emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and additive manufacturing, are further disrupting the sector, adding new market entrants, including energy-hungry data centers and startups seeking to build small modular reactors and even fusion reactors. Emerging technologies are also offering novel solutions to make operations and supply chains more efficient, streamlined and compliant.
Collectively, these forces are reshaping the global nuclear landscape. The global nuclear fuel cycle, once divided by Cold War allegiances and later globalized, now faces what many see as a potential re-bifurcation between the West and Russia. Add in China’s growing nuclear capacity, and the discussion focuses on the development of a ‘Cold War 2.0’ – a nuclear market defined by two main competitors to the West. The reality is likely to be more complex as newcomers and established players alike seek to secure and balance their energy portfolios, giving rise to a ‘Global Nuclear Market 3.0,’ characterized by multiple hubs for nuclear technology and fuel production, supporting both conventional and next-generation reactors. This shifting landscape underscores the need for robust policy frameworks to navigate its evolution, enabling the industry to harness the ‘transformative tailwinds’ of a changing global market while mitigating the headwinds of geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions. Impact of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine on the Global Uranium Market
Since 2022, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and ongoing annexation of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) has been a significant driver of disruption to the global nuclear market. It marks the first time in the nuclear age that a country with an advanced civilian nuclear program is not only experiencing armed conflict but its nuclear facilities have also been taken over by a foreign power. Energy security concerns were realized within the first months of the war when Russia began cutting deliveries of natural gas to Europe in response to sanctions, raising fears that Moscow would do the same to its exports of nuclear fuel. This led to an urgent, mostly coordinated push among a number of Western nuclear operators to wean themselves from a reliance on Russian reactor construction and uranium exports.
But Russia is hard to shake. For more than twenty years, Russia has been leveraging its investments in nuclear power at home to expand its nuclear services abroad, positioning itself as a leader in the nuclear power industry. Today, Russia dominates the seller’s market. The Russian State Atomic Energy Corporation (Rosatom) owns over 300 companies, with nuclear services vertically integrated. It is the primary global supplier (44%) of uranium enrichment and is a leader in decommissioning, spent fuel management services, and building and fueling reactors abroad. By 2017, sixty percent of global reactor sales and technical assistance projects were provided by Russia.3
Rosatom’s advantage is its vertical integration, delivering nuclear energy as a package: from financing, reactor construction, and operation services to supplying fuel and removing its waste. Russia also offers a ‘build-own-operate” model, whereby Moscow retains ownership and operations of the plant, taking on all financial, construction, and operational risks in exchange for a repayment plan based on future electricity revenues. The twin reactors Rosatom sold to Turkey will be the first to operate under this model, followed by Egypt. In 2023, 42 reactors outside of Russia were operating with Russian or Soviet-designed VVER (water-water energetic reactors, or vodo-vodyanoi enyergeticheskiy reaktory) across 11 countries. Of these, five countries—four in the EU plus Ukraine—are actively diversifying their fuel supplies away from Russia. The remaining six countries—Armenia, Belarus, China, Hungary, India, and Iran—continue to maintain their contracts for VVER fuel with Russia. Rosatom is also set to supply fuel for the VVERs currently under construction in Bangladesh, 4 Egypt, 5 and Turkey. 6
Rosatom also provides fuel services for the global fleet, with its largest nuclear fuel markets in Europe and the United States. In 2022, Russia exported 30% of Europe’s uranium enrichment services, along with 22.35% of its conversion requirements and nearly 17% of its natural uranium.7 The same year, Russia provided the United States 35% of its imports of nuclear fuel.8 Cutting supplies overnight is therefore not feasible as neither Europe, nor the United States, has the domestic capacity to replace it. The process of breaking off from Russia however is underway, but it will take years to complete.
In the short term, this has meant importing more uranium from Russia than pre-war levels as utilities are stockpiling, running down current contracts and transitioning to other suppliers. Utilities generally maintain inventories of one to three years, but the processing, permitting, and transporting uranium along the supply chain, from uranium mining to fuel loading, takes just as long. The push to diversify from Russia is therefore tied to expanding already-existing capacity, running down excess supply, as well as developing new facilities to support additional customers and future next-generation reactors. The United States is the first – and only – country so far to legislate a ban on importing Russian LEU with the bipartisan Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act which entered into force on August 11, 90 days after signature. With the US ban to be fully in place by January 2028, the U.S. is confident that American utilities have the reserves while capacity is being expanded, but the timing is tight. As noted by Joseph Dominguez, CEO of Constellation Energy Corporation, the largest nuclear power plant operator in the United States, “in the world of nuclear fuel, 2028 is tomorrow.”9
In the United States, imports of enriched uranium from Russia rose by about 20 percent, from 588 tons in 2022 to 702t in 2023,10 as US utilities prepared for the impending ban. In Europe, the EU purchased more material in 2022 than was loaded, mainly to supply Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Finland, Hungary, and Slovakia – the five countries in the EU that operate Russian-designed reactors. In 2022, all five grew their inventories, buying 30% more conversion services and 22% more enrichment from Russia than the year before.11 Last year, imports among the five surged to 80 percent more than pre-war levels.12 The Czech Republic alone accounted for 40 percent of the EU’s annual intake, increasing its fuel imports from Russia from 90t in 2022 to 199t in 2023.13
In Asia, Japan has not imported any enriched uranium from Russia after Moscow invaded Ukraine.14 Japan however has accumulated large uranium stockpiles since Fukushima with only 10 of its 48 reactors restarting as of last August. South Korea’s imports of Russian uranium declined in 2022 but rebounded and surpassed the 2022 figure in the first nine months of 2023, representing nearly 41% of its enriched uranium imports, which is higher than before the conflict.15
Russian exports to China have also increased over the past couple of years. China imported 467 metric tons of enriched uranium from Russia last year, which is down from the 685t it imported in 2022 but still higher than during the years before Covid lockdowns (China imported no enriched uranium from Russia in 2020 and only 44t in 2021). Russia also is supplying China with highly enriched uranium (HEU) as part of their long-standing cooperation on building fast breeder reactors in China that dates back to the 1990s.16 In December 2022, Russia transferred 25 tons of HEU to China to fuel a Chinese fast breeder reactor – the first delivery as part of a much larger contract for HEU fuel.17
China’s exports to the United States have also increased, exporting a “considerable amount” last year, for the first time since 2019,18 raising suspicions that Beijing is using Russian imports to increase its own exports of enriched uranium, known as ‘displacement.’19 This is difficult to determine however given China, like others, have market reasons for purchasing uranium ahead of price surges and increasing stocks at a time of uncertainty related to fuel supply. During this ‘historical window period’, the China Nuclear Energy Industrial Corporation (CNEIC) is pursuing a policy of ‘going out, grabbing orders, and stabilizing growth.’ 20 In 2022, China announced several long-term nuclear fuel contracts with U.S. and EU utilities, but the details are unclear about whether they include deliveries of Chinese-enriched uranium.
Increases in imports of Russia’s uranium are happening amid rising prices, boosting Rosatom’s revenues. The spot price of uranium surged from $43.08 per pound in January 2022 to $100.25 per pound in January 2024.21 The price had been accelerating since September 2023 and shot up another 10% in January when the world’s largest uranium producer, Kazatomprom, announced it would not meet its production targets in 2024 owing to a disruption of supply of sulphuric acid which it expects to persist through 2025.22 Similarly, the spot price of enriched uranium (SWU) climbed from $47.50 per SWU in June 2020 to $159 per SWU by the end of 2023. As a result, the U.S. paid 40 percent more in 2023 for the same volume of imports as in the previous year.23 And the price continues to rise with the US ban on imports further driving up spot prices for uranium conversion (increasing by 46% to $60/kg) and enriched uranium to $174 per SWU in June 2024.24
Sanctions on the Russian transportation and banking sectors have also led to fuel delivery disruptions with some canceling cargo insurance coverage, adding to supply chain risks and costs to transports of uranium out of Central Asia.25 Transports of uranium from Kazakhstan, the world’s largest producer, are bypassing Russia, running from China through Kazakhstan, the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan, Georgia and further to Turkey, Europe, and North America.26 Transports of nuclear fuel have also been complicated due to the war in Ukraine. For instance, nuclear fuel to Hungary now travels from Russia by ship via the Black Sea to the Bulgarian port of Varna from where it travels by rail through Bulgaria to Romania and onwards to the Paks nuclear power plant.27 Coup in Niger and Crisis in the Middle East
In Niger, a military junta has been running the country since its coup d’état in July 2023, disrupting exports of uranium ore concentrates from the country which, until the coup, was the world’s seventh-largest uranium producer – and Europe’s second-largest supplier.28 French company Orano has been unable to export any of its uranium from the Somair mine since before the coup, impacting its mining business with a loss of €133m in the first half of 2024 29 After the coup, supplies to operate the mine were disrupted, halting production until February when Orano imported supplies through Togo and Burkina Faso.30
Since taking power, the junta has distanced itself from France and the U.S. while moving closer to Russia. In June, the junta revoked the permits for the Imouraren uranium project which was majority-owned by Orano and the Madaouela project owned by Canada-based GoviEx.31 While neither mine was operating and will not impact current uranium production, their nationalization is a sign of Niger’s future as Russia (and potentially China) are eyeing the two projects. Notably however, another greenfield project involving Canadian-based Global Atomic Corporation received support from the Nigerien Minister of Mines in June.32 Global Atomics is currently raising financing for the Dasa project, including $295m debt financing by the U.S. development bank which is currently undergoing review.33 Another project, the Chinese-owned Somina mine at Azelik, in northern Niger has indicated it plans to resume uranium mining, although exactly when has yet to be announced. For any of Niger’s uranium to be exported however, the junta must reopen the border with Benin which it has kept closed since taking power. The Port of Cotonou in Benin is the only port in the region permitted to handle uranium.
The war in Gaza between Israel and Hamas, along with proxy wars involving Hezbollah and the Houthis, have caused nuclear transporters to avoid the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez, diverting ships around Africa to Asia, Europe and North America, adding delays and higher costs. A resurgence in activities by Somali pirates is further adding to transport risks, driving up prices for armed guards and insurance coverage.34 Overall, with transporters navigating conflicts, sanctions, delays and pirates, the nuclear transportation sector costs associated with supply routes from Australia and Asia to Europe have increased by 25 to 30 percent.35 Shifting Supply Chains
All of the five EU countries with Russian reactors, except Hungary, are in the process of switching their fuel requirements to other suppliers, mainly Canada’s Cameco (for natural uranium and conversion), the British-Dutch-German-owned Urenco (for enrichment), France’s Framatome and the United States’ Westinghouse (fuel assemblies). Bulgaria, Czech Republic, and Slovakia are anticipating their first deliveries this year while Finland’s Fortum announced in January 2024 that it was no longer dependent on new shipments of Russian nuclear fuel, using up its existing stocks before switching to Westinghouse as a supplier.36 Hungary is maintaining its contracts with Rosatom but there are signs Budapest is opening the door to diversification. Last November, Hungary’s parliament approved an amendment to its nuclear energy policy, allowing alternative sources to be used for fueling the Russian-built Paks NPP.37 Across the world in Asia, South Korea’s nuclear operator KHNP signed a new contract with Urenco for the long-term supply of enrichment services to replace Russian services.38
For reactor construction going forward, Rosatom is still positioned to build Hungary’s fifth and sixth reactors but is excluded from bidding on new builds in the Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia.39 Poland, a newcomer to the nuclear energy sector, has chosen Westinghouse’s AP1000 technology for its first reactor units.40
Ukraine’s determined push has managed to significantly diversify its nuclear fuel needs away from Russia. Ukraine began collaborating with Westinghouse Electric in 2005 on an alternative to Russian fuel. By 2022, Westinghouse provided nearly half of the fuel used in Ukraine’s nuclear power plants. That June, Ukraine’s national nuclear power company, Energoatom, signed an agreement for Westinghouse to supply fuel to all of Ukraine’s VVERs, and build nine AP1000 plants.41 In February 2023, Energoatom also signed an agreement with Canada’s Cameco to supply 100 percent of uranium hexafluoride to the Rivne, Khmelnitsky, and South Ukraine NPPs, starting this year. 42 The contract will also include an option for Cameco to supply Zaporizhzhya when it returns to Ukraine’s control.
Recognizing the need for a multilateral approach, the June 2022 Communique by G7 Leaders stated their intent to reduce reliance on Russian civil nuclear and related goods and work with countries seeking to diversify their nuclear fuel supply chains. Following on this Canada, France, Japan, the UK, and the U.S. announced on the margins of the 2023 G7 meeting in Sapporo, Japan, their commitment to leverage their domestic nuclear sectors in uranium mining, conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication to establish a “global commercial nuclear market” to support a stable supply of nuclear fuel today and the future.43 At COP28, the “Sapporo 5” announced their commitment to pursue U.S.$4.2 bn in government-led and private investment in their collective enrichment and conversion capacity over the next 3 years. At COP28, twenty-two (now 28) countries also launched the Declaration to Triple Nuclear Energy Capacity by 2050 44 which was accompanied by the Net Zero Industry Pledge to do the same.
While the targets are aggressively ambitious and said to be impossible to meet,45 they indicate a coordinated drive for advancing nuclear technology, by both industry and governments. The funding drive is dual-tracked to expand existing capacity while developing an entirely new supply chain for next-generation reactors to provide a competitive alternative to Russia. Expanding Existing Capacity
The two companies that offer global commercial enrichment outside of Russia, namely France’s Orano and the British-Dutch-German-owned Urenco, are currently expanding. Urenco is increasing capacity at all four of its enrichment facilities. The first cascades at its U.S. site in New Mexico will come online in 2025, increasing full capacity by additional 15 percent by 2028.46 Another 15 percent increase will be added to the Almelo plant in the Netherlands with the first cascades expected in 202747 and a refit of existing space at its Gronau plant in Germany which will slightly increase its capacity by a few hundred SWU per year.48 It is also expanding the Tails Management Facility (TMF) at its Capenhurst site in the UK.49 These expansions will be enough to cover U.S. imports from Russia by 2028.50
At the same time, Orano is expanding its Tricastin site by more than 30% with production scheduled to start in 2028,51 offering an additional source of future supply. France is not reliant on Russia at the front end of the fuel cycle but does depend on Russia for services at the back-end, specifically for converting and enriching reprocessed uranium for reuse in its nuclear power plants. French energy company EDF has said it will honor its 2018 contract with Rosatom’s Tenex for reprocessing used fuel; it has also indicated that it is studying the option to build its own facility for enriching reprocessed uranium.52
In December 2022, the UK Government announced £13m ($15.9m) to develop the necessary design and testing to begin new conversion capabilities at the site “for the world’s utilities” from 2028.53 Westinghouse was also awarded £10.5m ($13.6m) to upgrade and expand the fuel fabrication facility at Springfields, aimed at “future-proofing” the British nuclear fuel industry by developing a range of LWR fuel types, including the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor and AP300 SMR.54
In June, the US Department of Energy (DOE) also opened a request for proposals for additional domestic enrichment capacity with plans to award two or more contracts, for up to ten years.55 The funding comes from the $2.7 bn authorized in the Emergency National Security Supplemental Appropriations Act for domestic enrichment capacity which the bill banning LEU imports releases. There are also next-generation innovations in LEU production being tested in the United States. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) recently gave the go-ahead to Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) for loading UF6 feed material for testing at its Test Loop pilot demonstration facility in Wilmington, North Carolina. The company is also moving ahead with activities at the Paducah Laser Enrichment Facility in Kentucky, in preparation to feed 200,000 metric tons of depleted UF6 received by the DOE under a 2016 sale to GLE to produce natural UF6.56 Laser enrichment has the potential to be more economical and efficient and is currently the only third-generation technology that is advancing towards commercialization. GLE is owned by Australian Silex (51%) and Canada’s Cameco (49%).
There is also an increase of capacity upstream in the fuel cycle. ConverDyn, the only conversion facility in the US, restarted in 2023 after nearly six years idled, with projections to supply 40% of the US market in the near term.57 While the restart was decided back in 2021 given more favorable market conditions, ConverDyn is also considering expanding as domestic demand will increase with the ban on Russian LEU imports. In Canada, Cameco plans to increase its production of UF6 at its Port Hope facility to 12,000 metric tons in 2024,58 an increase from 2023, when the plant set a record for production (the facility is licensed to produced 12,500 metric tons per year).59
Mining is also being ramped up. Cameco resumed operations at the McArthur River/Key Lake uranium mine in November 2022 with output expected to reach 18 million pounds this year, doubling production from 2023. Cameco is also planning to extend the life of Cigar Lake to 2036.60 Kazakhstan has been experiencing supply chain disruptions related to acquiring sulphuric acid, a critical ingredient for Kazatomprom’s extraction method. Although there was a dip in production last year from 2022, the country remains the largest uranium producer by a mile, producing more in 2023 than the next four top producers (Canada, Namibia, Australia and Uzbekistan) combined. New mines have opened in the United States for the first time in decades with production expected to grow over time as the White Mesa Mill reopens this year. In 2023, uranium production in the United States accounted for only 5 percent of its fleet’s requirements.61 Next Generation Supply Chains
The Sapporo 5 are also working to develop entirely new supply chains for manufacturing the high assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) needed for next-generation “advanced” reactors. Today, nearly 96 percent of the global nuclear fleet is based on only three reactor designs. All are water-cooled and operate with fuel enriched to 3.5 – 5% uranium-235 (low enriched uranium, or LEU). Many next-generation small modular reactors (SMRs) are essentially shrunken versions (up to 300 MW) of water-cooled reactors and use the same fuel. Advanced reactor technologies however are gas-cooled, liquid metal or molten salt designs that will use higher levels of enrichment (LEU+ fuel at 6% or HALEU up to 19.75%), which can be produced by existing centrifuge technology. The higher enrichment levels increase efficiencies and lengthen operating cycles, but they also require a specific nuclear fuel cycle, infrastructure, and regulatory and licensing system, including new or modified transport containers licensed to the higher enrichment levels. Currently, only Russia and China can produce HALEU at scale. Centrus Energy, in the United States, began producing HALEU from a demonstration-scale cascade in October 2023.
UK funding for expanding Westinghouse’s Springfields fuel fabrication facility also supports potential production of fuel for advanced reactors with Westinghouse, Terrestrial Energy, and the UK National Nuclear Laboratory to pilot enriched uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) and molten salt fuel for use in Terrestrial’s Integral Molten Salt Reactor. Urenco has also been awarded £196m ($245m) to support the build of an advanced fuels facility at its Capenhurst enrichment site in the northwest of England,62 with plans to produce up to 10 metric tons of HALEU per year by 2031.63 The UK also opened a competition on July 1 to support the design and build of a commercial-scale oxide HALEU deconversion facility, with funding up to £70m which closes on Sept 9.
In the US, Urenco submitted a license amendment request to the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)) to increase enrichment levels from 5.5% to 10% (LEU+) at its New Mexico site. A decision by the NRC is expected by the end of 2024.64 Urenco has also responded to the Department of Energy’s request for proposals for HALEU deconversion and enrichment that were issued in November 2023 and January 2024. Orano has said that it is resurrecting plans by Areva to build an enrichment plant in Idaho that had been abandoned after Fukushima when some countries shut down nuclear reactors or suspended projects, leading to an overcapacity in enrichment.65 Orano has also begun the regulatory process to produce HALEU in France with timelines yet to be announced.
In a first for Canada, Ontario Power Generation (OPG) became the newest customer of Urenco and Orano for enrichment services – and their first for supplying an SMR project long-term.66 The GE-Hitachi BWRX-300 SMRs to be constructed adjacent to OPG’s Darlington site are boiling water reactors using LEU. Cameco will supply natural uranium hexafluoride for enrichment at Urenco’s site in New Mexico which in turn will be fabricated at Global Nuclear Fuel Americas in Wilmington, North Carolina. Orano will provide additional enriched uranium product. These relationships boost the growth of SMR supply chains but also will be the first time that Canada relies on foreign fuel services. Out of the 31 countries (plus Taiwan) with operating power reactors, Canada stands alone in being able to fully supply its fleet of CANDU reactors, from mining to conversion through to fuel fabrication. Global Nuclear Market 3.0
Much of the language surrounding expansion and diversification suggests a bifurcated (re)alignment of the global nuclear fuel cycle between ‘the West’ and Russia. Add in China’s growing nuclear capacity, and the discussion focuses on the development of a “Cold War 2.0” – a nuclear market defined by two main competitors to the West. China is the most active – and proficient– builder of nuclear power plants, adding more than 34 GW of nuclear power capacity in the past ten years alone. As a comparison, the US with 94 operating reactors, the largest in the world, took nearly 40 years to add the same capacity as China did in 10 years.67 While China’s capacity is rapidly growing; its focus is overwhelmingly domestic with plans to build 150 new nuclear reactors between 2020 and 2035. Today China has 56 operating reactors (the same as France) with an additional 26 reactors under construction that will add another 27.3 GW over the next decade.68
China’s domestic capacity will eventually surpass its needs, placing it as a more viable competitor over the longer term, particularly for building and supplying its reactors abroad. So far though, China has only built four NPPs in Pakistan and, just last March, broke ground at Chashma-5, a 1,200 MW Hualong One next-generation pressurized water reactor which will be the largest NPP constructed by China. This will be the third Hualong One technology deployed in Pakistan with the first two (at 1,100 MW each) connected to the grid in Karachi in March 2021 and March 2022 respectively. But the 20% – 30% market share (equivalent to 30 reactors) that Beijing was hoping for in 2016 to obtain by 2030, is not being realized. Its agreement with Argentina to supply the Hualong One at Atucha III is stalled,69 and in the UK a strained relationship and cost overruns led to the UK government taking over the stake of China General Nuclear Power (CGN) in the Sizewell NPP project in 2022 and, last year, CGN halted funding for UK’s Hinkley Point.70
Initially divided between West and East during the Cold War, the global nuclear fuel cycle became globalized in the 1990s. Despite the war in Ukraine and conflicts stretching from the Middle East to Africa, the uranium market remains globalized and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. Utilities are aligning supply chains to protect them from further disruptions, whether in transportation or impending sanctions which will also drive countries to expand existing capacity outside of North America, Europe, Russia and China as seen in Brazil which added 10 cascades to its Isotopic Uranium Enrichment Plant in Resende in 2022.71 Indústrias Nucleares do Brasil (INB) anticipates adding 30 cascades over the next years to domestically meet the fuel demands of Angra 1 & 2 by 2037 and the needs of Angra 3.72
New strategic partnerships, such as AUKUS, US nuclear deals with the Philippines, Singapore, and potentially Saudi Arabia and Russian nuclear deals with Bangladesh, Egypt, Hungary, and Turkey are redrawing geopolitical alliances. Russia’s presence in Africa is particularly growing. Alongside its overtures to Niger, Moscow signed memorandums on nuclear cooperation signed with Burkina Faso, Mali, and South Africa last year.73 All these partnerships are new and yet to be tested, but they indicate that the geographies of nuclear technology are shifting. Over the long run, the global uranium market is therefore likely to shift into a third iteration as the drive for energy security coupled with an evolving geopolitical landscape expands fuel cycle capabilities and develops new supply chains in support of net zero targets. A Global Nuclear Market 3.0 could therefore be defined by several different hubs for nuclear technology located globally, producing and fabricating fuel for both conventional and next-generation reactors. This will raise not only concerns over both vertical and horizontal proliferation should more countries expand – or even build – enrichment facilities, alongside new reactor builds, but also the need for robust policy approaches to support this evolving energy market. Conclusion
The direction of the global uranium market is only at the beginning of a major shift. The convergence of geopolitics, conflict, and climate are a potent mix for the nuclear industry and will require sustained financing, partnerships, and multilateral efforts to maintain a stable – and peaceful – drive towards net zero targets. Potential newcomers to the fuel cycle will be courted by all sides while additional sanctions on Russia’s uranium continue alongside ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, will add complexity and confusion for new consumers in navigating the nuclear market, delivery routes, and in developing energy policies and regulatory structures.
Barriers to investment, namely high upfront costs of building new facilities and product lines, coupled with the timelines for siting, licensing and deploying nextgen reactors and uncertainties about the future of long-term fuel demand require a coordinated approach. The G7 and the Sapporo 5 are on track with their commitments, and they will benefit more over the long run as they increase collaboration with potential newcomers to ride the ‘transformative tailwinds’ of a shifting global market while also mitigating the headwinds of geopolitical tensions and supply chain disruptions.
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