Russia Ukraine war, page-181384

From Suriyakmaps TG:
As we enter October, the rainy season is upon us and with it the end of the Ukrainian counteroffensive in the south. During the last days the Ukrainian attacks have considerably decreased and despite the fact that resources are still being allocated to these fronts the Ukrainian military capabilities to achieve a considerable advance and reach, no longer the Sea of Azov, but the second main Russian line of defense, are not enough.
Gradually the focus of attention will shift from the south to the east where the Russian army, as it did last year, is expected to resume offensive operations along this entire front, with the aim of controlling the rest of the Donbas outside its control.
One year after the annexation of these territories, the situation on the ground is still very different from the new maps. At present, the annexed oblasts are divided as follows:
- Luhansk:
UA: 330 sq Km (1,24%)
RuAF: 26354 sq Km (98,76%)
- Donetsk:
UA: 11217 sq Km (42,31 %)
RuAF: 15300 sq Km (57,69%)
- Zaporizhia:
UA: 6929 sq Km (25,49 %)
RuAF: 20254 sq Km (74,51%)
- Kherson:
UA: 7038 sq Km (24,73 %)
RuAF: 21423 sq Km (75,27%)

With this situation, Russia has not been able to take the territory it considers its own, even to this day the populations of the Donbas are still targeted by Ukrainian shelling. This has a negative impact on the image of Russia, which seems unable to achieve the objectives of the Special Military Operation. For reasons such as these the option of a major Russian offensive is more than necessary to turn the situation around and avoid a permanent freezing of the conflict.

In fact, the coming months would present an opportunity for the Russian side to initiate this offensive, as the failure of the Ukrainian counteroffensive will negatively affect the defensive capabilities of the Ukrainian army, which, in addition to facing quantitative losses during the battle of Bakhmut and the southern fronts, will also have to face a reduction in US military aid. Every day it seems clearer and clearer that Ukraine cannot win a long-term war, and even less so against a Russia that still retains large amounts of military resources, including those mobilized, a large part of which have not yet entered combat and are still being formed in the rear. In the coming months we may witness important changes in the course of a war that is approaching its second year.