On North Korea, reality would favour your views. See, for example, the EIU Riskwire analysis (prepared by Stratfor, 7 March 2003) that I have copied, below (end of post). It supports the contention that bi-lateral dialogue between North Korea and the United States has already commenced.
On treating the Taliban and al-Qaida as war criminals, the degree of association may well be difficult to achieve, but this is also one of the main reasons why the United States has denied them Geneva Convention status. Once afforded that status, they can be treated and tried as war criminals. But, the difficult legal argument now going on in the States questions whether they should be tried as war criminals, as domestic criminals (albeit under various articles of terrorism), as mass murderers, or for crimes against humanity. For the time being, however, they continue to remain in legal limbo and de-camped in Camp X-Ray.
Hi Croupier,
One of the original tenets of the UN system, when first conceived was to create a global military force under the direct command of the UNSC. This, however, has not come to pass although Art 43 -48 (43, 45 and 46, being the most significant) were originally intended to act in this way. Unfortunately, by having no forces of its own, the UNSC must act through the conduct of its member states (ie: Coalition air forces enforcing the Northern and South no-fly zones, for instance, pursuant (presumaby) to Art.45, and in support of various UNSC resolutions concerning Iraq over the years.
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Article 43 1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Council,on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace and security.
2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the numbers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as possible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be concluded between the Security Council and Members or between the Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to ratification by the signatory states in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.
Article 45 In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military measures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force contingents for combined international enforcement action. The strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for their combined action shall be determined within the limits laid down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43, by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
Article 46 Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.
------------------------------------------------------ EIU RISKWIRE ARTICLE FROM STRATFOR (7 MARCH 2003):
World: Risk: Alert
07 Mar 2003
Alert - North Korea, US work behind scenes on compromise COUNTRY BRIEFING
FROM STRATFOR
North Korean and U.S. representatives met in Berlin on Feb. 20 and 21 to discuss North Korea's uranium enrichment program, German Foreign Ministry sources have confirmed. Another round of talks is set for mid- to late March, according to Russian Foreign Intelligence Service sources. The behind-the-scenes talks belie the public bluster from both sides and may signal a breakthrough in the nuclear standoff within months.
Analysis
Four Americans met with North Korean representatives at the North Korean embassy in Berlin on Feb. 20 and 21, German Foreign Ministry sources have confirmed to Stratfor. News of the meeting was leaked to Japan's Asahi Shimbun, which published it March 6. According to the initial report, the U.S. delegation included a former U.S. government official, a scientist from a public research center and a nuclear expert. The fourth member cited by German sources was likely an interpreter.
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service sources also confirmed the meeting and said another was planned for mid- to late March. North Korea was represented by an officer from the Atomic Energy Department, a Foreign Ministry official and two Berlin embassy employees, according to media reports. The secret meetings belie the public posturing by both nations and may signal a resolution to the nuclear standoff within months.
According to the Asahi Shimbun, the two sides discussed ways to verify that Pyongyang had abandoned its uranium enrichment nuclear program. Washington suggested international inspectors, such as those from the International Atomic Energy Agency, but the North Koreans stood fast, saying only U.S. inspectors were necessary. The debate mirrors the public standing of both nations, with the United States pressing for a multilateral solution and Pyongyang calling for a bilateral resolution to the building crisis.
While Japanese and South Korean media said little progress was made during the talks, Russian sources suggest otherwise. They tell Stratfor that both sides looked much more "agreeable" than their public postures. Following the talks, the American delegates briefed U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, while officials from Pyongyang briefed Russia on the talks. It is likely that Powell shared knowledge of the talks with Chinese, South Korean and Japanese leaders during his late February visit to Northeast Asia.
While the United States is deploying long-range bombers to Guam and North Korea is reportedly planning a test of its No Dong intermediate-range ballistic missile, the two sides are engaged in a secret dialogue to settle the crisis. And it appears there is some progress. Powell mentioned a continuation of U.S. food aid to North Korea during his visit to South Korea, and a British member of the European parliament, who visited North Korea between Feb. 22 and March 1, said Pyongyang had promised to study a European proposal to hold seven-party talks -- which would include both Koreas, the United States, China, Russia, Japan and the European Union.
For both sides, there is a psychological deadline for the conclusion of the nuclear crisis -- the July 27 anniversary of the 1953 Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War. While there is little strategic relevance to that date, its symbolism is quite clear. Both sides now appear to be pressing toward a resolution. North Korea fomented the crisis only to extract a security guarantee from the United States and has little interest in seeing things escalate beyond the posturing stage. Washington has little desire to test its claims of being capable of waging two simultaneous regional wars.
But as the talks progress, they will remain largely secret: Washington wants to avoid setting a precedent that any nation with nuclear weapons can wear down U.S. resolve and force its own solution on the United States. Nonetheless, Russian sources foresee the United States acquiescing to Pyongyang's calls for unilateral U.S. inspections of North Korean nuclear facilities. And Russia contends the uranium program is already shut down -- something North Korea has said all along, admitting only to having the "right" to have such a program, not the existence of an active program.
Copyright (c) 2003 Strategic Forecasting LLC. All rights reserved.
