''It was stupid to pause and fist bump the air in an active shooting.''
whilst we can value judge if it was stupid or not - IMO, there is a bigger lesson from the event.
Assuming that all was as was seen was mostly all there was to it - his reaction had 2 potential causes
1. (perhaps, least likely) - that he had trained for the moment, dreamed of it and practiced it - for political or fame gain (if he survived well enough to stand)
2. (more likely) - that his reaction was purely instinctive
If it were instinctive - then that gives a strong pointer to how he may react as Commander in Chief (CIC)if attacked - or 'perceived to be attacked'
his instinctive reaction will be to 'fight fight' - and perhaps react with little thought or no thought at all in 'measured response'
As CIC and with a strong record of not listening all that much to advisers (at least in quick time) ----- what does that mean for a person who has a mechanism in their power to launch major attacks with nuclear weapons?
Do we see a person like that being similar in character to the people who in the past with 'near misses' on launching nuclear weapons or do we see someone who is likely to just fire off instantly in an instinctive lash out?
- **5 November 1956**: During the Suez Crisis, a series of misinterpreted events led U.S. forces to believe a Soviet offensive was underway, which could have triggered a NATO nuclear strike. The perceived threat was due to a combination of unrelated incidents, including a wedge of swans mistaken for aircraft and a British bomber downed by mechanical issues[1].
### 1980s
- **1983**: Soviet early warning satellites misinterpreted sunlight reflections as incoming U.S. missiles. The officer on duty, Stanislav Petrov, judged it to be a false alarm and did not report it as an attack, preventing a potential retaliatory strike[3].
### 1990s - **25 January 1995**: Norwegian scientists launched a rocket for atmospheric research, which was mistaken by Russian radar as a potential U.S. missile attack. Russian President Boris Yeltsin was handed the nuclear briefcase but decided against launching a retaliatory strike after determining it was not a threat[4].
