sidney jones: "the hardliners are called thoifah m

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    TRACKING down terrorist networks in Indonesia is nothing new to Sydney Jones, director of the International Crisis Group in Indonesia. She released a paper titled, "Al Qaeda in Southeast Asia: the Case of the Ngruki Network in Indonesia", in August 2002, two months before bombs devastated Legian, on the Island of Bali. Then she researched and came up with a report (in Indonesian) "Terror Networks in Indonesia: How Jamaah Islamiyah Operates". Just two weeks before the second Bali bombing occurred, Sydney had just completed, "The Changing Face of Terrorism in Indonesia", a six-page research paper commissioned by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute


    In her paper, Sydney, 53, expounds on the emergence of a new generation of
    terrorists called Thoifah Muqatilah, recruited and trained by Jamaah Islamiyah
    (JI) top figures like Noordin M. Top, Azahari and Zulkarnaen.

    Sydney's views on JI are indeed controversial. Many believe her, but others
    are critical of her conclusions. Last year she was expelled from Indonesia,
    reportedly for leaking state secrets. But a few months later, she was allowed
    back in Indonesia.

    On Wednesday, two weeks ago, Sydney shared her views with journalists at the
    Tempo office on topics such as the second Bali bombing and the Jamaah
    Islamiyah movement. Excerpts:

    What is the status of terrorist networks in Indonesia today?

    Jamaah Islamiyah is far weaker today than three years ago. There used to be
    four Mantiqis. Mantiqi I in Malaysia and Singapore is almost destroyed. The
    leadership of Mantiqi III, covering Sulawesi and around East Kalimantan, has
    broken up, although there are still members in Poso, Central Sulawesi and
    Mindanao, southern Philippines. It is also possible that Mantiqi IV in Australia may
    no longer exist. Meanwhile, Mantiqi II (Sumatra and Java), which represents the
    majority of Jamaah Islamiyah, is seriously split.

    How serious is the split?

    Many JI members actually reject bombings. They see people like Hambali and
    his followers as deviating from JI's true objectives. They regard all bombings,
    from those that were exploded on Christmas Eve a few years back to the recent
    one in Bali a few weeks ago, as having destroyed the organization. The
    anti-Hambali people criticize Abu Bakar Ba'asyir because he seems reluctant to punish
    Hambali. But there are others who disagree with this viewpoint. One group
    rejects the bombings but is reluctant to bring in the perpetrators to the police.
    Another group thinks it's time to destroy the organization and then report
    them to the police. (Abu Bakar Ba'asyir has repeatedly denied his role in any
    terrorist activity. "I am always linked to many case, including the Bali
    bombing," he said. He said his relations with Hambali, who used to be his neighbor at
    Sungai Manggis in Malaysia, only involved missionary activities-Ed.)

    When did the split begin?

    Since 1999, there were already differences of opinion between Hambali and
    people who preferred structure. They regarded Hambali as acting beyond their
    objectives.

    What is the position of the hardliners within this organization?

    That's what we don't know for sure, whether they have officially quit or
    whether they have remained as a very militant wing.

    You mentioned the emergence of a new generation. Who are they?

    Three or four months ago, one of the very radical groups returned to the
    fore. I understand they call themselves Thoifah Muqatilah. They are trying to
    re-establish the Laskar Khos, which had broken up because many of them were
    arrested. Their existence is to form the suicide bombers brigade. There were
    indications that a few months ago, they were already planning a number of operations.
    But I don't know where and who they all are. According to Nassir Abbas (head
    of Mantiqi III-Ed.), the name Thoifah Muqatilah has been around since the
    first Bali bombing

    What is the role of Azahari and Noordin in this new organization?

    We don't know for sure. They can either be the founders or the leaders. We
    think Zulkarnaen, who used to be the JI military commander, is recruiting young
    men to join Thoifah. Their concept is still unclear. What is certain, this
    group exists and they are involved.

    Are they really the new generation?

    That could be the case, if we consider Noordin and Azahari as the first
    generation of JI. The new recruits are considered as the second generation because
    they are much younger. They study at JI schools or pesantren (Islamic boarding
    schools), around 18 of them. One is an important university in Solo, Central
    Java. When they want to contact each other, they get in touch with someone at
    the university, which is also the JI headquarters in Central Java. This place
    is really important because it is mentioned in the investigation records (of
    those arrested-Ed.)

    Where are these 18 schools located?

    Most of them are in Java and Lombok. Some are in Lampung and on the border
    between Aceh and North Sumatra.

    How exactly are these schools involved?

    We notice that the children of JI leaders are sent to these schools. There,
    the best graduates are selected to take part in a special work program for
    about a year. Out of a school with 30 students, two or three would be invited. As
    members of the JI organization, they are paid and receive proper JI
    supervision and training. Their fate in five years' time will depend on the situation in
    Indonesia and the world, and the emergence of local political parties.

    Would they be considered hardline JI or moderates?

    They can be both. They usually enter through involvement in missionary
    programs, but their aim is still to establish an Islamic state, albeit not all
    resort to criminal activities.

    Do the second Bali bombers come from this Thoifah Muqatilah?

    They are possibly members of Thoifah but we don't know for sure. We know that
    their activities tend to lead towards some kind of operation, but where and
    when we can never tell. If there were indications that it would happen in Bali,
    the embassies would have issued travel warnings. But this time, there were no
    warnings at all. We will have to wait for what the police investigation
    uncovers.

    Were there signs that the second Bali bombing was the work of Azahari and
    Noordin?

    Suspicion certainly points at Noordin, Azahari and other groups. I can't tell
    for sure whether this is the group from Banten or from other areas. But I
    would be very surprised if it turns out that they were players outside of this
    group of jihadists.
    There is an impression that the second Bali bombing was not a focused
    operation.

    Unlike the first Bali bombing, most of the targets were not expatriates.

    It's possible they came to Bali with little time to do any kind of survey. My
    guess is that their targets in Bali would always comprise some expatriates
    victims. That's why people say this second Bali bombing is not as devastating as
    the Kuningan bomb. Not sensational enough.

    Why was the method different? For example, they didn't use cars.

    They calculated that car bombs were easily traced by forensic experts. At
    Tentena (Central Sulawesi-Ed.), they didn't use a car bomb, and till today we
    don't know who did it.

    Are there links between terrorists in Indonesia and those overseas, like in
    London?

    I don't see any links. What happened in London, UK last July, was that they
    succeeded in making that country tremble. I think they want to do the same in
    Bali, that is by using backpacks and going inside restaurants. But I doubt
    there are any direct links. What happened in Indonesia was 100 percent independent.

    How are their relations with Al Qaeda?

    I don't think there are links with Indonesia. I think it would be a mistake
    to look at JI as Al Qaeda in Asia. There might have been close links when
    Hambali was active and used to go back and forth between Indonesia, Malaysia,
    Pakistan and Afghanistan.

    At that time there were Al Qaeda people who came to Indonesia. But that was
    two years ago.

    What about their sources of funding?

    For their everyday activities, they get their funds from their members' dues.
    They also get contributions from sympathetic corporations. Meanwhile, for
    each bombing operation, there seems to be a huge amount of funds from outside. We
    know that for the first Bali bombing, about US$35,000 may have come from Al
    Qaeda. Before the Marriott bombing, some A$10,000 was suddenly deposited in
    their accounts. Even so, this doesn't mean the money came from Australia. Money
    can be moved in any currency. For the Kuningan bombing, the amount I heard was
    A$9,700 in cash. With regards to the latest case, investigations indicate that
    the funding was much lower and that was a total of US$700.

    Back to the anti-Hambali faction. Who are they?

    This group is not necessarily a benign bunch. Their goal is an Islamic state
    in Indonesia, but it needs to be built from a secure base, a qoidah aminah
    where Islamic law can be fully applied. Not only is there not yet any such place
    in Indonesia, but if there were, JI leaders believe it would encounter
    resistance from the Indonesian government or from non-Muslims. They thus believe they
    have to acquire the military capacity to protect themselves in the short
    term, as well as to eventually take on the Indonesian state 25 or 30 years down
    the road.

    At this point, have they joined any formal organization or political party?

    They previously wanted to make Poso as the first wing block to expand their
    influence. But they have not achieved this yet.

    So till now they have been using JI?

    There are groups other than JI in Indonesia. There is the Banten ring, a part
    of the KW 9 (Kartosuwiryo, conceiver of the Indonesian Islamic State
    concept-Ed.), a splinter group of the Darul Islam.

    What's the role of this Banten ring?

    There are at least two or three KW 9 splinter groups. One of them is Abu
    Totok. I can't see a clear connection between the Abu Totok group or Panji
    Gumilang (leader of the Al-Zaytun pesantren at Indramayu, West Java) and other
    terrorist groups. Maybe sooner or later they will meet, but it's not happening yet.
    The role of the Banten ring emerged after the name Iqbal was identified as one
    of the perpetrators of the first Bali bombing. (Panji Gumilang, in an
    interview with Tempo a few years back, denied he or his pesantren was involved in
    violent activities-Ed.)

    What about the Kuningan bombing?

    The Kuningan bombing was clearly the act of Rois alias Iwan Darmawan from
    Bandung and his friends. They are all members of the Banten ring, which met the
    JI at Poso. Some Banten people got to know JI through Imam Samudra. There
    relations became closer at the JI training camp in Poso. I obtained information
    that when Azahari needed people to bomb Kuningan, he came to one of the JI
    members. He was introduced to Rois, whom they met at Poso (Tempo sources also
    mention Azahari as knowing Rois since the training days in the Philippines, in
    1997-Ed.).

    Are there really new groups?

    Yes. A number of different groups have emerged from the DI, JI and perhaps
    remnants of the Laskar Jundullah at Poso and Makassar. This does not include
    regional groups like the Mujahidin Kayamanya, or groups in Ambon. Their numbers
    are small. How they are interlinked is not easy to explain. For example,
    members of the Mujahidin Kayamanya, which took its name from a village in Poso, took
    part in the attack at Seram last May. They came from Solo. I see the
    involvement of an NGO here, but I must keep its name off the record. When the Ambon
    conflict broke out, this NGO helped to disburse funds for the training of
    mujahidin by JI instructors. Later they became the go-betweens in a complicated
    structure between the JI, Darul Islam and other groups.

    How does this network operate?

    When they plan operations, they can use personal contact through this NGO
    member, without going through organizations. For example, if according to Noordin
    and Zahari, the Thoifah Muqatilah members need training, they could do it
    elsewhere.

    What about the Sumatra group?

    We don't have enough information on the structure of groups over here. In
    Serang, for example, of the eight people involved in the attack, there was a
    member of the Riau DI. The problem is that in Riau, one can find the DI and the JI
    as well, so it is unclear to which organization they should be affiliated to.
    Lampung remains the JI base in Sumatra. But there are cells there too.
    Meanwhile in Bengkulu, there is a Ngruki graduate who is building a foundation there.
 
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