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Beijing Olympics - Security

Overall Situation:

In preparation for the upcoming Beijing 2008 Olympics, the Beijing Government and The Beijing Organizing Committee for the Games of the 29th Olympiad (BOCOG) have the task of protecting 34 Olympic venues and associated properties scattered mainly throughout Beijing, as well as soccer stadiums in Tianjin, Shenyang, Qinhuangdao, and Shanghai, and sailing facilities in Qingdao.

Security:

BOCOG will be primarily responsible for Olympic security directly reporting to both the International Olympic Committee and to the highest levels of Chinese Government security personnel. BOCOG’s security department is divided into 4 divisions: General Office; Liaison Division; Venues Security Division; and, Intelligence and Anti-terrorist.

General Office: formulates the Olympic strategic security plan, coordinates with law enforcement authorities and agencies, and supervises the implementation of security plans.

Liaison Division: international communication of the Security Departments. The Liaison Department also reports to the International Olympic Committee.

Venues Security Division: drafts of Olympic venues and facilities construction security requirements.

Intelligence and Anti-terrorist Division- collects and analyzes security intelligence (domestic and international), and carries out Olympic security risk assessments.

National Plan:

The Olympics Security Personnel will be divided into three parts: headquarters, security managers and directors, and liaison officers.

Headquarters- the staff (which will assume office before 2006) will be in charge of managing Olympic Security headquarters and the Central Command Center (to be created in 2006).

Security Managers and Directors- will be in charge of overseeing Olympic venues (competition and non-competition) and other vital public facilities.

Liaison Officers- responsible for communicating between delegations of National Olympic Committees (NOC) and other stakeholders.


The Leading Group for Security Preparation for the 2008 Olympic Games will have a significant role in Olympic security. The Leading Group will be composed of officials from the Beijing Municipal Government, the Communist Party Committee, Beijing Public Security Bureau, Ministry of Public Security, and several other related agencies.

Funding for Olympic security will be divided primarily between the Beijing Municipal Government and BOCOG. BOCOG will provide funding for security planning and for the training of staff directly serving the games. BOCOG will also fund comprehensive security exercises and operational costs. The Beijing Government will provide funding for staff indirectly serving the Games and the general equipment necessary for security. BOCOG and the Beijing Government will work together, identify and coordinate the security budget.

Developments:

An Olympic security seminar, organized by the U.S. Embassy Beijing Regional Security Office, will be held from September 26-28, 2005. The title and focus of the seminar is “Olympic Security: International Cooperation and Lessons Learned.” There will be 50-60 participants in the seminar, split between American and Chinese Government officials, with some U.S. corporate sponsorship and seminar participants. The Chinese delegation will be composed of members from the Ministry of Public Security, Beijing Olympic Organizing Committee, Shanghai’s Expo Bureau, Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau, Peoples Armed Police, Beijing Municipal Government, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Health. The American delegation will include experts from various agencies with a variety of Olympic security expertise. Israeli, Greek, and Japanese security experts also participate in this event.

There will be four main topics discussed during the seminar: Potential Threats at the 2008 Olympic Games; Information/Intelligence Sharing; Venue Facility/Design Security (Hardened Facilities); and, Procedural Security (Soft Target Facilities).

For more information regarding this seminar, please contact the FCS Beijing: Matt Gettman ([email protected])

Procurement Opportunities:
Equipment, related-software or training support for:
Command control center,
Overall security systems integration, and
Individual Olympic venues.

U.S. Export Controls:

In April 2002, the Bureau of Export Administration changed its name to the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). The contact numbers remain the same, but the new website address is www.bis.doc.gov.

The Tiananmen Sanctions of 1990 are still in effect and sharply curtail U.S. exporter opportunities to sell crime control equipment to China's police agencies and defense electronics equipment to the Chinese military. The Tiananmen Sanctions prohibit the export of items listed on the U.S. Munitions List and crime controlled items listed in the Export Administration Regulations (EAR). These sanctions explicitly prohibit the exportation of crime control and crime detection instruments and equipment. These restrictions apply regardless of the end user in China. The sale of these items to third parties as a means of circumventing the Tiananmen Sanctions is also prohibited.

The United States Government's Enhanced Proliferation Control Initiative (EPCI), requires the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) and exporters to scrutinize end-users of U.S. exports of all kinds. This regulation requires a Validated License application if the exporter has "reason to know" that the end-users might be involved in missile, nuclear or chemical weapons proliferation. Periodically, both the State Department and U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) identify sensitive end-users and add them to the USDOC Entity List. For such identified firms, U.S. exports and U.S. origin re-exports require an individual validated license for virtually all shipments to these entities. Currently, nineteen Chinese companies appear on the Entity List, which can be viewed at the USDOC Bureau of Industry and Security website at www.bis.doc.gov.

On June 14, 2002, the BIS published the Unverified List. This is a list of companies where BIS was unable to conduct pre-license checks (PLCs) or post shipment verifications (PSVs) for reasons outside the control of the U.S. Government. The list notifies exporters that involvement of a listed person as a party to a proposed transaction constitutes a red flag as described in the guidance set forth in Supplement No. 3 to 15 CFR part 732 of the EAR. Under that guidance, the red flag requires heightened scrutiny by the exporter before proceeding with a transaction in which a listed person is a party. Currently, six Chinese companies are on the Unverified List. The Unverified List can be viewed on the BIS website at www.bis.doc.gov.

On January 3, 2005, the U.S. State Department published in the Federal Register sanctions against eight Chinese entities for violating the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. On January 24 and May 16, 2002, the U.S. State Department published in the Federal Register, sanctions against a total of 11 Chinese entities for violating the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000. These sanctions prohibit the sale of any item on the U.S. Munitions List, defense articles, defense services, or design and construction services controlled under the Arms Export Control Act to the listed entities. They also require a denial of new licenses and the suspension of existing licenses for the sale items controlled under the Export Administration Act (EAA) or the EAR to the listed entities. A list of the sanctioned entities can be found in the federal register publications.

On May 23, 2003, the U.S. State Department published in the federal register sanctions against the North China Industries Corporation (NORINCO) for engaging in missile technology proliferation activities that required the imposition of measures under Executive Order 12938, as amended by Executive Order 13094 (Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction). This sanction prohibits the importation into the United Sates of any goods, technology, or services, produced or provided by this entity, its subunits, and successors, other than information or information materials as defined in the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). The sanction also prohibits the export of defense articles and services from the United States and of United States origin defense articles and services from foreign to this entity, its subunits, and successors. The sanction is in effect for two years.

A law passed by Congress in late 1997 requires that the U.S. government conduct Post Shipment Verification visits (PSVs) on all High Performance Computers (HPC) shipped to one of 50 countries including China. As of March 8, 2002, the definition of a HPC with respect to China is any computer with a MTOPS (million theoretical operations per second) level of 190,000 or greater. There is a USDOC requirement that a MOFCOM issued end-user certificate (EUC) must be obtained by the exporter before the computer is shipped to China. Ordinarily the computer importer or re-seller in China applies for this document and passes it to the exporter. For information on this regulation see the BIS web page at www.bis.doc.gov/HPCs .

USDOC Dual-Use Export Applications: A USDOC dual-use export license application that does not present to the USDOC reviewers serious Chinese end-user concerns is usually approved by the USDOC in about one week. In the case of a Pre-License Check (PLC) requirement, USDOC requests permission from the Chinese Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) for a Commercial Officer from the U.S. Embassy to visit the site of an end-user to determine the bona fides of the end-user for the actual end-use of the product. This must be done before USDOC will act further on the export license application. The amount of time needed to complete the entire PLC process is usually two to three months. If the U.S. government is not permitted to conduct a PLC by the Chinese government, an export license may not be issued.

In April 2004, BIS reached an agreement with MOFCOM regarding end-use visits. Such visits, which include PLCs and PSVs, help ensure that U.S. exports of controlled dual-use items are being used by their intended recipients for their intended purposes. The End Use Visit Agreement provides a framework for timely and transparent processing of PLCs/PSVs, which will facilitate licensing determinations.

If an exporter needs information on the regulations relating to the sale of its goods to China, they can request an advisory opinion from BIS. The advisory opinion will supply the exporter with a commodity classification and any restrictions on the export of that item to China. For more information about advisory opinions or U.S. dual-use export controls, exporters should view the BIS website at www.bis.doc.gov or contact:

BIS Exporter Services Division
Washington, D.C. Tel: 202-482-4811 Fax: 202-482-3322
Western Regional Office Tel: 949-660-0144 Fax: 949-660-9347

U.S. Embassy-Beijing, Commercial Section
Jeannette Chu, BIS Officer Tel: (86-10) 8529-6655 x810 Fax: (86-10) 8529-6558
[email protected]

The U.S. State Department’s Office of Defense Trade Controls, under the Arms Export Control Act and the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), controls the export of items listed on the U.S. Munitions List, including satellites and related technology. For information on State Department export licensing procedures see the relevant State Dept website of the Office of Defense Trade Controls at http://www.pmdtc.org. A point of contact for State Department Licensing business advocacy matters at the State Dept is David Nobles, Tel. 202-647-1817. In the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, the point of contact for State Dept. Licensing matters is the Economic Section, Tel: 86-10-6532-3431, Fax 86-10-6532-6422.

Contacts:

1. Beijing Municipal Government
http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Government/default.htm

2. Beijing Municipal Public Security Bureau
Email: [email protected]
Address: No. 9, Qianmen Dongdajie, Dongcheng District, Beijing
Postcode: 100740
http://www.ebeijing.gov.cn/Government/Organizations/t20030924_1528.htm


3. BOCOG Security Department
(8610) 6404 4151
[email protected]

4. Bob Eckert ([email protected]), U.S. Embassy,
Beijing Regional Security Officer

5. Jeanette Chu, Bureau of Industry and Security Attaché, U.S. Embassy, Beijing,
for export control issues, [email protected]

6. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, www.bis.doc.gov

7. Matthew Gettman, FCS Beijing, U.S. Embassy Beijing,
for Olympics business opportunities, [email protected]