According to Channel NewsAsia, things are heating up in Thailand, where concerns about spying may force the country to buy back satellites it sold to a Singapore investment firm, Temasek, last year. As you might expect, things get a little complicated when you viewed up closer:
"[The controversy]... centers around four satellites owned by ShinSat, which is a subsidiary of Shin Corp.
Shin Corp was founded by former [Thai] premier Thaksin Shinawatra, whose family sold a 49 percent stake in the company to Singapore investment firm Temasek in January 2006.
General Sonthi [Boonyaratglin, who led last September's coup d'?tat] said the government should buy back these satellites, which transmit encrypted military communications, in the interest of national security.
The estimated price tag is US$294 million."
Most Thai's on the street believe that the Thailand should reclaim ownership of the old satellite's for reasons of national security, although many don't think the country should have to pay for the reacquisition. As one Thai citizen said in an interview:
"Thaksin sold it, so he should buy it back for Thailand. Thai people are already paying taxes to the government, so we shouldn't use the country's money to buy it from Singapore."
The problem for Thailand is, however, that such an oddball move with a foreign company would probably inhibit the future foreign direct investment so crucial to their development.
======================================================= Shin Satellite-Temasek Contradictions Great background in the Bangkok Post on this:
SATELLITE ROW RICH IN CONTRADICTIONS; The Shin Corp-Temasek deal still has the power to throw the longstanding good relations between Thailand and Singapore off trajectory. It's time for a more rational approach, writes SIRIPORN SACHAMUNEEWONGSE
Ever since ousted PM Thaksin Shinawatra sold his shares in the family's Shin Corp for the huge sum of US$1.8 billion to Temasek Holdings, a Singaporean state-owned entity with stakes in 70 companies (including Singapore Telecommunications, the DBS banking group, Singapore International Airlines, shipping line Neptune Orient, logistics group Semblig and Singapore Technologies), it has been the talk of the town.
The political heat over the controversial deal of April 5, 2006 appeared to have lowered a bit in Thailand until two weeks ago, on Friday, February 16, when General Sonthi Boonyaratkalin raised the temperature again with an appeal to nationalism. The chief of the Council for National Security, which orchestrated the September 19 coup, said that he would like to see satellites under ShinSat and other assets of Shin Corp back under Thai control.
The Bangkok Post on February 17 quoted the army officer as saying that soldiers would tolerate not even the loss of a square inch of national territory; hence, how could they let important national assets belong to Singapore?
"I want my belongings back, especially the satellites," said the headline of the related story in the Singaporean Asiaone online publication.
To Thais, the message conveyed by the general was that the Temasek-Shin deal involved "national assets" - the monopolistic telecommunications business operated by Shin Corp that is now largely under the influence of Singapore's direct foreign investment arm.
In January, Gen Sonthi had mentioned that he suspected interference by the company in military officers' mobile phones. This sparked an emotional concern voiced in many corners for national security, and set the stage for his most recent words and deeds.
On the other side, the government of Singapore was initially taken aback by the army general's declaration that Thailand should regain control of the satellites. In response to media queries, Singapore's Foreign Affairs spokesman said: "Singapore is surprised at what CNS Chief Sonthi Boonyaratkalin was reported to have said about getting back Thai national assets which have been sold to foreigners. We should wait for the Thai government to clarify what those remarks meant."
Singapore's government was in somewhat of a state of denial, which academics believe was partially due to confusion. At first, the issue was framed as a matter of Thailand's internal politics. It is still unclear whether Singapore has accepted and understood the sentiments expressd by Gen Sonthi, or whether Temasek would be willing to sell ShinSat back to Thailand.
Although the Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs claims that it has de-linked the whole issue from diplomatic relations between the two countries, it is clear that the general's statements have spurred up a great deal of fresh discussion on the nature of the Shin-Temasek deal, as well as the bilateral dynamics in general.
On this point, it is noteworthy that Singapore and Thailand have long been engaged in many partnerships - military, financial, trade, among others - which should remain long after the animosities over the recent heated football match have faded from memory.
As well, certain misunderstandings have contributed to the transnational satellite row. Thais have been led to believe that the Shin-Temasek deal meant that Thailand was surrendering its satellites to Singapore. However, a prime fact that seems to have been forgotten is that even before the sale of shares, ShinSat was owned privately by Shin Corp, which had legitimately received the nation's satellite concession for 30 years.
In addition, in reference to claims of spying by telecommunication industries, a point worth mentioning is that apparently even the owner of a satellite cannot spy on encrypted messages, a technique used, for example, to send classified military communications. Therefore, the issue of national security may be moot when it comes to satellite ownership.
This is not to say there aren't good reasons for wanting the shares back in Thai hands. Temasek's operational style and methods of governance have been criticised in the past, in particular for the lack of transparency of the company. Given the limited access to information, granting the investment arm of the Singaporean government a voice in Thailand's telecommunications sector could turn out to be risky.
WAKE-UP CALL
Regardless of whether ShinSat is bought back, with a quarter million baht profit going to Singapore, is seized by the identification of flaws in the sale contract, or stays in the hands of Temasek Holdings, this is a wake-up call for Thailand to be more cautious in dealings involving sensitive sectors. The whole incident serves as another prominent lesson for the country in terms of mixing business with politics.
To begin with, the scandal highlights errors in Thailand's legal framework, which should immediately be addressed to avoid such controversies in the future. A strict set of regulations that addresses the nationalisation of sensitive sectors such as telecommunications is probably the best solution at this point. That the country has every right to investigate or refuse foreign involvement in sensitive sectors should be enforcable by law.
Seen in this light, the controversial Temasek-Shin deal also spotlights a rising concern for globalised business practices, where state-enterprises, often in sensitive areas, are openly dealt on foreign markets. Clarifying policies on how to deal with state-owned enterprises engaging in foreign direct investments deserves attention on the agendas of Asean, the WTO and other international gatherings.
Somewhat ironically, Thailand is gaining influence in sensitive areas of the Cambodian and Lao economies in terms of direct investment in sensitive sectors.
Shin Corp's sale to Temasek Holdings should provide the perfect stimulant to enact a regulation prohibiting political figures from running private businesses. Commercial dealings should be separated from national politics, and political figures should ideally be separated from business. The prime minister especially should not have a business agenda. Moreover, the recent lessons learned from inappropriate corporate governance should be reflected in the new constitution.
As for the current dispute over the Temasek deal, it should be handled rationally, especially since the deal has already been sealed. Government officials must handle this transnational issue with caution, and not make it personal. The Thaksin factor should not come into play.
Bearing in mind the nationalistic tone of the dispute, it is useful to examine where these feelings originate. Mostly they arise from the nature of the relationship between ousted PM Thaksin Shinawatra and the current government of Thailand. This relationship must be separated from the relationship between the governments of Thailand and Singapore and that of the former Thai PM with Singapore, or else it could result in more harm to the country.
Last but not least, it would be well to look into some other significant issues involving the telecommunications industry, such as the monopolistic nature of the market, private versus state ownership and broadcasting (including the Internet) freedom. =======================================================
National Security and Satellite Ownership This news has been swirling in Thailand for a month now, with national security a top priority, as this article in The Nation illuminates:
ShinSat sale 'tragic blow for defence'
Expert says takeover should be blocked or Thailand would have to spend billions to ensure signals are not intercepted
Singapore's takeover of the Thaicom satellite and AIS mobile phone company is a "tragedy" for Thailand's defence communications network and should be blocked if possible, a top Australian defence analyst said yesterday.
Deal of the Century
Professor Des Ball said the sale of the ShinSat satellite and AIS to Temasek would end up costing Thailand billions of baht - which would be the price of having to launch a new satellite to ensure the Thai military's signals could not be intercepted.
"It's not in Thailand's interests to allow Singapore control of such a critically important communications system, through the satellite and mobile phone company," Prof Ball said in an interview in Bangkok yesterday.
"That's why they [the Thai Army] are now talking about their own satellite and using [two-way] radios - their system has been compromised."
Professor Ball, from the Australian National University in Canberra, is a world authority on signals intelligence. A regular visitor to Thailand and Southeast Asia, he has strong links with the Thai military.
Prime Minister Surayud Chulanont said yesterday the government would solve the problem in the long run - by either buying the [ShinSat] stake back or launching a new satellite. "We have to think about this in various aspects, not only security, but also commercial," Surayud told reporters.
"Further, we don't know whether the current stakeholder wants to sell to us."
The government had no plan to launch a new satellite in the short term, but the Information Communications and Technology Ministry was likely to launch its own satellite late this year, he said.
Prof Ball said Australia went through a similar debate five years ago when Singtel purchased the Optus mobile phone company. He was one of a series of analysts who publicly opposed the takeover. The Australian government eventually allowed the sale to go through, partly to ensure continued close cooperation with the island state, but Australia had to spend a huge sum on fibre-optic cables to avoid use of the Optus satellite and ensure its defence communications were secure.
Part of the problem, Ball said, was "Singapore have a track record of taking advantage of information for commercial and political purposes" - as did the US, and former Soviet Union.
Singapore had "listened to and photographed Australian military facilities", which had created diplomatic rifts, he said.
"They have a history of abusing their access to training in other facilities abroad.
"That is not what friends are supposed to do - they abused their friendship," Ball said.
But remarks made recently by Army chief General Sonthi showed it was very clear Thailand was aware of the problem posed by the Shin takeover, he said.
The sale of ShinSat to Temasek had "given Singapore direct access to the Royal Thai Army's satellite communications", Ball said.
"They are going to have to have their own independent system, otherwise they hand their military and very sensitive [data] traffic to Singapore on a plate.
"It's a tragedy they've handed that away with the Shin deal and will now have to redesign their own system.
"If they could get out of this [Shin] there are national security reasons why they should. If not, they'll have to spend billions [of baht] - or hundreds of millions of dollars - to redesign another satellite system. Launching a new satellite could cost US$250 million.
"If I was in [Thai] Army HQ [headquarters] I'd be trying to get out of this [Shin] deal as quick as I could."
Singapore already had an extensive array of satellite listening facilities, from a major base on Sentosa Island to listening equipment at the Thai Army base in Sai Yok - which Prof Ball said appeared to be "primarily focused on Thailand" - judging by the types of antennae he had seen there in recent years.
There were both HF (High Frequency) and VHF (Very High Frequency) antennae at the Singaporean compound at RTA base in Sai Yok, but he believed "the VHF is predominantly listening to Thailand" within a radius of 100-150km. A priority target might be a military base such as the Ninth Division and its associated units at Kanchanaburi.
Ball presumed that Thai military data sent via the Thaicom-3 would be encrypted - "so that's not easy [to decode ] ... it depends on the level of encryption and the Singaporeans' ability to access this stuff.
"The Thaicom-3 satellite system carries a considerable amount of military and non-military [data] traffic. And in a sense, AIS and the mobile phone system is the same issue - it's the ability [of Singapore] to monitor the mobile phone traffic devices from that satellite."
Thailand's communications experts were "very switched on" and among the leaders in Southeast Asia, Ball said. "And Thaicom-3 is one of the most advanced in Asia.
"These guys know how your circuits flow better - probably better than anyone, other than the Singaporeans. They would have been aware of this [problem] from the start."
Among other things, the successful anti-satellite test conducted by China in January not only made people realise that satellites are both more vulnerable and indeed more valuable than previously thought, but also that interfering with satellite transmissions in any form needs to be taken very seriously. During this test, a Chinese weather satellite was successfully intercepted and destroyed by China while orbiting at an approximate altitude of 500 miles above the Earth.
"People are more concerned about interference with communications services, and this issue is a frequent topic at satellite industry meetings," Mr Rusch said.
"Generally, there is a belief that satellites in geostationary orbit (a satellite in geostationary orbit is stationed 22,300 miles above the Earth) are not vulnerable to attack from the Earth," he adds.
As for the importance of satellites when it comes to national security, nations in Asia appreciate and understand that satellites play a key role in everything from secure communications to remote surveillance. At press time, for example, Japan had just launched its fourth surveillance or spy satellite.
--If you're interested there is more below:
http://blog.reallyrocketscience.com/node/509
(Last one for today, this is not new but not common knowledge either IMHO)
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