Saturday, 07-11-2020 06:25:56 PM Aden time



South 24 | Sana'a
The Riyadh Agreement, signed a year ago, failed in nearly every aspect of its implementation. As his promises to act as a unifying force in Yemen continued to fade in the past, a de facto partition of the country began to loom forever.

As the name suggests, the agreement was designed with Saudi Arabia. Through it, the Kingdom sought to assume absolute power over the Yemeni forces facing the armed Houthi movement - which seized the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, and a large part of the north of the country five years ago - to fix the violent confrontations between those parties that were undermining the fight against its common enemy, the Houthi.

The agreement stipulated that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would become the sponsor of the Southern Transitional Council, and assume leadership from the United Arab Emirates, where Abu Dhabi withdrew its military participation in Yemen, and dissolved the Southern Transitional Council in the internationally recognized Yemeni government. Fighters affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council had expelled the Yemeni government from its temporary capital, Aden, in August 2019, and in exchange for relinquishing control of the city and joining their armed forces with the Yemeni government’s military and security services, figures from the Transitional Council were to receive ministerial positions, including positions Other political and security matters, and to be represented in any future government delegation to participate in peace talks supported by the United Nations to end the wider war.

The political and military provisions of the agreement were to begin implementation immediately and be completed within three months - an absurdly ambitious timetable for integrating arch rivals into a unified body. Every implementation deadline was missed. Sporadic Saudi efforts to revive the pact since then, including throughout October, have seen much talk and speculation with few results.

"The Southern Transitional Council remains the de facto authority in the largest city in southern Yemen and the neighboring governorates."

Various factors have helped impede the implementation of the agreement, including intense hostility between the implementing parties, lack of technical details related to implementation, and a slow Saudi decision-making process in responding to the changing conditions on the ground. However, one of the factors behind many other factors is the fundamental disagreement over the hierarchy of political and military aspects of the agreement: The Southern Transitional Council wants to secure its political position before relinquishing its military advantage in parts of southern Yemen, while Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi wants integration Military and security forces before they give up any political authority. The two parties at various times pretended to compromise while avoiding concessions that would purposefully affect their points of influence against the other.

The stalemate itself in 2016 was a major factor responsible for the failure of the UN-backed peace talks between the Hadi government and the armed Houthi movement, as well as the peace initiative that then US Secretary of State John Kerry had embraced. Hadi insisted that the political dimensions of the post-conflict government would not be decided before Houthi forces surrender their heavy weapons and withdraw from the areas they controlled, while the Houthis refused to give up their military influence until securing their place in the post-conflict government.

In the years that followed, and without a broader political agreement, the Houthis' military influence provided space to entrench themselves and create their political reality in the area they control. Today, it is clear that they are building the features of the state on their image in North Yemen.

"It is likely that the continued decline of the Yemeni government in the coming months and years will lead to a further de facto division of the country, while preserving only one Yemeni state with a legal identity."

Likewise, the failure to implement the Riyadh Agreement created a space for the Southern Transitional Council to take advantage of its military control over Aden and the neighboring governorates to try to create conditions to realize its ambitions for the secession of southern Yemen. These efforts saw the Council declare its self-rule in southern Yemen in April, and then, in direct violation of the Riyadh Agreement, it took targeted steps towards establishing an independent financial basis, by redirecting state revenues in the areas it controls - such as the port of Aden - to His newly established quasi-governmental financial institution.

It is almost certain that the historical differences between the south and regional identities prevent the Southern Transitional Council from extending its control in southern Yemen to the governorates east of Aden, and Riyadh was able in the end to pressure the Southern Transitional Council to withdraw from declaring self-rule. Nevertheless, the Southern Transitional Council remains the de facto authority in the largest city in southern Yemen and neighboring governorates such as Lahj and Al Dhale'e, and on the current tracks, its continued political entrenchment in these areas appears possible. Meanwhile, the Yemeni government - after its ouster from the country's capital and its temporary capital - is facing increasing pressure from Houthi forces in Marib, its most important remaining stronghold.

The continued retreat of the Yemeni government from its association with Yemen in the coming months and years is likely to lead to a more de-facto and patchy division of the country, while preserving only one Yemeni state with a legal identity, a situation similar to Somalia. Although the Riyadh Agreement is deeply flawed, it is likely the best, and possibly last, viable option to reverse this course.
The original source in English: Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Treatment for Arabic: SOUTH 24 for News and Studies