Ok thanks Noomxx. I was hoping you might have a list of the...

Ok thanks Noomxx.
I was hoping you might have a list of the properties they own or some extra work done on the asset value mainly because they are selling their best assets and the December update reflected 0.7% of their assets.
The playbook in this scenario is to writedown assets you are looking to sell and then sell them and then claim you sold them at BV. A nice sleight of hand.

Have you had a look at the properties they do have to split out? I just had a quick glance at the three properties they do disclose in the 1H result (5% of total assets) and compared it with the FY19 result.
A few very unusual things immediately jump out:
1. Why did they change from using JLL to a no-name real estate broker to value these?
2. Why did the valuer decide to increase market rents by 40% per square foot (!!!) compared with the previous valuer (JLL). Particularly with Covid occurring!
3. Why did the discount rate decline by nearly half in performing the valuation?
4. Despite these shenanigans, the value of these assets were still written down 10.2% in June!!
4. Furthermore, these assets themselves within the structure are amazingly geared (Debt to Equity) at 127%!! So the headline metrics we look at actually don't capture all the debt!! I.e. It is even more geared than I thought once you incorporate this additional gearing.
5. URF owns ~65% of these assets but has no rights to influence or direct the owner of the asset??! WTF! Can you imagine owning 65% and having no influence whether they are sold, renovated or rented out.


I'm surprised you would have such a large swing at this without doing more work on the underlying assets, particularly given the accounting value has been proven to be illusory so far.