Dear all,Assuming that new information deserves a new subject...

Dear all,

Assuming that new information deserves a new subject heading and at risk of a newcomer causing offence, I wish to break away from the all consuming T/O topic and introduce some new and relevant information as expressed in my reply to Rudders copied below.

Regards
Fairgopat
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Dear Rudders,

Re your "Still the same old endless takeover talk, ppl overanalyzing & coming up with every possible scenario & mathematical equation...." Yes I agree with you on this except that it seems you may have missed the new information on the prospectivity for UCG and shale gas in my recent post which I copy here for your information.

Regards
Fairgopat

Dear Yaqona and SeamFiend,

Thank you for those assessments on the worth of OIP to ESG and for your support and good wishes in exposing what amounts to fradulence against OIP shareholders in that proposed OIP/GGX merger.

In your assessments and in the report of the Independent Expert, Mulready Consulting Services Pty Ltd, the value of OIP's tenements was determined only on the basis of their prospectivity for coal bed methane gas. Their value based on their prospectivity for syngas from Underground Coal Gasification (UCG) and shale gas was not considered.

It is in the more marginal CBM coal seams like those held by OIP, some in JV with ESG, where UCG comes into its own. For whereas the extraction of methane gas from a coal seam recovers less than 2% of the stored energy in the seam, UCG extracts as much as 90% of the coal seam's energy. An added advantage is that UCG's environmental footprint is substantially less than that of CBM extraction.

So it may well be worth ESG acquiring OIP's coal assets for their potential as UCG projects... perhaps even shale gas projects too! (It is well to remember that as much as 40% of the domestic gas supply in the USA is from indigenous shale gas projects).

The unmerged OIP with $12.77 million in cash would be a far more attractive acquisition for ESG than a merged OIP with its cash reserves severly depleted through expenditures on GGX's cash-hungry tenements, two of which are overseas and one in the remote Canning Basin. Not to mention the merged OIP's swelled share capital and diluted equity from the addition of the GGX shareholders.

It follows that ESG's interests would be best served by voting its 23% holding in OIP against the OIP/GGX merger. It makes no sense for the ESG board to vote in favour of the merger, unless there are other undisclosed interests being served.

The critical underlying factor in this is whether OIP and ESG have the rights to UCG and shale gas on their extensive tenements. And if they don't possess those rights then why not? (UCG and shale gas are regulated under the NSW Mining Act and not, as with CBM and oil, under the Petroleum Act).

I hope this helps you understand, at least in part, where I am coming from. Thanks again for your support.